United States v. Fresno Unified School Dist., F-75-220-Civ.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. F-75-220-Civ.,F-75-220-Civ.
• Citation: 412 F. Supp. 392
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. FRESNO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.

412 F. Supp. 392

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. FRESNO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.

No. F-75-220-Civ.

United States District Court, E. D. California.

April 27, 1976.

Daniel L. Bell, II, Atty., Dept. of Justice, McLean, Va., by Brewster Q. Morgan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff.

Robert M. Wash, County Counsel of Fresno County, by Thomas J. Riggs, Deputy County Counsel, Fresno, Cal., for defendants.

FURTHER MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

CROCKER, District Judge.

On December 11, 1975, the Attorney General filed suit on behalf of the United States against the defendant School District, the District Superintendent and members of the District's Governing Board. The complaint alleges that the actions of the defendants ". . . constitute a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment by women of the right to equal employment opportunity guaranteed them by Title VII."

The complaint further alleges that the court has jurisdiction on the basis of Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-6(b) which authorizes so-called pattern or practice suits and Title 28, United States Code, Section 1345 which is the general jurisdictional grant to the district courts to entertain actions specifically authorized by statute.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint and the action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants assert that the Attorney General has no present authority under Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e-6, to bring a pattern or practice suit against a political subdivision such as the School District because that authority was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by the 1972 Amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The language of the statute in question compels this court to grant the motion to dismiss. Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the sole authority to bring pattern or practice suits was lodged in the Attorney General. Section 2000e-6(a) of Title VII presently retains the original language from the 1964 Act that recites that the Attorney General had this authority. Subdivision (c), however, states that on March 24, 1974, "the functions of the Attorney General under this section shall be transferred to the Commission, together with such personnel, property, records, . . ." etc., and subdivision (d) provides that the EEOC would be substituted as a party for the Attorney General in existing lawsuits on that date. Subdivision (e) authorized the EEOC to commence investigating and acting upon pattern or practice charges in 1972 so that there would be a two year overlap of authority to facilitate a smooth transfer of functions. Subdivision (e) also provides, in most significant language, that all actions brought by the Commission "shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 2000e-5."

Section 2000e-5(b) provides that an employer shall be given notice by the Commission of a charge of unlawful employment practices. The Commission must then determine if there is reasonable cause to believe such charge is true, and if such cause is found, attempt to informally conciliate the dispute. Subdivisions (c) and (d) require the Commission to defer for sixty days to state or local authorities authorized to act under state or local law to remedy the practice. Subdivision (f)(1) provides that if after a thirty day period the Commission "has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission", a civil action may be brought in the appropriate United States District Court.

It appears that in enacting the 1972 Amendments Congress intended to transfer the entire pattern or practice jurisdiction to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and it also appears that it was...