United States v. Fiorillo
Decision Date | 03 April 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 351,Docket 30985.,351 |
Citation | 376 F.2d 180 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Vincent M. FIORILLO, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
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Irving Anolik, New York City, for defendant-appellant.
Edward Meyer, Asst. U. S. Atty., Southern Dist. of New York (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., and Douglas S. Liebhafsky, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and WATERMAN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Vincent M. Fiorillo, long engaged in the garbage collection business in Westchester County and elsewhere, was convicted on trial to the jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Edward Weinfeld, Judge, of perjury1 in his testimony before a Southern District Grand Jury investigating possible violations of the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act in the garbage collection industry, and he appeals. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
Appellant's chief claims are insufficiency of proof and error in the charge relating to the required quantum of proof, error in refusal of a request during the trial by defense counsel that he be allowed to withdraw since he felt he should testify, violation of the Communications Act by an agent's listening in on a telephone conversation, prejudicial cross-examination of defendant, entrapment, and lack of materiality of the perjured testimony.
Before the Grand Jury, appellant testified as follows:
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we must, United States v. Padilla, 374 F.2d 782 (2d Cir., March 13, 1967), it appears that the appellant had been in the garbage collection business for many years, as had his father before him, and that he had been barred from the business in the Bronx because of his association with one Nicholas Ratenni, also known as Nick Perry. The Grand Jury was investigating possible violations of the Hobbs Act in the Southern District in the garbage and refuse collection field. One Tony Vone, a small operator in the field, was soliciting an account at a new Geigy Chemical plant in Suffern, New York, late in 1964. Appellant asked him to desist from the solicitation, since appellant had invested money in the account, apparently a $5,000 "gift" to a Geigy officer to influence the awarding of the contract. Appellant offered in exchange to subcontract to Vone the Daitch-Shopwell stop on Pelham Road in New Rochelle, which was at the time under contract to appellant and by him subcontracted to one D'Onofrio. Vone agreed and in January 1965 began to service the Daitch stop. Among other garbage collection companies in the area were Westchester Carting owned by Ratenni and Valley Carting owned by one Tobia DeMicco.
In February, Fiorillo called Vone and told him he was under pressure from Ratenni and others and might have to give the Daitch stop back to D'Onofrio. On a morning in March, appellant called Vone, who was out. On Vone's return he called but failed to reach appellant. When appellant returned the call, F. B. I. Agent Taylor was in Vone's office and with Vone's permission listened in on an extension phone. Appellant told Vone that the Daitch subcontract would have to be returned to D'Onofrio, that Ratenni and DeMicco were putting pressure on appellant and that without their permission to do otherwise he would have to return the stop to D'Onofrio. Vone asked appellant to talk to Ratenni and DeMicco again and appellant said he would see what he could do. A few days later D'Onofrio's company resumed the service of the stop.
The testimony of Fiorillo before the Grand Jury was plainly material to an investigation of possible Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951,2 violation by obstructing, delaying or affecting commerce or the movement of a commodity in commerce by extortion or attempted extortion, or threats or violence. Materiality turns on the testimony's potential, viewed as a matter of law to be decided by the trial court, for affecting the course of the inquiry. United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955, 86 S.Ct. 429, 15 L.Ed.2d 360 (1965); United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653, 665 (2d Cir. 1965). If, as appellant assumes, the interstate character of the commerce under investigation makes a difference here, it was sufficiently shown by testimony of the foreman of the Grand Jury and the minutes.
The proof of falsity of the appellant's testimony before the Grand Jury was clearly sufficient, since the telephone conversation was testified to by two witnesses, Taylor and Vone, and there was, moreover, substantial corroboration in the treatment of the Daitch stop, as well as in the evidence of a post-indictment attempt to obtain an exculpatory affidavit from Vone.
After the indictment of appellant, appellant had met Vone and an associate of his, one Feraca, at a diner run by Charles Reiter. Appellant asked Vone for an affidavit of recantation respecting the phone call in question and Vone refused. Thereafter appellant had arranged to help Vone obtain a truck for use in his business.
Judge Weinfeld correctly charged the jury it could convict on the basis of direct testimony of two witnesses or of one witness plus independent and trustworthy corroborating circumstances. There is not nor ever has been a requirement that where two witnesses testify, circumstances must be ignored. Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 65 S.Ct. 548, 89 L.Ed. 495 (1945), merely required instruction that the corroborating circumstance must be trustworthy, while United States v. Alu, 236 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1956), also cited by appellant, merely held that essential facts in dispute must be proved by direct testimony of at least one witness rather than by circumstances alone. 236 F.2d at 181-82. Indeed, such a rule would be ridiculous when the government uses more than one witness or the defense witnesses implicate the accused. Here, both Vone and Taylor testified for the government, and if Vone was disbelieved because of his criminal record, or Taylor's testimony was incredible for any reason, circumstances elicited from appellant's case regarding his past relationship with Vone and the post-indictment meeting were sufficient to corroborate their testimony. Clearly, the jury would not have convicted had they disbelieved both Vone and Taylor.
The claim of entrapment is made, but upon what basis escapes us. There is no slightest indication that the government instigated the false testimony or implanted the idea of lying in Fiorillo's mind. Compare Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932); United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 908 (2d Cir. 1950), reversed on other grounds, 341 U.S. 946, 71 S.Ct. 1004, 95 L.Ed. 1370 (1951).
The claim of error for refusal of the court to permit withdrawal of counsel during the trial is based on the fact that appellant's trial counsel, one Terkeltoub, decided to take the stand to contradict Vone's version of the post-indictment diner meeting, during part of which counsel was present. The possibility of such a situation had been known to counsel and to appellant before the trial date was set, for the government had disclosed to court and counsel its intention to call Vone to testify concerning the diner conversation, pointing out that counsel had been present and a conflict might arise. The court required counsel to take the matter up with appellant, and with full knowledge of the possibility, counsel, with appellant's consent, entered upon the trial without employing other counsel. There was no error in these circumstances in going on with the trial even though Terkeltoub took the stand.
No case has been found requiring a new trial because the complaining party's attorney testified at trial hence depriving him of the assistance of counsel. Such a claim seems untenable unless the attorney testifies against his client who is unable to cross-examine him. Nor does the record show that appellant's counsel was distracted from his defense by preoccupation with his own testimony and credibility. Nor was appellant prejudiced by such testimony since, unlike Weil...
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Irrelevant or Immaterial Questions
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