United States v. Frazier
| Decision Date | 10 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | 3:17-cr-00130 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. [1] JAMES WESLEY FRAZIER [2] AELIX SANTIAGO [3] KYLE HEADE [8] MICHAEL FORRESTER, JR. [10] JAMIE HERN [15] DEREK LEIGHTON STANLEY [17] WILLIAM BOYLSTON [18] JASON MEYERHOLZ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
At the pretrial conference on March 9, 2020, the Court informed the parties that, having considered United States v. Lawson, 5535 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 1999), it intended to empanel an anonymous jury in this case. The Court, having studied the Third Superseding Indictment and considered all of record recreated through pretrial motions, identified a number of measures that would be taken to address potential security concerns, while at the same time preserving each Defendant's right to a fair trial.
Now before the Court is Defendant's Joint Objection to an Anonymous Jury and Motion to Reconsider Order (Doc. No. 1420), to which the Government has responded in opposition (Doc. No. 1454), and Defendants have replied (Doc No. 1480). Defendants' Motion will be denied.
"The Sixth Amendment provides defendants with a right to a public trial by an impartial jury, but it does not guarantee a right to a public jury." Lawson, 535 F.3d at 440-41 (citing U.S. Const. amend). In fact, "[f]ounding-era evidence indicat[es] that such a right was not intended to be part of the Constitution," id., and the empanelment of an anonymous jury is specifically allowed by statute, 28 U.S.C. 1 1863(b)(7). Nevertheless, anonymous juries are the exception, not the rule.
Relying on Talley, the Sixth Circuit in Lawson observed:
We have referred in the past to the Second Circuit's preference that "a district court should not order the empaneling of an anonymous jury without '(a) concluding that there is strong reason to believe the jury needs protection, and (b) taking reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure that his fundamental rights are protected.'" [Talley, 164 F.3d at 1001] (quoting United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991)). The anonymity of a jury should be preserved in situations including, but not necessarily limited to, the following: (1) when the case involves very dangerous defendants who were participants in large-scale organized crime, and who participated in mob-style killings and had previously attempted to interfere with the judicial process; (2) when the defendants had a history of attempted jury tampering and serious criminal records; or (3) when there have been allegations of dangerous and unscrupulous conduct by the defendant, coupled with extensive pretrial publicity. Seeid. (citing Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192). (emphasis added).
535 F.3d at 439. Defendants insist that "[b]ecause the[se] factors are not present in this case, and because there is no evidence whatsoever suggesting that the jurors are in any danger," this Court's reliance on Talley and Lawson for its decision was misplaced, and "empaneling an anonymous jury in this case is unnecessary, inappropriate, and unconstitutional." (Doc. No. 1420 at 4). The Court disagrees.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the jury selected in this case will hardly be anonymous. Rather, the jury will be "partially innominate" or "semi-anonymous" because, while the names of the jurors will be known to the Court and all counsel of record, Defendants will not know the actual identities of the jurors. See, United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962, 964 n. 1 (11th Cir.2001) (); United States v. Nicholson, No. 13-20764, 2014 WL 5312276, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2014) (); United States v. Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 2d 939, 956 (N.D. Iowa 2005) ().
Furthermore, unlike the typical case where little is known about a prospective juror prior to the start of voir dire, the prospective jurors in this case were each required to complete an extensive questionnaire that was the result of a joint effort between the Court and the parties. See United States v. Edwards, 119 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592 (M.D. La. 2000) (). Nevertheless, for continuity's sake only, the Court will continue to identify the jury to be selected as anonymous.
Nomenclature aside, this Court's decision is supported by Talley and Lawson. Quoting Lawson, Defendants argue that (1) "it cannot be tenably suggested that the Defendants 'ha[ve] a history of attempted jury tampering,' have 'serious criminal records,' have 'participated in mob-style killings,' 'previously attempted to interfere with the judicial process,' or are 'very dangerous defendants'"; (2) "[n]one of the defendants in this case have been accused of intending to intimidate,threaten, injure or tamper with the jury in any way, nor have they been accused of doing so in the past" and (3) "while there are unproven 'allegations of dangerous and unscrupulous conduct' in this case, the allegations have not been 'coupled with extensive pretrial publicity.'" (Doc. No. 1420 at 4-6).
Defendants fundamentally misread Lawson when they suggest that at least one of the three factors listed in Lawson and in Talley must be met in order for an anonymous jury to be appropriate. Quite the contrary, what the Sixth Circuit said was that the "anonymity of a jury should be preserved" when any of the three factors are met, while at the same time noting that empanelment of an anonymous jury is "not necessarily limited to" those factors. Lawson, 535 F.3d at 439. This proposition is clear from Talley itself.
In Talley, the trial judge empaneled an anonymous jury because defendant "had allegedly tried to interfere with the judicial process by attempting to have a witness in his criminal case killed, it was not unreasonable to assume that he may try to further interfere with the judicial process, [and] the case was of some 'modicum of interest' to the press." 164 F.3d at 1001. In affirming that decision, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged "there was no evidence that [defendant] was involved in a criminal organization that included a pattern of violence, that he had ever attempted to tamper with any previous juries (such as the grand jury in his case), or that there was any evidence of extensive pretrial publicity." Id. Nevertheless, an anonymous jury was appropriate because the record illustrated defendant's "dangerousness in this case and on other occasions, and showed that his many years of law enforcement experience provided him with the types of contacts that would enable him to tamper with the jury." Id. at 1002.
As in Talley, there are more than enough allegations before to the Court to warrant ananonymous jury. Defendants (with the exception of Derek Stanley) are all alleged to be members of the Mongols, an outlaw motorcycle club that proclaims itself to be part of the "1%" of motorcycle clubs that are not law-abiding. While Defendants assert that "[a] Westlaw search unconvered no use of an anonymous jury in a prosection of alleged Mongols' members," (Doc. No. 1420 at 5), "the Mongols Nation is a convicted criminal entity" whose "members have pleaded guilty to heinous acts of murder, attempted murder, drug trafficking, and other crimes," United States v. Mongol Nation, 370 F Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2019). In this regard, the Mongols are not dissimilar from the Outlaw Motorcycle Club, the Bandidos, or the Hell's Angels for whom trials before anonymous juries have been approved. See, United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 685 (6th Cir. 2009) (); United States v. Portillo, No. 5:15-CR-820-DAE (1), 2018 WL 9786081, at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 23, 2018) (); United States v. Fabel, No. CR06-041RSL, 2007 WL 9728659, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2007) ().
Nor can it be seriously argued, as Defendants assert, that the Government supports the empanelment of an anonymous jury simply because "other members of the Mongols Motorcycle Club in other states in other regions of the country have intimidated witnesses before," or that"because the national Mongols organization has been labeled as organized crime, an anonymous jury is justified" here. (Doc. No. 1480 at 2). To the contrary, the Third Superseding Indictment in this case alleges a wide-ranging RICO conspiracy involving two murders, four kidnappings, a shooting, four assaults in aid of racketeering, assorted physical violence,...
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