United States v. Farah

• Citation: 953 F.Supp.2d 861
• Decision Date: 18 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 3:12–cr–00196.,3:12–cr–00196.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Abdullahi FARAH.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

953 F.Supp.2d 861

UNITED STATES of America

v.Abdullahi FARAH.

No. 3:12–cr–00196.

United States District Court,

M.D. Tennessee,

Nashville Division.

June 18, 2013.

Van S. Vincent, Office of the United States Attorney, Nashville, TN, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM

KEVIN H. SHARP, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant's timely filed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c) (Docket No. 76), to which the United States filed a response (Docket No. 80) and Defendant a reply (Docket No. 81). In the motion, Defendant argues that the Court should set aside the guilty verdict found by the jury with respect to each of three counts-misbehavior in or so near the Court's presence as to obstruct the administration of justice (18 U.S.C. § 401(1)), criminal contempt (18 U.S.C. § 401(3)), and obstructing, attempting to obstruct, or in any way interfering with or preventing the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (18 U.S.C. § 1591(d))—due to insufficient evidence of obstruction and incorrect jury instructions.

On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court views the evidence in “a light most favorable to the prosecution, giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the testimony.” United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 537 (6th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). “The relevant question in assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden.” United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

For the following reasons, Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The Court will discuss each count in turn.

I. Count I (18 U.S.C. § 401(1))

Defendant argues that in order to convict him on this count, the jury was required to find “actual obstruction,” and that the government introduced no evidence establishing or justifying a reasonable inference that the administration of justice was actually obstructed. The United States responds that Defendant's refusal to respond to questions at a court-ordered deposition constitutes ipso facto obstruction because it prevents the United States from obtaining the testimony of a material witness.

The parties debate the significance of a litany of cases interpreting the language of § 401(1). What is clear is that § 401(1) establishes a contempt power little-used outside the courtroom; most authorities discuss it in the context of the summary contempt procedure provided under Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(b). The statute provides that a “court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contemptof its authority, and none other, as (1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice[.]” To find contempt under § 401(1),

(1) There must be conduct which constitutes “misbehavior”; (2) the misbehavior must amount to an “obstruction of the administration of justice”; (3) the conduct must occur in the court's presence ¹; (4) there must be some form of intent to obstruct. The minimum requirement for establishing intent was described as proof of “a volitional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.”

Vaughn v. City of Flint, 752 F.2d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir.1985); accord United States v. Moncier, 571 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir.2009). The Sixth Circuit requires that “willful disobedience be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and defines willfulness as ‘a deliberate or intended violation, as distinguished from an accidental, inadvertent or negligent violation.’ ” Vaughn, 752 F.2d at 1169. It is well settled that the contempt power should be limited “to the least possible power adequate to prevent actual obstruction of justice.” In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 235, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962). In other words, a court should exercise restraint when vindicating its authority, and its power should be directed at conduct that actually obstructs the administration of justice.

In particular, Defendant and the government differ on whether Defendant's refusal to testify at the September 12, 2012, deposition itself amounted to an obstruction of the administration of justice. “Obstruction of the administration of justice is not to be confused with obstruction of justice. Justice may be obstructed by mere inaction, but obstruction of the administration of justice requires something more—some act that will interrupt the orderly process of the administration of justice, or thwart the judicial process.” United States v. Warlick, 742 F.2d 113, 115–16 (4th Cir.1984). “[A]n actual, not a theoretical obstruction” is required. Vaughn, 752 F.2d at 1168. To prove obstruction, “the government must show ‘that the defendant's acts delayed the proceedings, made more work for the judge, induced error or imposed unnecessary costs on the other parties.’ ” United States v. Meacham, 65 Fed.Appx. 529, 535 (6th Cir.2003) (Daugherty, J., dissenting) (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 968 F.2d 523, 532 (5th Cir.1992)).² “At a minimum, the defendant's misconduct must have ‘had an effect on the proceedings.’ ” Id. (citing United States v. Oberhellmann, 946 F.2d 50, 52 (7th Cir.1991)).³ “[F]alse testimony alone, whether written or oral, will not amount to contempt of court,” Arredondo, 349 F.3d at 318 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), but a “contumacious silence” that disrupts the progress of a trial will, U.S. v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 315–16, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975).

The United States cites Arredondo for the proposition that “[a] witness's refusal to respond to questions is a classic form of contempt,” but in context that statement, and the case upon which it relies, provides little support for the government here. See349 F.3d at 319 (citing United States v. Seavers, 472 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir.1973)). The witness in Seavers refused to testify at trial—the judge twice excused the jury in order to examine the witness before summarily punishing him for contempt—which had the effect of delaying the proceedings.⁴ The court in Arredondo, meanwhile, did not address the question of a witness who refused to testify; it considered whether the filing of evasive and inconsistent affidavits, which “compelled the expenditure of scarce judicial resources” and “threatened unwarranted professional discipline on an attorney,” could be punished as contempt, determining it could not. 349 F.3d at 320. That is in part because, at least before its amendment in 2002, Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a) was “still a pretty summary procedure,” Oberhellmann, 946 F.2d at 52, and courts are cautioned to show “restraint and discretion” in the exercise of judicial power. U.S. v. Aleo, 681 F.3d 290, 312 (6th Cir.2012) (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 44, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)).

With regard to the proof in this case, the United States contends that its evidence, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it, established at trial that Defendant deprived the government, the Adan defendants, and the court of his testimony, obstructing the administration of justice. (Docket No. 80 at 10). However, as Defendant correctly points out, none of the three witnesses who testified at trial stated that Defendant's refusal to testify at the September 2012 deposition had any effect whatsoever. (Docket No. 76 at 6–7). Donna Buford, a court reporter, testified that a deposition was convened and that Defendant refused to testify. Heather Weyker Sanders, a St. Paul, Minnesota, police officer, testified that Defendant refused to testify at the deposition. And Mark Shafer, a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, read a transcript from the deposition. It indicated that four or five trials remained in relation to United States v. Adan, et al., No. 3:10–cr–00260, and that Defendant refused to testify in each and every one of those. It also indicated that no trial dates were then presently set in relation to any defendant in the Adan case. Shafer was later recalled to the stand to testify that the deposition was taken on the 7th floor of the federal courthouse building.

Documentary evidence included Judge Campbell's order, the government's deposition notices, and the deposition transcript. Finally, the government introduced a lengthy document in which Defendant stipulated that he had material evidence and that the United States was engaged in the enforcement of relevant federal laws.

This evidence did not, however, establish or warrant the reasonable inference that Defendant's refusal to testify delayed a prosecution, made more work for the judge, or had any effect whatsoever on the proceedings. Neither Agent Shafer nor Officer Sanders testified that their investigation was impeded by Defendant's failure to provide testimony to be used at trial. No proof established that a trial date was moved, a jury excused, a proceeding infected with error, or that other parties were forced to bear greater costs. Defendant's persistent refusal to testify in the Adan matter may have actually obstructed the government's prosecution, but if it did, the jury never heard about it. Because no evidence at trial supported the “obstruction of the administration of justice” prong, the Court finds that no rational trier of fact could have found that the administration of justice was actually obstructed by Defendant's refusal to testify at the deposition. And since “the government has the burden ... it loses.” Oberhellmann, 946 F.2d at 53. The verdict will be set aside, and an acquittal will be entered. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)(2).

Because the Court will grant Defendant's motion with respect to Count I, it need not address at length Defendant's challenges to the...