United States v. Fields

• Decision Date: 02 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-10639,19-10639
• Citation: 977 F.3d 358
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Darius FIELDS, Defendant—Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

977 F.3d 358

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.Darius FIELDS, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 19-10639

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED October 2, 2020

Gary C. Tromblay, Leigha Amy Simonton, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff—Appellee.

Seth Kretzer, Law Offices of Seth Kretzer, Houston, TX, for Defendant—Appellant.

Before Smith, Clement, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:

Darius Fields was tried and convicted of three firearms offenses. On appeal, Fields raises three issues. First, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under an aiding-and-abetting theory of making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, as well as making false statements with respect to information that a licensed firearms dealer is required to keep in its records. Second, Fields asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. Third, Fields posits that the district court abused its discretion by including, in the written judgment, a special condition of supervised release that it omitted from the oral pronouncement of sentence. We affirm the conviction but vacate the sentence in part and remand for amendment of the written judgment by removing the unpronounced special condition.

I.

Fields was convicted of acquiring a firearm from a licensed dealer by false or fictitious statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(2), and 2 (Count One) and for making a false statement with respect to information required to be kept in the records of a federally licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(1)(A) and 2 (Count Two). The jury also found Fields guilty of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count Three).

Counts One and Two arise from the purchase of a pistol. In May 2017, Fields drove LaPorshya Polley, his then-girlfriend and subsequent codefendant, to DFW Gun Range, a federally licensed firearms dealer located in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. There, Polley purchased an FN 5.7 millimeter pistol. As part of the transaction, she completed a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Firearms Transaction Record ("Form 4473"), in which she certified that she was purchasing the firearm for herself and not for someone else.

Fields entered the store several minutes after Polley, proceeded to examine the contents of various display cases, and briefly stood near Polley and the attending salesman. Despite their close proximity, Fields did not acknowledge or otherwise indicate that he knew Polley. He left the store alone; Polley remained there for approximately thirty minutes, completing the requisite forms, successfully clearing a background check, and finalizing the purchase. During that time, Fields and Polley exchanged several texts, in one of which Polley wrote, "They only make the kind you told me not to get." After completing the purchase, Polley left the store carrying a bag. She rejoined Fields in the car, and they departed together.

Events during the following month gave rise to Count Three. In June 2017, the police sought Fields in connection with the kidnapping of a teenage girl. The officers located Fields with Polley in a hotel room, where they found a box of ammunition on a desk alongside various items, including Fields's belongings. Police found a loaded pistol—the same FN 5.7 pistol that Polley had purchased at the DFW Firing Range—in a nearby bag under some clothes.

The police also discovered a firearm in the car that Fields and Polley drove to the hotel and had parked outside. After initially denying that he had traveled in the car, Fields admitted it belonged to a friend and that he rode in it to the hotel. He gave officers the car key and permission to search the vehicle. Before searching, police looked through the window and saw an AK-47 style pistol that was partially covered in clothes. They later discovered that, like the FN 5.7 pistol, the second firearm had also been purchased by Polley.

A jury determined that Fields aided and abetted Polley in making a straw purchase, thus finding him guilty of Counts One and Two. The jury also found that as a convicted felon, Fields had possessed firearms and ammunition, convicting him of Count Three. The district court sentenced Fields to 216 months in prison and pronounced several special conditions of supervised release. In its written judgment, the court included an additional special condition not mentioned in the oral pronouncement—that Fields must submit to mental health treatment as directed by his probation officer.

II.

Fields contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on any of the three counts. He timely moved for a judgment of acquittal, properly preserving his challenge, so we review de novo . United States v. Huntsberry , 956 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir. 2020). "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Mitchell , 484 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2007). Moreover, "[w]e do not reevaluate the weight of the evidence or ... the credibility of the witnesses." United States v. Bowens , 907 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipsis in original). Furthermore, "[t]he standard of review is the same ... whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial." United States v. Burton , 126 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1997). Finally, "[i]t is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence." United States v. Pennington , 20 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

III.

On Count One, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), "the government must show that the defendant[ ] knowingly made false statements and that such statements were intended to deceive or likely to deceive a federally licensed firearms dealer with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale." United States v. Ortiz-Loya , 777 F.2d 973, 979 (5th Cir. 1985). Regarding Count Two, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A), the government must prove that "(1) the dealer was a federally licensed firearms dealer at the time the events occurred; (2) the defendant made a false statement or representation in a record that the licensed firearms dealer was required by federal law to maintain; and (3) the defendant made the false statement with knowledge of its falsity." United States v. Pena , 541 F. App'x 453, 455 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Abramski , 706 F.3d 307, 316–17 (4th Cir. 2013), aff'd , 573 U.S. 169, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014) ). Relatedly, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for aiding and abetting "requires the government to establish that the defendant willfully associated himself in some way with the criminal venture and willfully participated in it as he would in something he wished to bring about." Ortiz-Loya , 777 F.2d at 980. Furthermore, under § 2, a person "who ‘aids’ and ‘abets’ an offense against the United States is liable as a principal." Bowens , 907 F.3d at 351. Because the same evidence pertains directly to the first two counts, we discuss them together.

If Fields assisted Polley in making a straw purchase, that assistance would satisfy the elements of both counts. Indeed, an untruthful answer on a Form 4473 violates both relevant statutes.

First, intentionally providing a false answer regarding the actual purchaser violates § 922(a)(6) as a materially false statement intended to deceive the dealer. See United States v. Ortiz , 318 F.3d 1030, 1038–39 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Second, giving such an answer violates § 924(a)(1)(A) because it constitutes a false statement with respect to information that a firearms dealer must retain in his records. See Pena , 541 F. App'x at 455. Third, to effect a straw purchase, it is unnecessary that a defendant expressly know that a straw purchaser must falsify specific portions of a Form 4473. United States v. Soto , 539 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). Indeed, to find that a defendant aided and abetted a violation of § 924(a)(1)(A), it is "enough that [the defendant] encouraged [the straw purchaser] to represent herself as the ‘actual buyer’ and that, in order to do so, she was required to lie" on the Form 4473. United States v. Shorty , 741 F.3d 961, 970 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, the only questions are whether Polley bought the firearm for herself, and, if not, whether Fields aided and abetted the unlawful transaction.

Fields contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the government failed to show that he engaged in any affirmative conduct. Fields is correct that aiding and abetting requires "shared ... criminal intent" and "some affirmative conduct" by the defendant in support of the criminal act. United States v. Colwell , 764 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, "[t]he intent necessary to support a conviction can be demonstrated by direct or circumstantial evidence that allows an inference of an unlawful intent, and not every hypothesis of innocence need be excluded." United States v. Aggarwal , 17 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1994).

Fields contends that the government failed to prove that he engaged in any affirmative conduct, asserting that the best pieces of evidence the government produced were the text messages between Polley and Fields while she was in the firearms dealership. Although Fields posits that the text messages merely demonstrate that he was curious about Polley's whereabouts, he fails to address several other pieces of evidence suggesting the transaction...