United States v. Feauto

Citation146 F.Supp.3d 1022
Decision Date23 November 2015
Docket NumberNo. CR 12–3046,CR 12–3046
Parties United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Randy Feauto, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Shawn Stephen Wehde, US Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.

Jim K. McGough, Omaha, NE, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING RESENTENCING OF DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO AMENDMENT 782 TO THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MARK W. BENNETT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION...––––
A. Foreword...––––
B. Resentencing Under Amendment 782...––––
1. Proceedings in this case...––––
2. Resentencing authority...––––
3. The pertinent guidelines and policy statements...––––
4. Operation of the policy statement here...––––
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS...––––
A. Limits On The Authority Of The Sentencing Commission...––––
B. Ultra Vires Action Of The Commission...––––
1. Departure from the mandate for mandatory minimums...––––
2. Possible sources of a mandate to ify mandatory minimums...––––
a. Section 3553(e)...––––
b. Section 3582(c)(2)...––––
c. Section 994(u)...––––
3. Pernicious Consequences...––––
C. Improper Delegation...––––
III. CONCLUSION...––––
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Foreword

Before me for consideration is defendant Randy Feauto's eligibility for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

in light of Amendment 782, the “All Drugs Minus Two Amendment,” to the United States Sentencing Guidelines.1 The parties and the Federal Defender for the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, as invited amicus curie, argue that a defendant subject to a mandatory minimum sentence who previously received a “substantial assistance” reduction below that mandatory minimum can be resentenced pursuant to Amendment 782 without regard to the mandatory minimum. That position was originally music to my ears, because I have consistently—and vehemently—disagreed with the harshness of most mandatory minimum sentences.2 In fact, in most of the over 1,000 congressionally-mandated mandatory minimum sentences that I have imposed over the past twenty-two years, I have stated on the record that they were unjust and too harsh. I would often inform or remind defendants and their families and supporters in the courtroom that reform of mandatory minimum sentencing must come from the legislative branch of our federal government—Congress. So it is with significant irony, but consistent with my view that only Congress has the authority to waive mandatory minimum sentences (with the exception of substantial assistance motions, pursuant to § 3553(e) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)

, and “safety valve” eligibility, pursuant to § 3553(f)), that I disagree with the parties' argument that the Sentencing Commission has the authority to use Amendment 782, or any other amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, to “ify” a mandatory minimum sentence established by Congress. For the reasons set forth below, my understanding is that only Congress itself, not the Sentencing Commission or the Judicial Branch, has that power. Consequently, the proper net effect of Amendment 782, applied either retroactively or prospectively, is that it can only reduce the sentence of a defendant who originally received a reduction for substantial assistance if he had no mandatory minimum or both his original guideline sentence and his amended guideline sentence are above his mandatory minimum. Feauto is not such a defendant. I fully recognize that, like the vast majority of mandatory minimum sentences themselves, this construction leads to a harsh result, but fidelity to the rule of law and principles of non-delegation and separation of powers trumps any personal views on the harshness of federal sentencing. As discussed below, the construction urged by the parties and amicus creates an Alice In Wonderland like scenario in which the retroactive application of Amendment 782 opens a rabbit hole that Feauto, instead of Alice, falls through and receives a lower sentence in Wonderland than if he were originally sentenced today for his crime with the application of post-Amendment 782. Surely, this Mad Tea Party scenario creates the very kind of unwarranted disparity the guidelines were intended to avoid.

B. Resentencing Under Amendment 782
1. Proceedings in this case

Consideration of whether or not defendant Feauto is eligible for a reduction in sentence pursuant to Amendment 782 began in March 2015. At the conclusion of Feauto's “All Drugs Minus Two” hearing on October 23, 2015,3 I informed the parties that I would issue a tentative opinion for their comment within the next few weeks, before issuing a final opinion. I provided the parties with such a tentative opinion on November 3, 2015. The prosecution and the Federal Defender submitted their comments on November 11, 2015, see docket nos. 87 and 89, respectively, and defendant Feauto submitted his comments on November 12, 2015. See docket no. 91. This Memorandum Opinion And Order is my final opinion on the matter, which has taken into consideration the parties' original arguments and their comments on my tentative opinion.

