United States v. Fay

Decision Date08 November 1962
Citation211 F. Supp. 359
PartiesUNITED STATES of America ex rel. Samuel Tito WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. Edwin M. FAY, Warden of Greenhaven Prison, Stormville, New York, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Petitioner submitted on papers and record.

Edward S. Silver, Dist. Atty., Kings County, William I. Siegel, Asst. Dist. Atty., affiant, submitted affidavit in opposition for State of New York.

DAWSON, District Judge.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arising out of a conviction of first degree murder in the State of New York. The petitioner was found guilty of felony murder by a jury on January 22, 1948 in the County Court of Kings County. Sentence was imposed on March 2, 1948 by County Court Judge Goldstein who had presided at the trial. Based upon probation department reports which disclosed a criminal background, Judge Goldstein rejected the recommendation of the jury that the petitioner be sentenced to life imprisonment and instead imposed the death sentence.

The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the conviction without opinion (People of the State of New York v. Williams, 298 N.Y. 803, 83 N.E.2d 698), amended its remittitur (298 N.Y. 863, 84 N.E.2d 446) and denied motion for reargument (300 N.Y. 460, 88 N.E.2d 325). The case then went to the United States Supreme Court on the narrow issue of whether it was constitutional for a trial judge to base sentencing upon the report of witnesses that the defendant had not cross-examined or confronted. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and affirmed the Court of Appeals of New York. Williams v. People of the State of New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), rehearing denied 337 U.S. 961, 69 S.Ct. 1529, 93 L.Ed. 1760 and 338 U.S. 841, 70 S.Ct. 34, 94 L.Ed. 514. In November 1949 Governor Dewey commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment.

No further legal action was undertaken until the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in 1958 in the Northern District of New York. United States ex rel. Williams v. LaValle, 170 F.Supp. 582 (N.D.N.Y.1959). The petition was opposed by the state of New York on two grounds: (1) there was no merit in petitioner's claim and (2) petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies.1

Judge Foley rejected the latter argument of the State of New York and denied the petition on the merits. A certificate of probable cause was granted and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Williams v. LaValle, 276 F.2d 645 (2d Cir., 1960). The court did not consider the merits of the controversy but affirmed Judge Foley's denial of the petition on the ground that the prisoner had not exhausted his state remedies.

The United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari. United States ex rel. Williams v. LaValle, 364 U.S. 922, 81 S.Ct. 287, 5 L.Ed.2d 261 (1960). The Court of Appeals of New York then denied petitioner's motion for reargument of the original appeal. People v. Williams, 11 N.Y.2d 888, 227 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 182 N.E.2d 415 (1962). Petitioner next sought a writ of certiorari based on New York's failure to hear reargument. This was likewise denied. Williams v. United States, 370 U.S. 960, 82 S.Ct. 1614, 8 L.Ed.2d 826 (1962). A motion was also made to the Kings County Court which denied petitioner's motion in the nature of coram nobis to vacate the judgment.

Petitioner now brings the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the State of New York, while opposing the petition on its merits, does not now claim that the petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies.

The question raised by this petition is not a novel one. It seeks to show that the confession given by the defendant and used against him at the trial was coerced and therefore inadmissible. Petitioner also claims that there was illegal delay in arraignment and that his lack of counsel at his first arraignment rendered the entire trial invalid.

The record of the trial of the petitioner fills two bound volumes. In addition, there are briefs submitted to the New York Court of Appeals, including one by the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae in behalf of the petitioner, the transcript of record filed in the United States Supreme Court on appeal and the opposing briefs and the two petitions for rehearing. Lastly, there are the affidavits of petitioner and the State of New York.

In compliance with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1952), this court has examined the transcript of the state proceedings. Since the record in this instance affords an adequate opportunity to weigh the sufficiency of the allegations and the evidence, there is no necessity for a hearing on the application for a writ of habeas corpus. Brown v. Allen, supra, at page 463, 73 S.Ct. at page 410, 97 L.Ed. 469. See Application of Jackson, 206 F.Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y.1962), aff'd, United States ex rel. Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d 573 (2d Cir., 1962).

