United States v. Fitzsimons
| Decision Date | 26 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No.: 21-158 (RC) |
| Citation | 605 F.Supp.3d 132 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Kyle FITZSIMONS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Brandon K. Regan, Puja Bhatia, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, DOJ-USAO, Washington, DC, Douglas Burton Brasher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Dallas, TX, Michael Matthew Gordon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, Criminal Division, Violent Crimes and Narcotics Section, Tampa, FL, Robert Craig Juman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for United States of America.
Natasha Taylor-Smith, Public Defender, Federal Community Defender Office, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT III OF THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT
As a result of his alleged participation in the events at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, Defendant Kyle Fitzsimons stands charged with several offenses. See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 50. Today, the Court denies Fitzsimons's motion to dismiss Count III of the Superseding Indictment, which charges that Fitzsimons "attempted to, and did, corruptly obstruct, influence, and impede an official proceeding, that is, a proceeding before Congress, specifically, Congress's certification of the Electoral College vote as set out in the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and 3 U.S.C. §§ 15 - 18," all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2) and 2. Superseding Indictment at 2.
The general events of January 6, 2021 are by now well known, and the indictments filed in this case add only general descriptions of Fitzsimons's alleged involvement, so the Court will be brief in reciting the relevant facts. At 1:00 p.m. on January 6, 2021, both houses of Congress, as well as then-Vice President Mike Pence, convened in a joint session in the Hall of the House of Representatives to carry out their constitutional and statutory duty "to certify the Electoral College vote in the 2020 presidential election." United States v. Montgomery , No. CR 21-46, 578 F.Supp.3d 54, 59 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2021) ; see U.S. Const. amend. XII ; 3 U.S.C. §§ 15 – 18. Fitzsimons was a member of the crowd that converged upon and entered restricted areas of the Capitol grounds. Superseding Indictment at 4.1 While there, he engaged in physical violence, injured an officer of the United States Capitol Police and an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department, and ultimately impeded and disrupted Congress's certification proceeding from going forward as planned. See id. at 2–5. The mob forced Congress to evacuate the House and Senate chambers; they were not able to return and fulfill their duty of ascertaining and counting the electoral votes until the wee hours of the following morning. Montgomery , 578 F.Supp.3d at 59–60.
Only one of the Superseding Indictment's ten charges against Fitzsimons is relevant to the instant motion. Count III charges Fitzsimons with obstructing, influencing, and impeding Congress's certification of the electoral vote, allegedly in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).2 Superseding Indictment at 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) reads:
18 U.S.C. § 1512 (emphasis added). "Official proceeding" is defined in a subsequent section to include "a proceeding before Congress":
18 U.S.C. § 1515(a) (emphasis added).
Fitzsimons moves to dismiss Count III, which he says fails to state an offense for three reasons. First, Fitzsimons argues that the January 6 election certification meeting was not an "official proceeding" as that term is used in § 1515(c)(2), and, therefore, that any obstruction of the meeting would be beyond the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 3. Second, Fitzsimons contends that the mens rea term in § 1512(c), "corruptly," is unconstitutionally vague, or, alternatively, is constitutional only when narrowly construed to apply only to actions taken "with the intent to obtain an unlawful advantage for oneself or an associate contrary to the due administration of justice." Id. at 32. If this narrowed understanding is correct, Fitzsimons argues, Count III fails to state an offense because it does not allege conduct that "had anything to do with interfering with a tribunal, or the flow of evidence, or anything else characteristic of the administration of justice." Id. at 37. Third, he says that "the conduct [he] has been accused of committing cannot qualify as conduct that ‘otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes’ an official proceeding, within the meaning of" § 1512(c)(2). Id. at 2. According to Fitzsimons, these terms refer only to "conduct that impairs the integrity and availability of evidence," and the Superseding Indictment fails to allege any such conduct. Id. at 30 (emphasis omitted). The Court joins the weight of authority in this district in rejecting these arguments about the scope and constitutionality of § 1512(c)(2), and therefore denies Fitzsimons's motion to dismiss Count III.
"An indictment's main purpose is to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him." United States v. Ballestas , 795 F.3d 138, 148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Thus, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require only that the indictment include "a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). A defendant may move to dismiss counts of an indictment for "failure to state an offense." Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). A court considering such a motion must "assume[ ] the truth of th[e] factual allegations" in the indictment. Ballestas , 795 F.3d at 149. Indeed, the court's review is limited to "the four corners of the indictment." United States v. Ring , 628 F. Supp. 2d 195, 204 (D.D.C. 2009). This limitation "affords deference to the ‘fundamental role of the grand jury.’ " United States v. Mostofsky , No. CR 21-138, 579 F.Supp.3d 9, 15 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2021) (quoting Ballestas , 795 F.3d at 148 ). "Adherence to the language of the indictment is essential because the Fifth Amendment requires that criminal prosecutions be limited to the unique allegations of the indictments returned by the grand jury." United States v. Hitt , 249 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2001). "A court accordingly cabins its analysis to the face of the indictment and, more specifically, the language used to charge the crimes." Mostofsky , 579 F.Supp.3d at 15 (cleaned up).
Fitzsimons's first argument is that the relevant definition of "official proceeding" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) —"a proceeding before the Congress," 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(B) —applies only to "tribunal-like proceedings before Congress related to the administration of justice," and that the January 6th electoral vote certification meeting was not such a proceeding. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 2. This Court recently joined several other judges in this district in rejecting a very similar set of arguments, and does the same here. United States v. Andries , No. CR 21-93, 2022 WL 768684, at *4–7 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2022) ().
In Andries , the Court analyzed dictionary definitions of the relevant statutory terms, case law interpreting them, and their statutory context to conclude that the plain meaning of "proceeding before the Congress" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(B) is "a formal convocation at which Congress has convened to conduct its official business." 2022 WL 768684, at *4–7. The Court further explained that the defendant's assertions about the statute's purpose and legislative history—principally that Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) as part of a statute principally concerned with obstruction of justice in corporate fraud cases, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—were not persuasive and in any event could not override the statute's plain meaning. 2022 WL 768684, at *3, *7. Next, the Court held that whatever "the precise contours of formality necessary to constitute an official proceeding" and whatever the scope of Congress's "official business," "there is a wealth of indicators that the electoral count session is a formal convocation for the carrying out of Congress's official business":
The Constitution requires the Vice President, acting as President of the Senate, to "open all the certificates" of...
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