United States v. Feeney
Decision Date | 07 October 1980 |
Docket Number | Crim. A. No. 80-CR-54. |
Citation | 501 F. Supp. 1324 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James FEENEY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Joseph F. Dolan, U. S. Atty., Susan R. Roberts, First Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.
Daniel J. Sears, Denver, Colo., for defendant.
Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard & McPherson by Stuart F. Pierson, Washington D. C., for intervenor.
As explained in my opinion of September 5, 1980, a copy of which is attached, this case is before me on the second prong of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and on motion for new trial. Obeying my understanding of the command of the United States Supreme Court, I am permitting inquiry into all matters which may impact favorably to defendant on the sentence to be imposed. Another judge ruled that certain evidence was not relevant to guilt, but I deem the evidence to be quite relevant to sentencing, and, if some of the conversations on tape are uncoded, it may be that although their relevance would not appear before deciphering, the conversations may indeed be relevant to guilt, but that remains to be decided.
Defendant claims that his activities were known to, and were condoned and encouraged by the United States Department of Justice; that prominent persons engaged in illegal activities; that defendant participated in the monitoring of his own conversations with others with the aid and assistance of Department of Justice officials and that presentation of his defense and presentation of testimony in mitigation of punishment has been thwarted by government officials and other persons of prominence. As I have had occasion to explain before, this matter the government says is quite sensitive is a situation of the government's own making. It elected to prosecute defendant, and, when it did, defendant's due process rights became dominant. I have explained to the prosecution that it can, if it wishes, dismiss this case, but so long as I must decide defendant's fate, I shall provide him with all of the rights I think are guaranteed him by the Constitution and by the United States Supreme Court.
It is my intent to permit defendant to present all evidence which is relevant to his sentencing, and, although it is my desire to protect ongoing investigations and grand jury proceedings insofar as possible, it must be remembered that Grand Jury material has been disclosed as it had to be under 18 U.S.C. § 3500, and that disclosure broke the seal of secrecy as to it. Congress has so decreed. Moreover, the interests of justice demand that full inquiry be made into the truth or falsity of the averments of defendant, because, if true, they are in mitigation of sentence and, if uncoded, they may bear on the granting of a new trial on some or all of the counts on which he stands convicted.
In the course of on the record discussions concerning setting this matter for hearing, an invitation was extended to all interested public officials to participate. It appeared that defendant wished to call, among others, Philip B. Heyman, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice. A subpoena was served on him, but before it was even served, the government filed a motion to quash saying that he is precluded from providing information because of 28 C.F.R. 16.21 and because defendant didn't tell Mr. Heyman in advance what he was going to be asked about. It would be Valhalla for a private lawyer to be able to get a preview of an adverse witness' cross-examination. Defense counsel promptly filed an affidavit explaining the scope of the inquiry, at least part of which I think is probably relevant to this proceeding.
Moreover, during the course of the hearing, Department of Justice witnesses have refused to answer because of a direction they have received from the Deputy Attorney General to keep secret information which, by Department of Justice ipse dixit, is classified as immune from judicial process because of an "ongoing investigation." These agency directives of secrecy pose that which is for me a very difficult question. If an agency or its officials can decide what will and what will not be subject to disclosure in a court of the United States, functioning of the courts can be frustrated. I did not rule on the direction given the witnesses to refuse to answer, and I have asked for briefs from all interested parties, although, as I shall explain presently, it may be that I will not reach the question.
I say that because of an ancient rule of law which probably would not apply had the Department of Justice not demanded that some of its officials be excused from testifying and that others be permitted to refuse to answer relevant questions. Before that position was taken by the Department of Justice, the witnesses were equally available to both parties, but now it is crystal clear that they are not and the appropriate evidentiary inferences or presumptions come into play. See, Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal.App.2d 102, 335 P.2d 736; Barringer v. Arnold, 358 Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365; State v. Raible (Ohio App.) 117 N.E.2d 480; Hinton v. Waste Techniques Corp., 243 Pa. Super. 189, 364 A.2d 724.
In a sense this case is a modern version of Barbara Tuchman's Distant Mirror because this case is almost a replay of a part of the legend of the West. Many people are too young to know anything about the Teapot Dome scandal, but it dealt with Wyoming oil reserves, and the most vital of all of the meetings of the alleged conspirators took place in Pueblo, Colorado. The Teapot Dome scandal resulted in the conviction of the only cabinet officer ever convicted pre-Watergate. Secretary of the Interior Fall was convicted of accepting a bribe from Sinclair, but Sinclair, tried to another jury, was acquitted on the charge of giving it.
Reports of the case are replete with names familiar to Colorado legend-Blackmer, Humphreys and Admiral (then Commander) Shafroth. Thus, I find it somewhat eerie that this 55-year old scandal provides a rule of law applicable to today's claim of right to refuse to disclose information. The case is reported as Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, (1927) 275 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 1, 72 L.Ed. 137, and the government was represented by Owen J. Roberts. Justice Butler delivered the unanimous opinion of the seven justices who participated in the case. This is what the Court said as to the failure of a party to call witnesses within that party's control:
Mammoth Oil dealt with presumptions to be applied against private...
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...record that I would apply the rule of Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States (1927) 275 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 1, 17 L.Ed. 137, and United States v. Feeney (1980) 501 F.Supp. 1324, and United States v. Feeney (1980) 501 F.Supp. 1337. Accordingly, I deem the accusations The local rules of this court wi......
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