United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez

• Decision Date: 26 April 2022
• Docket Number: 22-3001
• Citation: 32 F.4th 607
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel ESTRADA-GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

32 F.4th 607

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Manuel ESTRADA-GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-3001

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: April 26, 2022

ON BRIEF: Christian J. Grostic, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Rebecca Chattin Lutzko. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: ROGERS, KETHLEDGE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Suppose a prosecutor told a district court that "a sentence at the top of a defendant's guidelines range was at least appropriate under the relevant sentencing factors, if not required by them." The court would likely understand the prosecutor to be arguing that such a sentence was legally permissible and perhaps even legally compelled. Now suppose that the prosecutor told the court that "a sentence at least at the top of the defendant's guidelines range was appropriate." The court would likely take the prosecutor to be arguing that such a sentence was the minimally acceptable one and that an above-guidelines sentence might also be justified.

This case requires us to consider which of these two ideas the prosecutor conveyed during Manuel Estrada-Gonzalez's sentencing for illegally reentering the country. Estrada-Gonzalez claims that the prosecutor impliedly recommended an above-guidelines sentence by stating that a sentence at the "high end of the sentencing guideline range would be at the least appropriate in this case." Sent. Tr., R.29, PageID 140. He thus argues that the prosecutor breached the parties' plea agreement, which barred her from "suggest[ing] in any way" that the court should vary above the guidelines range. Agreement, R.16, PageID 67. Yet the district court that heard this ambiguous statement in real time rejected Estrada-Gonzalez's reading of it, finding instead that the prosecutor had been advocating only "for a sentence at the high range of the guidelines." Sent. Tr., R.29, PageID 146. And while our precedent instructs us to review the ultimate question whether a prosecutor's conduct breached a plea agreement de novo, see United States v. Warren , 8 F.4th 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2021), we clarify in this case that we must review any subsidiary findings about the historical facts under the deferential clear-error standard. What the prosecutor expressed with her statement is that type of fact question. Because the district court did not clearly err in its resolution of the question, the government did not breach the plea agreement. We thus affirm.

I

Born and raised in Guatemala, Estrada-Gonzalez first entered the United States as a teenager with his father. In December 2001, shortly after a Missouri court convicted a then-adult Estrada-Gonzalez of forgery, the government removed him to Guatemala. Twenty years later, Estrada-Gonzalez came to the attention of the authorities in northeast Ohio when the mother of his longstanding girlfriend called the police on him. According to police reports, Estrada-Gonzalez's girlfriend told the officers who arrived on the scene that he had gotten intoxicated and threatened to kill her (as he had done frequently in the past). The reports noted further that Estrada-Gonzalez had possessed a machete while making these threats. He had fled the scene when the officers arrived, but they successfully arrested him on domestic-violence charges and seized the machete.

The federal government soon indicted Estrada-Gonzalez for illegally reentering the United States following his earlier deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He pleaded guilty to this reentry crime. In the plea agreement, Estrada-Gonzalez and the government both agreed to recommend that the district court impose a sentence within the applicable guidelines range. The agreement added: "Neither party will recommend or suggest in any way that a departure or variance is appropriate, either regarding the sentencing range or regarding the kind of sentence." Agreement, R.16, PageID 67.

At the start of the sentencing hearing, though, the district court told the parties that it was contemplating an upward variance from Estrada-Gonzalez's guidelines range. The court and the parties agreed that Estrada-Gonzalez faced a guidelines range of 6 to 12 months' imprisonment. But the court then expressed concern with the claims in the police reports, describing how they suggested that Estrada-Gonzalez had threatened to kill his girlfriend and burn their house down with their children in it.

