United States v. Fawster
| Decision Date | 09 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | 1:12-MJ-364PAS |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SHAUN FAWSTER |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
On December 14, 2012, Defendant Shaun Fawster was arrested and charged by a criminal Complaint with pulling fire alarms on six consecutive floors of the U.S. Veterans Administration Medical Center in Providence, Rhode Island. The Complaint charges Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 13, a provision that adopts the law of the State, here § 11-44-21 of the Rhode Island General Laws, which criminalizes the "giving of a false alarm of fire." This offense is subject to punishment by imprisonment for up to one year, in addition to other penalties. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-44-21. As a result of the potential penalty, the Complaint charged Defendant with an offense that is federally classified as a Class A misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6).
Defendant's initial appearance was conducted on the same day as his arrest. He was informed of his rights and the pending charge; counsel was appointed to represent him. He was detained temporarily pending a detention hearing, which was held three days later. As a result of the detention hearing, he was released with conditions, including travel restrictions, a curfew and GPS monitoring. Almost three months later, on March 21, 2013, his conditions of release were modified by the elimination of GPS monitoring and the curfew; all other conditions of release remained in effect, including the travel restrictions and the loss of access to his passport and other personal items seized at the time of his arrest.
On March 21, 2013, the Court conducted a status conference following which the parties agreed to consider the possibility of alternative resolution. As a result, on March 25, 2013, the Court granted Defendant's motion to continue empanelment and to extend the time for the filing of pretrial motions for a period of thirty days while the parties discussed alternative resolution. On May 14, 2013, the government referred Defendant, with the consent of his counsel, to the Pretrial Diversion Program. However, the program did not accept him.
Throughout the pendency of the Complaint, Defendant has consistently been clear that he intends to assert his right to trial by jury because, despite his admission during his initial appearance that he pulled the fire alarms, he expects to be exonerated based on his lack of the requisite intent to give "a false alarm." Further, Defendant has persistently asserted his intent to exercise his right to trial before an Article III district judge. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (); 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(5) ().
The case continued to drift until June 26, 2013, when this Court ordered the parties to show cause why the Complaint should not be dismissed, with or without prejudice, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, based on the government's failure to file an indictment or information within thirty days of Defendant's arrest on these charges. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b)(1-2) (); United States v. Jarzembowski, No. 07-122, 2007 WL 2407275, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2007) (); United States v. Trybus, No. 05-MJ-2161, 2006 WL1763672, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 23, 2006) (same); United States v. Green, 582 F. Supp. 265, 265 (D. Colo. 1984) (same).
The Speedy Trial Act applies to any case involving a defendant charged with an "offense," 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a), which includes not only felonies, but also Class A misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. § 3172(2); United States v. Morales-Montes, No. 12-639-M, 2012 WL 2835837, at *3 (D.P.R. July 9, 2012) (citing United States v. Boyd, 214 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Speedy Trial Act gives effect to the provision in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." United States v. Lee, 575 F.2d 1184, 1185 (6th Cir. 1978). It creates specific time limits to ensure the implementation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. United States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456, 1459-60 (9th Cir. 1984). Violation of the time limits in the Speedy Trial Act requires this Court to dismiss the Complaint. See United States v. Huete-Sandoval, 668 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2011).
The Speedy Trial Act requires that an indictment or information must be filed within thirty days from the date when an individual was arrested. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). It further mandates that trial shall commence within seventy days of the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date on which the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever date occurs last. Id. § 3161(c)(1).1 Here Defendant was arrested and charged with a Class A misdemeanor on December 14, 2012; therefore, the Speedy Trial Act required the government to file either aninformation or indictment within thirty days, by January 14, 2013. Defendant did not waive his right to a speedy trial. By the time he requested and received a thirty-day delay of trial by motion filed on March 22, 2013, the deadline for the filing of an indictment or information had already long since passed. Indeed, as of the date of the hearing on the Court's order to show cause (August 6, 2013), nothing has happened to move this case closer to trial.2
The sanction of dismissal is mandatory when the government fails to indict within the period specified in the Speedy Trial Act. Pollock, 726 F.2d at 1462 (). While there are few cases directly addressing the issue when the offense is a Class A misdemeanor, those courts that have considered the question have uniformly concluded that a complaint charging a Class A misdemeanor must be dismissed if there is a Speedy Trial violation. See, e.g., Morales-Montes, 2012 WL 2835837, at *3 (); United States v. Nash, No. 2:08-mj-00678-RJJ-RJJ, 2010 WL 702438, at *2 n.5 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010) (); United States v. Troy, 564 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45-47 (D. Me. 2008) (); United States v. Seitles, No. 2:04-CV-408KJD-PAL, 2006 WL 1367374, at *1 (D. Nev. May 12, 2006) (); cf. Boyd, 214 F.3d at 1057 ().
The government argues that Fed. R. Crim. P. 58, which allows a Class A misdemeanor to be charged by complaint, indictment or information, trumps the Speedy Trial Act in that the Rule makes clear that a complaint alone is sufficient as a charging document. Accordingly, the government contends, the Speedy Trial Act's requirement of the filing of an information or indictment within thirty days of arrest is inconsistent with Fed. R. Crim. P. 58. The government relies on the language in the Rules Enabling Act providing that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules [including Rule 58] shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect," so that the rules must be afforded the weight of a statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2010). Because the Speedy Trial Act conflicts with the later-adopted Fed. R. Crim. P. 58,3 the government argues, the adoption of Fed. R. Crim. P. 58 impliedly repealed the Speedy Trial Act protections for defendants charged with Class A misdemeanors when the charging document is a complaint. The government brushes aside the preceding sentence of the Rules Enabling Act, which states that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right," arguing that the issue here is merely the procedural matter of what document is used to charge. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
The same argument was squarely rejected by the court in Morales-Montes, which pointed out that there is no inconsistency between Fed. R. Crim. P. 58 and the Speedy Trial Act:
Nothing under Rule 58, however, hinders a trial and/or plea on a complaint or violation notice to take place within the first thirty days from the filing of the complaint or notice, that is, well before the speedy trial provisions would apply. Upon thirty days having transpired from the filing of the complaint without aninformation or indictment being filed, and absent waiver from defendant, the provision of speedy trial kicks in and charges may be dismissed, with or without prejudice.
2012 WL 2835837, at *3. It is beyond cavil that the rights established by the Speedy Trial Act are not merely procedural, but are substantive, so that an inconsistent procedural rule cannot abrogate its time constraints. See United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (). The practical effect of the Government's...
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