United States v. Fattah, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 15-346-1
Decision Date | 16 March 2016 |
Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 15-346-1 |
Citation | 170 F.Supp.3d 761 |
Parties | United States of America v. Chaka Fattah, Sr. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Paul L. Gray, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for United States of America.
Bartle
, District Judge.
The defendant Chaka Fattah, Sr., a United States Representative elected from the Second Congressional District of Pennsylvania, has been indicted in a 29-count indictment along with four other defendants: Herbert Vederman (“Vederman”), Robert Brand (“Brand”), Karen Nicholas, and Bonnie Bowser (“Bowser”). The indictment also references two unindicted co-conspirators, Thomas Lindenfeld (“Lindenfeld”) and Gregory Naylor.
All five defendants are charged in Count One with conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
. Fattah is also named in sixteen additional counts while the other four defendants are also named in multiple counts, including some with Fattah.
Fattah has now moved to dismiss Count Three (conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343
, 1346, and 1349 ), Count Sixteen (conspiracy to commit bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 371 ) and Count Seventeen (bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) ) of the indictment on the ground that they infringe upon his rights under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution.1 That provision states that “for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, ¶ 1.
The Speech or Debate Clause is rooted in English history and the struggles of the House of Commons to protect its members from intimidation by the King. The Crown in times past used both the criminal and civil process against members who displeased it. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177–78, 180–83, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966)
. The Clause was engrafted into our Constitution to protect the independence of the Legislative Branch from improper encroachment by a potentially hostile Executive Branch or Judiciary. Id. at 177–83, 86 S.Ct. 749.
The Supreme Court has stressed in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972)
, that the Clause immunizes the members of Congress only to the extent of having to answer in either a criminal or civil proceeding for their “legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts.” The Court explained:
Legislative acts also include activities at committee hearings. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504–06, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975) ; Grav el v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972)
. Nonetheless, “some nexus to legislative functions” without more is not enough to trigger the privilege. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. 2531.
While “performing legislative activities” is protected, the Supreme Court has recognized that the duties of members of Congress are much more expansive. Constituent services; making appointments with Government agencies; assisting in securing government contracts, news letters, and news releases; speeches outside of the halls of Congress; and other similar political activities, for example, are all legitimate aspects of the job of a representative or senator. These activities, however, do not constitute legislative acts encompassed by the Speech or Debate Clause. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512, 92 S.Ct. 2531
.
The Speech or Debate Clause was not designed “to make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility.” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 576, 92 S.Ct. 2531. For example, it does not shield them from indictment for accepting a bribe as a quid pro quo for a promise related to an official act. It is the taking of a thing of value in return for making the promise that is the crime. Whether the member of Congress fulfills his promise, reneges on his promise, or does nothing is irrelevant. Even if the promise was related to legislation, the bribery charge may proceed because it is unnecessary for the government to introduce any evidence of a legislative act as part of its proof. Evidence of the acceptance of the bribe tied simply to the promise to undertake a legislative act is sufficient. Significantly, the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause does not reach a promise to perform a legislative act in the future. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 526–27, 92 S.Ct. 2531
; United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir.1994).
It is also well settled that the efforts to lobby or influence the Executive branch to take certain action is “in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative process,” at least when legislative oversight or fact-finding is not involved. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 513, 92 S.Ct. 2531
(quoting Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172, 86 S.Ct. 749 ); McDade, 28 F.3d at 299–300 ; Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 521 (3d Cir.1985).2
With this background, we turn to the specific counts and allegations in the indictment which Fattah challenges as violating the Speech or Debate Clause.
Count Three of the indictment, as noted above, charges Fattah and Bowser with conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343
, 1346, and 1349. Unindicted co-conspirator Lindenfeld is also implicated. This conspiracy relates to Fattah's promise to Lindenfeld to obtain a congressional earmark, that is an appropriation, for a non-profit organization known as “Blue Guardians,” formed by Lindenfeld. In return for this promise, Lindenfeld is alleged to have agreed to forgive a campaign debt owed to him and his company, LSG, by Fattah for Fattah's unsuccessful run for mayor of Philadelphia in 2007.
Count Three, which describes this offense in detail, incorporates by reference a number of paragraphs found in Count One on pages 7 and 12-14 of the indictment:
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