United States v. Fox
| Decision Date | 31 August 1880 |
| Parties | THE UNITED STATES, respondent, v. FOX, appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Third District, Lewis and Clarke County.
THE facts and authorities cited will appear in the opinion. No briefs filed.CHUMASERO & CHADWICK and E. W. Toole, for appellant.
J. L. DRYDEN, U. S. district-attorney, for respondent.
This is an application for a discharge from imprisonment on habeas corpus.
I will state sufficient of the facts to present the question to be determined.
It appears from the record that the defendant, George W. Fox, was cashier and one of the directors of the People's National Bank of Helena in the Territory of Montana; that at the November term, 1879, of the district court within and for the county of Lewis and Clarke sitting to hear and determine causes arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, certain indictments were returned against Fox by the grand jury thereof, charging him with the crime of making false entries in the books of the bank, embezzlement, perjury and forgery; that at said November term he was tried upon one of said indictments, which trial resulted in a failure of the jury to agree, and thereupon at the same term another jury was impaneled, but before the close of the second trial, one of the jurymen becoming sick and unable to attend court, the jury was discharged and the cause continued for the term; that at the March term, 1880, of said court, that being the next term thereof after the November term, the defendant demanded a trial upon the indictments aforesaid, and a designated day had, by the court, been assigned for such trials during said term; that in consequence of congress having failed to make the necessary appropriations of money to pay the expenses of marshals in serving process in such cases, and there being no money in the hands of the marshal, or in the treasury of the United States applicable to the payment of such expenses, the marshal of the Territory officially notified the judge of the court of his inability to further serve process by reason of the failure of congress to make the necessary appropriations of money for that purpose, which notice was entered of record and is as follows:
“Hon. D. S. WADE, Chief Justice of Montana:
DEAR SIR--I recently addressed a letter to the attorney-general referring to the failure of congress to pass the marshals' appropriation bill, stating that I had already advanced an inconveniently large sum to defray the actual expenses of executing process and asking what course I should pursue. In reply I have this day received a communication in which the following language is used:
Accordingly this is to inform you that I will be unable to execute process on behalf of the United States until congress shall have made an appropriation for such services.
U. S. Marshal, Dist. Montana.”
Whereupon the court of its own motion made and caused to be entered of record the following order:
“By reason of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that all United States cases be continued for this March term of court, and United States grand and trial jurors summoned for the term are hereby notified that their services will not be required.”
Thereupon the defendant, after the adjournment of said March term of court, made application to the judge of said court for his discharge from imprisonment upon habeas corpus, which was denied and he appeals to this court.
The ground upon which the petitioner bases his right to a discharge from imprisonment is that at the said March term of court he was ready for and demanded a trial upon said several indictments, and that the United States being plaintiff in the cases, and charged with the duty of providing the necessary money therefor, and speedily prosecuting the same, failed, neglected and refused so to do at said March term, whereby the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
1. Among the principles that adorn the common law, making it the pride of all English-speaking people, and a lasting monument to the noble achievements of liberty over the encroachments of arbitrary power, are the following: No man can be rightfully imprisoned except upon a charge of crime properly made in pursuance of the law of the land. No man, when so imprisoned upon a lawful charge presented in a lawful manner specifying the crime, can be arbitrarily held without a trial.
These principles are in accord with the enlightened spirit of the common law, and form a part of the framework of the English Constitution. They are guaranteed and secured by Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights, and by a long course of judicial decision, and they belong to us as a part of our inheritance from the mother country. These rights were claimed by our ancestors in Colonial times, and they have been engrafted into and secured by our Constitution, the supreme law of the land, which, in article six of the amendments, provides:
ART. VI. “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”
Within the meaning of this article of the Constitution what is a speedy trial?
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution the common law was in force in this country so far as applicable, and the terms used in that instrument ought to be construed with reference to their common-law meaning.
Some idea of the term, “speedy trial” at common law may be gathered from the fact that by that law, in order to insure the trial of all prisoners within a certain time, a patent in the nature of a letter is issued from the king to certain persons appointing them his justices, and authorizing them to deliver his jails. Bouv. Law. Dic., title Gaol Delivery.
The jails are thus cleared and all offenders tried,...
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United States v. Olsen
...in Colonial times, and they have been engrafted into and secured by our Constitution, the supreme law of the land[.] United States v. Fox , 3 Mont. 512, 515–16 (1880) (holding that, at common law, a prosecutor's neglect or laches constitutes a denial of a speedy trial).To be sure, after cro......
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State v. Keefe
...and deliver every prisoner, whereby the jails were generally cleared at least twice in each year. (12 Cyc. 498; 4 Bl. Com. ch. 19; U.S. v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512; 2 Hawkins' C. ch. 6; Cummins v. People, supra.) And by the habeas corpus act of 31 Car. II c. 2 (1680), it was provided, among other t......
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State v. Keeler
...the court and public officers can, without extraordinary efforts, diligence, or exertion, get around to its consideration ( United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512; State Conrow, 13 Mont. 552, 35 P. 240); and, finally, the right to an impartial jury is held to mean a jury composed of persons whos......
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State v. Maldonado
...whereby the English jails were emptied twice a year and the prisoners either convicted or discharged. See generally, United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512, 515-516 (1880); People v. Den Uyl, 320 Mich. 477, 486-487, 31 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1948). The right was further implemented by the English Habe......