2. Resentencing authority

To put the present discussion in context, I will summarize the authority of a court to resentence a defendant in light of subsequent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. Congress has provided, inter alia, that [t]he [Sentencing] Commission periodically shall review and revise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)

. Congress has also provided authority to reduce a sentence in light of such revisions to the Sentencing Guidelines in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Specifically, § 3582(c)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment. —The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—
* * *
(2) in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o )

, upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

. “The Supreme Court has indicated that a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is not a ‘plenary resentencing’; rather, it operates as ‘a narrow exception to the rule of finality’ that ‘permits a sentence reduction within the narrow bounds established by the Commission.’ United States v. Anderson, 686 F.3d 585, 589 (8th Cir.2012) (quoting Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827, 831, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2692, 2694, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) ).

3. The pertinent guidelines and policy statements

The pertinent guideline revision here, triggering the possibility of a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2)

, is Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, in which the Sentencing Commission lowered the sentencing range for drug offenders. Amendment 782 became effective November 1, 2014, and was made retroactive effective November 1, 2015. United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual , Vol. 3, Amendment 782, Reasons for Amendment; United States v. Lawin, 779 F.3d 780, 781 n. 2 (8th Cir.2015) ; United States v. Thomas, 775 F.3d 982, 983 (8th Cir.2014) ( [T]he Commission expressly made Amendment 782 retroactive (effective November 1, 2015).”). Essentially, Amendment 782 “applies retroactively to reduce most drug quantity base offense levels by two levels.” United States v. Lawin, 779 F.3d 780, 781 n. 2 (8th Cir.2015) (citing Thomas, 775 F.3d at 982 ). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed out, Amendment 782 amended [U.S.S.G.] § 2D1.1,” that is, it amended sentencing ranges determined by drug quantity, but it did not lower the sentencing ranges established on the basis of other offense or offender characteristics, such as “career offender” status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Thomas, 775 F.3d at 983. The Sentencing Commission, itself, expressly stated that the purpose of Amendment 782 was to “change[ ] how the applicable statutory mandatory minimum penalties are incorporated into the Drug Quantity Table while maintaining consistency with such penalties,” and that it served this purpose by “reduc[ing] by two levels the offense levels assigned to the quantities that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum penalties, resulting in corresponding guideline ranges that include the mandatory minimum penalties .” United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual , Vol. 3, Amendment 782, Reasons for Amendment (emphasis added) (quoted more extensively in footnote 4).4 Amendment 782 does absolutely nothing to reduce the drug quantity that triggers a mandatory minimum.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10

is the Sentencing Commission's policy statement concerning reduction in a defendant's term of imprisonment as a result of an amended guideline range, i.e., the companion provision under the Sentencing Guidelines to statutory § 3582(c)(2). As the parties and amicus note, this Guideline, as amended to implement Amendment 782, provides as follows:

(c) Cases Involving Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Substantial Assistance .—If the case involves a statutorily required minimum sentence and the court had the authority to impose a sentence below the statutorily required minimum sentence pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities, then for purposes of this policy statement the amended guideline range shall be determined without regard to the operation of § 5G1.1 (Sentencing on a Single Count of Conviction) and § 5G1.2

(Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction).

U.S.S.G....

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3 cases
  • United States v. Koons
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • March 10, 2017
    ...to a mandatory minimum sentence exceeding both his original guideline range and his amended guideline range." United States v. Feauto , 146 F.Supp.3d 1022, 1041 (N.D. Iowa 2015). This decision was consistent with controlling Eighth Circuit precedent prior to the adoption of § 1B1.10(c) in N......
  • United States v. Sawyer
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • December 2, 2016
    ...the Guidelines and if Congress has done so, whether that delegation of power is lawful." Id. (citing United States v. Feauto , 146 F.Supp.3d 1022, 1029–40 (N.D. Iowa 2015) (Bennett, J.)). The court found it unnecessary to resolve these concerns, however, "because even assuming that defendan......
  • United States v. C.D.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
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    ...WL 7045732, at *1–8 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (slip copy), appeal docketed, No. 16–17679 (11th Cir. Dec. 23, 2016); United States v. Feauto, 146 F.Supp.3d 1022, 1030–41 (N.D. Iowa 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15–3854 (8th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015). Because we resolve these appeals on the basis of § 3582(c)......

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