United States v. Fowkes

• Decision Date: 10 November 1892
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. FOWKES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

53 F. 13

UNITED STATES v. FOWKES.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

November 10, 1892

Robert Ralston, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Ellery P. Ingham, U.S. Atty for the United States.

Thomas Hart, Jr., for appellee.

Before ACHESON and DALLAS, Circuit Judges, and BUFFINGTON, District judge.

DALLAS Circuit Judge.

This was an application made on behalf of the United States to the United States district court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, for a warrant for the removal of the appellee to the eastern division of the eastern judicial district of Missouri. At the same time the appellee, who had been committed by the commissioner to the custody of the marshal, presented his petition to the same court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was allowed, issued and returned forthwith. Under this writ the relator was after hearing, discharged, and thereupon this appeal was taken from that order, as well as in the matter of the application for a warrant of removal. The assignments of error relate to both proceedings as practically constituting a single matter, and the whole case may be disposed of here, as it was by the district court, with reference to the habeas corpus; for, of course, if the appellee was entitled to discharge under that writ, no warrant for his further detention could have been properly issued. It is not necessary to consider the several assignments in detail. The material points presented may be disposed of by determining the answers which should be made to the two general questions to which the arguments of counsel have been directed: First. Has this court jurisdiction of this appeal? Second. Was there error in the discharge of the appellee, in view of the facts and circumstances of this case?

1. The act of congress of March 3, 1891, which created the several circuit courts of appeals, provides (section 4) that no appeal shall hereafter be allowed from any district court to the existing circuit courts, but that 'all appeals, by writ of error or otherwise, from said district courts, shall only be subject to review in the supreme court of the United States or in the circuit courts of appeals, hereby established, as is hereinafter provided. ' Section 6 of the same statute provides that the circuit courts of appeals shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review final decisions in the district courts, other than those provided for in the fifth section, unless otherwise provided by law. The present case is not included among those which are provided for by the fifth section, and there is no other provision of law affecting the subject. Hence it is clear that, if an appeal in such a case as this could, before the creation of this court, have been taken to the circuit court for this circuit, the present case is now cognizable by this tribunal as the lawful successor of that court with respect to such appellate jurisdiction. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 666, 12 S.Ct. 118; Lau Ow Bew v. U.S., 144 U.S. 47, 56, 12 S.Ct. 517. Entertaining this view of the matter, we have made investigation as to the jurisdiction of the circuit courts in such cases prior to March, 1891, and find that it existed. The question presented itself, and was judicially answered in a manner which accords with our judgment, in the case of Seavey v. Seymour, 3 Cliff. 439. See, also, Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, and Rev. St. § 763.

2. The appellee was in the custody of an officer of the United States, under color of a law of the United States. His detention was alleged to be justified solely by section 1014 of the Revised Statutes, which provides for the arrest and imprisonment of offenders only 'for any crime or offense against the United States, * * * for trial before such court of the United States as by law has cognizance of the offense. ' The court alleged to have such cognizance in this case is a district court of the United States in Missouri. If he had committed a crime against the United States, and if the district court referred to did have cognizance of it, the prisoner was, of course, lawfully held; but, if either of these facts did not exist, then his imprisonment, being without the sanction of the only law of the United States relied upon for its justification, was violative of that law. Seavey v. Seymour, supra. It follows from what has been said that it was the duty of the district court, making 'inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty' (Rev. St. § 752) in the case of the relator, who alleged that he was in custody in violation of law, to direct that inquiry to the matters we have alluded to as relevant to the issue joined upon that allegation. Horner v. U.S., 143 U.S. 207, 12 S.Ct. 407. Of this there can be no doubt; and, indeed, we do not understand that the learned district attorney has questioned the soundness of this general proposition, thus broadly stated, but that his contention relates only to the character of the inquiry which should be made and the extent to which it should be carried. The position taken on behalf of the United States is that the district court could not look beyond the indictment and the action of the commissioner by whom the relator had been committed; and this position was adhered to throughout the proceedings in that court, notwithstanding the fact that ample opportunity was afforded the appellant to produce evidence to refute that which was presented on behalf of the appellee. We, however, cannot sustain this view of the law. We do not doubt that a district court may, in its discretion, and in a proper case, order a warrant of removal upon the indictment alone; but it would be going much further, and much too far, as we think, to hold that in all cases, and especially in such a case as this record discloses, the judge is precluded from hearing any other evidence whatever, and must, upon mere inspection of the indictment, order the removal of the accused person to a considerable distance for trial, although evidence be offered which, if received, would conclusively establish that the court to which it is asked that he shall be remanded is without jurisdiction to try him.

We must not be understood as deciding that upon an application for a warrant under section 1014 of the Revised Statutes it is the duty of, or would be proper for, the court to enter upon an inquiry in the nature of a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The learned judge of the district court did not do so in this case; but, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and with reference to the special circumstances stated in his opinion, he-- properly viewing the function which he was called upon to exercise...