While much of what transpired is in dispute, certain facts remain unchallenged. The petitioner was tried for the murder of a fifteen year old girl which took place on the night of April 19, 1947. A burglar entered the premises and began to rifle the contents of a dresser. The girl, who was asleep, awakened and attacked the prowler. He responded by beating her over the head with an iron bar. The girl never regained consciousness and died several hours later in the hospital. Her younger brother, aged 10, also awoke and was struck by the burglar as he lay in bed.

In the following months a number of burglaries took place in the same section of Brooklyn. The entire area was under surveillance by the police for that reason. Petitioner was taken into custody on September 8, 1947 in the early hours of the morning. He was brought to the police station and was kept in custody until his arraignment before a magistrate in Felony Court at about noon on September 9, 1947. During the 34 hours that the petitioner was in the custody of the police he twice confessed to the murder. After extensive questioning petitioner wrote his own longhand confession. Then an assistant district attorney was summoned, together with a stenographer, and a detailed statement was taken from petitioner. In the company of the police and the assistant district attorney, the petitioner was taken from the station house to reenact the crime at the scene.

It is during the period of time in the custody of the police that the petitioner claims he was unmercifully beaten and tortured. This was denied by the assistant district attorney and all the police officers who took the stand. The police do not deny that the petitioner went without sleep for the entire period and that his consumption of food and drink was not extensive.

When the petitioner was first brought to the police station he was not questioned about the murder. Instead, the police concentrated their questions on the various burglaries that had taken place in the neighborhood. At one point petitioner was taken by automobile to the scenes of various crimes in the hope that someone could identify him as the perpetrator.

The interrogation concerning the homicide commenced at about 6:00 P.M. on September 8, 1947 and a longhand confession was obtained within about four hours. At this point the district attorney's office was called and petitioner gave a detailed statement at about midnight.

At the trial petitioner took the witness stand and testified at great length concerning the alleged police brutality. Petitioner exhibited to the jury the bruises and scars which he stated remained as a result of the alleged beatings. In rebuttal to this contention the police and assistant district attorney testified as to the lack of any coercion. Further, there was testimony of the admittance clerk of the Raymond Street jail to which petitioner was committed following his arraignment in Felony Court. According to that testimony petitioner complained only of swollen legs caused by rheumatic fever. There was also testimony by the jail physician who examined the petitioner and while he did find some injuries, these were inconsequential when compared to the torture described by the petitioner. Defense counsel introduced a series of photographs taken of petitioner on September 20, 1947. This was a result of an order signed by Judge Leibowitz of the County Court when petitioner was arraigned in that court on September 12th.

The charge to the jury fully explained the applicable law:

"A confession of a defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person can be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats or unless made upon a stipulation of the District Attorney that he shall not be prosecuted therefor; but it is not sufficient to warrant his conviction without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed. * * *
"If you decide that such confession or admission was made as the result of fear induced by threats, duress, or violence, or induced by unnecessary and illegal delay in arraignment, the confession so obtained cannot be used against the defendant and is to be disregarded even if you believe it to be true. No confession is admissible unless it is voluntary. Its primary meaning imports a condition of mind that is free and unconstrained by fear, or inspired by false hope, or threats or violence, or by illegal and unnecessary delay in arraignment. At any rate, it is a question of fact for you, the jury, to determine. You must also determine and decide, if you do accept such confessions and decide that it was made voluntarily, whether or not the confessions are true. Of course, if you decide that the confessions were not voluntary or not true, you must acquit the defendant." Trial Record, pp. 1143-46.

At the conclusion of this charge two of the three counsel appointed by the court to...

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1 cases
  • United States v. Fay
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • October 4, 1963
    ...this time in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, and it was again denied on the merits. United States ex rel. Williams v. Fay, 211 F.Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y.1962). He takes this appeal from the order denying his petition. We conclude that this denial was error, that the und......

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