Following its summary of the reports, the court asked for the government's position on the proper sentence. The prosecutor pointed out that the state had dismissed Estrada-Gonzalez's domestic-violence charges because the federal government had taken custody of him. Sent. Tr., R.29, PageID 138. She next played a portion of an officer's body-camera footage from the night of Estrada-Gonzalez's arrest to give the court a "clear understanding" of what had happened and to show the "present sense impressions of" those involved. Id. , PageID 139–40. After airing the video, the prosecutor noted that a sentence at the top of the guidelines range "would be at the least appropriate":

I realize that the statutory maximum is 20 years based on his prior forgery conviction from Missouri in 2001 prior to being deported. However, with the sentencing guideline range, it is between 6 to 12 months, I do realize he has since served seven months and four days incarcerated on this case, but based off the circumstances, and clearly I would echo [the court's] sentiments in regards to the safety of not only the wife, the children, as well as the mother and her boyfriend, who reside in the house, certainly a high end of the sentencing guideline range would be at the least appropriate in this case.

Id. , PageID 140.

Ultimately, the court chose to vary upward from Estrada-Gonzalez's guidelines range. It relied primarily on Estrada-Gonzalez's history of threatening violence against his family. Finding Estrada-Gonzalez's conduct "deeply troubling," the court opined that this conduct made his case stand out from the typical illegal-reentry case. Id. , PageID 143–44. The court thus chose an 18-month term of imprisonment, one that was six months above the top end of Estrada-Gonzalez's guidelines range.

The court ended the hearing by asking the parties whether they had any final objections. See United States v. Bostic , 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004). Defense counsel argued that the government had violated the plea agreement by advocating for a sentence "at least at the high end of the guidelines range[.]" Sent. Tr., R.29, PageID 146. This argument, counsel suggested, implied that an above-guidelines sentence might be appropriate. Id. But the plea agreement barred the government from suggesting "in any way" that the court should vary above the guidelines range. Id.

The district court overruled the objection. The court "did not interpret [the prosecutor's] statement to mean anything other than the government's lawyer is asking for a sentence at the high range of the guidelines." Id. It found that defense counsel was "misstating or misconstruing" the statement. Id. The prosecutor then made "clear" that she had been advocating for a sentence at the top of the guidelines range, not above it. Id. , PageID 147.

II

Estrada-Gonzalez renews his argument that the government breached the plea agreement by impliedly advocating for an above-guidelines sentence. The ground rules for this argument are well established. Our plea-agreement precedent blends a mix of contract principles with a mix of constitutional ones. Like any agreement with consideration on both sides, a plea agreement is "essentially" a contract between the defendant and the government. Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 137, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) ; see, e.g. , Warren , 8 F.4th at 448 ; United States v. Ligon , 937 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2019) ; United States v. Lukse , 286 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2002). Courts thus have looked to the common law of contracts to help resolve such issues as whether a plea agreement contained a particular term, see United States v. Robison , 924 F.2d 612, 613–14 (6th Cir. 1991), or whether the government's breach of the agreement voided it, see Puckett , 556 U.S. at 137, 129 S.Ct. 1423.

Unlike an ordinary agreement, however, a plea agreement implicates the constitutional protections for criminal defendants in our Bill of Rights. See Mabry v. Johnson , 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984) ; United States v. Barnes , 278 F.3d 644, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2002). Because a defendant who pleads guilty waives such things as the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the Constitution (not just the contract) requires the government to live up to the promises that it uses to induce the defendant to waive these rights. See Barnes , 278 F.3d at 647–48 ; see also Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257, 262–63, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) ; cf. Philip Hamburger, Purchasing Submission: Conditions, Power, and Freedom 44–45, 167 (2021). Federal courts thus have not treated plea agreements as purely state-law creatures subject solely to state-law contract rules. They have instead developed a body of federal principles to guide the interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements. See United States v. Herrera , 928 F.2d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 1991).

How do these federal principles apply to the parties' disagreement in this case? Clarifying where their disagreement sits within our caselaw goes a long way toward clarifying its proper resolution. In some of our cases, the defendant and the government have disagreed over whether they entered into a plea agreement at all (e.g., they dispute whether they reached an oral contract) or whether the agreement contained a particular term (e.g., they dispute whether the government agreed not to take a position on the appropriate sentence). See, e.g. , Ramos v. Rogers , 170 F.3d...