United States v. Exide Corporation, CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-CV-3057 (E.D. Pa. 2/27/2002)
| Decision Date | 27 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-CV-3057. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. EXIDE CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff, the United States of America (the "United States") brings this action against Defendant Exide Corporation ("Exide") alleging that under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., Exide is liable for costs incurred by the United States in response to the release of hazardous substances at the Hamburg Lead Superfund Site in Berks County, Pennsylvania. The United States also seeks a declaratory judgment under § 113(g)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), that Exide is liable for any future response costs or damages. Presently before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c). For the reasons stated below, the United States' motion is granted.
From the 1940s until approximately February 11, 1966, Price Battery Corporation ("Price") operated a lead-acid battery manufacturing plant in Hamburg, Pennsylvania ("the Hamburg Plant" or "the plant"). As a matter of course, Price reused the lead plates from old batteries in the process of creating new batteries. Until the early 1960s, Price employees brought used batteries back to the Hamburg Plant, split them open, and re-used the lead plates in the plant's smelter. The junk battery casings, each often containing a paste of lead residue, were not re-used. Price employees dumped these battery casings at various locations in and around Hamburg. Price also made these battery casings available for members of the community to pick up for themselves and use as landfill. During this time until 1961, Price also contracted with Blue Mountain Coal Company ("Blue Mountain") to crush the junk battery casings with a bulldozer after they were dumped in and around Hamburg, and to dump slag (waste leftover from the smelting operations) at the same locations. At least one Blue Mountain truck driver saw pieces of lead in the slag.
Beginning in the early 1960s, Price altered its method of acquiring the lead plates for re-use. Instead of breaking the junk batteries itself, Price contracted with Brown's Battery ("Brown's") to do so. Brown's used a shear that sliced off the tops of the batteries in order to remove the lead plates for re-use. After the tops were removed, Brown's shipped not only the lead plates, but the casing battery tops (which also contained re-usable quantities of lead) back to Price. Price crushed the battery tops, removed the lead pieces, and then gave away the remaining battery casing pieces as landfill. Price then re-used both the lead plates and the lead pieces removed from the battery tops in its smelter.
On February 11, 1966, General Battery Corporation ("General") entered into a Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") with Price. The Agreement called for General to purchase all of Price's assets, except its cash on hand at closing and the Hamburg Plant and attendant land, which were sold to the Greater Berks County Development Fund and leased by General. Price also transferred to General all its rights under its existing contracts, including contracts pertaining to employment and employee benefits, insurance, customers, purchasing, material supply, as well as the battery breaking contract with Brown's. In exchange, Price received approximately $2.9 million in cash, 100,000 shares of General's common stock, and General's promise to "pay, perform and discharge the debts, obligations, contracts and [certain] liabilities" of Price. Specifically, General agreed to assume all liabilities reflected on its balance sheet as of the day of purchase, and agreed to "indemnify and save harmless Price" regarding "all other liabilities of any kind or character . . . unless unknown to Price . . . arising out of the operation of the business of Price or its subsidiaries in the normal course prior to January 1, 1966." Under the Agreement, Price agreed to change its name to Price Investment Company or another name as approved by General. In addition, the Agreement was also conditioned upon General's employment of numerous Price executives.
General continued the system for re-using the lead in junked batteries that had been in place since the early 1960s: it provided the batteries to Brown's for breaking and received back both the lead plates and the sheared battery tops. It crushed the battery tops and removed the lead pieces. Finally, it re-used these lead pieces, as well as the returned lead plates, in its smelter. Significantly, however, the parties disagree on what happened to the remaining pieces of the battery tops after General's purchase. The United States contends that General continued to give away the remaining pieces for landfill as Price had done. Exide, however, contends that General burned them for fuel and did not give them away. In any case, General continued this basic system to re-use lead from old batteries until the smelter closed in the early 1970s. In 2000, General merged with Exide.
In August 1993, the U.S. Department of Environmental Protection (EPA) performed a removal assessment of two sites near Hamburg — referred to as "the Fieldhouse" and "the Playground" — where Price dumped broken battery casings and where it now observed such casings. Levels of lead well above allowable amounts were found at both sites. EPA performed a removal action from August 1994 to August 1995 at the Fieldhouse and the Playground. In connection with the removal action, EPA discovered three additional sites at which Price had dumped broken battery casings and that now contain levels of lead above EPA's removal action level. On September 28, 2000, EPA Region III approved the re-start of the removal action to remedy soil erosion due to heightened concern about these hazardous substances in residential areas where children play. As of this date, EPA is still acting at these five sites and is investigating further sites in and around Hamburg where battery casings battery casings may have been dumped.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where all of the evidence demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.
If the moving party establishes the absence of the genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The nonmoving party, however, cannot "rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions" to support its claim. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Du Fresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982). To the contrary, a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position will not suffice; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmovant. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. Therefore, it is plain that "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In such a situation, "[t]he moving party is `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Id. at 323 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
A. Liability Under § 107(a) of CERCLA
In order to establish a defendant's liability under § 107(a) of CERCLA, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) that hazardous substances were disposed of at a "facility"; (2) that there has been a "release" or "threatened release" of "hazardous substances" from the facility into the environment; (3) that the release or threatened release has required or will require the United States to expend "response costs"; and (4) that the defendant falls within one of four categories of responsible parties set out under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The relevant category of responsible parties includes "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal . . . of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).1 If these requirements are met, responsible parties are liable regardless of their intent. United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 712 (3d Cir. 1996). See also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258-259 (3d Cir. 1992).
Exide does not dispute that the United States satisfies the first three elements of § 107(a). To satisfy the fourth element, in its motion the United States contends that: (1) Exide is a responsible party because it is the successor to the liabilities of General through its merger with General in 2000; (2) General is a responsible party both indirectly, because it was the successor to the liabilities of Price through its purchase of Price in February 1966, and directly, because after the purchase it continued to give away pieces of the battery tops as landfill; and (3) Price...
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