United States v. Fairly
| Decision Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:95-cr-05193-DAD |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. RASHEEN D. FAIRLY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT FAIRLY'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE UNDER § 404 OF THE FIRST STEP ACT
Pending before the court is defendant Rasheen D. Fairly's motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). (Doc No. 311.) For the reasons explained below, defendant's motion will be granted.
On October 28, 1996, defendant Rasheen Fairly was sentenced in this court to a mandatory life sentence following his conviction of drug trafficking and related offenses. (Doc No. 144.) Specifically, defendant was charged and convicted following a jury trial of: (i) conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 846, 841(a)(1); (ii) possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and (iii) being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911(g)(1). (Doc. No. 311-1 at 2.) Prior to his sentencing, the government filed a memorandum pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, providing notice to the court and the defense that it would seek enhanced penalties at sentencing based upon defendant's prior state court convictions for serious drug felonies. (Doc. No. 124.) On October 28, 1996, the then-assigned district judge sentenced defendant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A) based upon the finding that defendant had been previously convicted of two serious drug felonies and that the amount of cocaine base for which he was responsible in this case was 879.4 grams. (Doc. Nos. 143, 144.) Defendant's conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal on January 8, 1998. See United States v. Candler, 133 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1998).
Since that time, defendant has filed numerous collateral attacks challenging the validity of his convictions and sentence. (See Doc. No. 284 at 2-4) (describing defendant's prior petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2241). For example, on July 6, 2012, defendant filed a “Petition Challenging the Validity of a Prior Conviction Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2) in Aid of All Writs Act Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).” (Doc. No. 279.) The court construed that petition as defendant's fourth successive § 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 284.)
Defendant is now 53 years old and, to date, has served approximately 310 months (nearly 26 years) of his sentence-i.e., half of his life. (Doc. No. 311 at 1.) Accounting for the award of maximum good time credits, defendant has already served a 375-month sentence (over 30 years) of imprisonment.[1] (Id. at 10.)
Defendant filed the pending motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to § 404 of the First Step Act on October 30, 2020. (Doc. No. 311.) On December 3, 2020, the government filed its opposition to that motion, and on January 11, 2021, defendant filed his reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 317, 325.)
In 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), “to reduce the disparate treatment of offenders who dealt crack cocaine compared to offenders who dealt powder cocaine.” United States v. Kelley, 962 F.3d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 2020), abrogated by Concepcion v. United States, U.S., 142 S.Ct. 2389 (2022). Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 841 (b)(1)(B)(iii) by increasing the amounts of prohibited controlled substances required to trigger certain mandatory penalties. Kelley, 962 F.3d at 472. “These changes did not apply to offenders whose convictions became final before Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act.” Id. Eight years after Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, Congress passed the First Step Act, in part to provide that certain provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act would apply retroactively. See United States v. Neal, No. 2:09-cr-00089-JAM-KJN, 2020 WL 4476718, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2020). In particular, “[s]ection 404 of the First Step Act addresses how the Fair Sentencing Act applies to offenders whose sentences were final before Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act.” Kelley, 962 F.3d at 472. Section 404 of the First Step Act provides that “[a] court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5222 § 404(b) (emphasis added). A covered offense is defined as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . that was committed before August 3, 2010.” Id. § 404(a). “In other words, the First Step Act permits a defendant who was sentenced for a crack cocaine offense to move the court ‘to impose a reduced sentence as if' the First Step Act had been in effect at the time the defendant committed the offense, and it gives the district court discretion to do so.” Kelley, 962 F.3d at 472.
On June 27, 2022, the United States Supreme Court expanded the scope of factors district courts may consider in resentencing a defendant who was convicted and sentenced for a covered offense. Specifically, on that date the Supreme Court addressed the question of “whether a district court adjudicating a motion under the First Step Act may consider other intervening changes of law (such as changes to the Sentencing Guidelines) or changes of fact (such as behavior in prison) in adjudicating a First Step Act motion.” Conception v. United States, U.S., 142 S.Ct. 2389, 2396 (2022). The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative, noting that the text of the First Step Act “does not so much as hint that district courts are prohibited from considering evidence of rehabilitation, disciplinary infractions, or unrelated Guidelines changes.” Id. at 2401-02, 2404 (). Put simply, district courts are not solely limited to the changes imposed by the Fair Sentencing Act in determining whether or to what extent to grant relief under the First Step Act. The Supreme Court emphasized in Concepcion that only two limitations on district courts' discretion appear in § 404(c): “A district court may not consider a First Step Act motion if the movant's sentence was already reduced under the Fair Sentencing Act or if the court considered and rejected a motion under the First Step Act.” Id. The Court instructed that “when deciding a First Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obligation to explain their decisions and demonstrate that they considered the parties' arguments.” Id. However, the Court also noted that a district court is not “required to articulate anything more than a brief statement of reasons.” Id. (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
Before determining whether a defendant's sentence should be reduced pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act, courts must first determine whether the defendant's conviction qualifies as a covered offense under the Fair Sentencing Act. See United States v. Alvarez-Contreras, No. 2:14-cr-00238-JAM, 2021 WL 1022845, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2021). As noted, a “covered offense” “means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 that was committed before August 3, 2010.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5222 § 404(a). Relevant here, § 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for violations involving crack cocaine (otherwise known as cocaine base). See Alvarez-Contreras 2021 WL 1022845, at *2.
Defendant Fairly's conviction qualifies as a “covered offense” because he was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. (Doc. No. 311-1 at 2-3.) Moreover, the sentence imposed as to those offenses of conviction was determined in part based on 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), which was also amended by § 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). Thus, it is undisputed by the parties in this case that in sentencing defendant Fairly in 1996, the court imposed a sentence for a covered offense. (Doc. Nos. 311 at 5; 317 at 9.) Accordingly, defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act and the Fair Sentencing Act.
While defendant Fairly is eligible for a reduction of his sentence it is of course entirely within the court's discretion whether to grant him such relief. See Concepcion, 142 S.Ct. at 2404; see also Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5222 § 404(c) (). In exercising this discretion, courts consider the familiar sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which include the applicable advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, as well as all other pertinent information regarding the offender's history and conduct. See United States v. Johnson, 26 F.4th 726, 736 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, U.S., ...
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