United States v. Fuller

• Decision Date: 21 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-2113.,73-2113.
• Citation: United States v. Fuller, 497 F. 2d 551 (6th Cir. 1974)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Craig Lee FULLER, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

497 F.2d 551 (1974)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v.Craig Lee FULLER, Appellant.

No. 73-2113.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 9, 1974.

Decided May 21, 1974.

Frederick Cohn, New York City, on brief, for appellant.

Eldon L. Webb, Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee; Eugene E. Siler, Jr., U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., on brief.

Before EDWARDS, CELEBREZZE and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.

LIVELY, Circuit Judge.

After waiving trial by jury the defendant was found guilty of failure to submit to induction into the armed forces of the United States in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462.His five-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for 25 months on condition that he accept employment for 24 months at a civilian hospital.The defendant accepted probation on this condition.

Upon registering for the draft Fuller received a student deferment, but this was lost when he dropped out of college.He made several attempts to establish his disqualification for military service on grounds of physical disability, submitting medical statements to his local board which indicated that he was suffering from a weakness of the feet, nasal congestion and chronic nasal allergy.He also claimed a psychiatric disability, which will be discussed more fully in this opinion.Each time he was examined, defendant was found acceptable for military service.

On February 27, 1969defendant filed with his local board Form 150 seeking a I-O conscientious objector classification.In this form he claimed exemption from both combatant and non-combatant training and service in the armed forces, but indicated a willingness to perform civilian alternative service if called.A portion of the form is headed Series II — Religious Training and Belief.Question one requires the applicant to "Describe the nature of your belief which is the basis of your claim and state why you consider it to be based on religious training and belief."Defendant's complete answer was:

I am "devoted to" Humanity; to life.I possess an intense "affection for" all living things.These, according to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, are the to sic valid definitions of religion.

Question two under Series II requires the applicant to "Explain how, when and from whom or from what source you received the religious training and acquired the religious belief which is the basis of your claim."Defendant answered as follows:

I attended church in Waverly Ohio and in Oregon and found a condition of hippocracy in existance so strong it would have stiffled even the most self evident truths, truths which I have required sic from men like Edward Carlos and Bruce Sodervick who are proffessers at the University.(Spelling and punctuation as in original.)

The records of the local board indicate that the Form 150 of defendant was reviewed on March 11, 1969.Two members signed a notation that "The statements therein are not considered as warranting a change of classification from I-A to I-O.Accordingly the classification is again confirmed as I-A."The same date the executive secretary of the board entered the following minute: "SSS Form 150 reviewed.Board does not feel that there are any grounds for a conscientious objector's classification.Classification reopened and registrant again classified I-A."Thereafter the defendant was granted a personal appearance before the board and was notified to appear on May 13, 1969.The defendant did not appear, but the board reviewed the file and the classification was again confirmed as I-A in accordance with the decision of March 11, 1969.The local board forwarded the file to Ohio Selective Service headquarters and on July 9, 1969 the Appeal Board affirmed the denial of exemption without any further statement of the reason therefor.

The district court held that there was no violation of defendant's rights in the refusal to reclassify him as a conscientious objector.It found that the statements contained in defendant's Form 150 were not sufficient to justify granting such a classification and that the request was properly considered and the refusal was for sufficient, stated reasons.Both parties cite United States v. O'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365(6th Cir.1971).In the O'Bryan opinionthis court noted that the scope of review applicable to Selective Service cases is among the most narrow known, and that reviewing courts may not sit as "super boards."The question before a court reviewing the actions of a draft board is whether there is a basis in fact for the determination made by the board.The first, or threshold step, in determining whether there is a basis in fact for a board decision is for the reviewing court to "determine, on the basis of the registrant's submitted Selective Service Form 150 and supplemental material, whether the registrant has made out a prima facie case for entitlement to classification as a conscientious objector."450 F.2d at 368.In O'Bryan, neither the government nor the district court contended that the registrant had failed to make out a prima facie case.Independent examination of the Selective Service file confirmed that a prima facie case for conscientious objector classification had been made out and the court then reached the second step which required it to consider whether the statement of the board denying the classification was sufficient.The court held that where a local board gives no statement of reasons for rejecting an application which presents to it a prima facie case for conscientious objector classification it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the local board exceeded its jurisdiction in making the decision.When no such statement is made a local board has failed to demonstrate a basis in fact for its determination, and a conviction based upon refusal to submit to induction must be reversed.

Our first task then is to determine whether the defendant made out a prima facie case for I-O classification.In Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 91 S.Ct. 2068, 29 L.Ed.2d 810(1971), the Supreme Court set forth three tests which must be satisfied by a draft registrant in order to qualify for conscientious objector classification: (1)"He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form."(2)"He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, as the term has been construed in our decisions."(3)"And he must show that this objection is sincere."403 U.S. at 700.The statements contained on Craig Fuller's Form 150 do not directly relate his conscientious opposition to war to any religious training and belief.Although in answer to question number four under Series II Fuller claims to have expressed his views orally in class and in a theme for English and a lengthy poem written in a fine arts course, neither the theme nor the poem was submitted as a supporting document.Furthermore, neither of the two professors referred to by Fuller as supplying his "truths," and given as references, filed any supporting information with the board.

We recognize that the statement of an applicant for reclassification is not required to be written in the language approved by the courts or accepted among theologians.United States v. O'Bryan, supra, at 372.However, there are significant differences between the statement of Fuller and that of O'Bryan as set forth at 450 F.2d 368 n. 2.Defendant contends that his statement meets the requirements listed in Clay v. United States, supra, when considered in the light of United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733(1965), andWelsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308(1970).In those two casesthe Supreme Court considered conscientious objector claims which were based on convictions acquired from sources other than formal religious training or orthodox religious beliefs.In Seeger,the court provided a test for determining whether an applicant's beliefs are religious within the meaning of the exemption statute as follows:

The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.380 U.S. at 176.

In Welsh, the applicant denied that his scruples against taking part in wars was based on religious training, but wrote a letter that his beliefs were "certainly religious in the ethical sense."The government conceded that Welsh's beliefs were held with the strength of more traditional religious convictions, but the appeal board could find no religious basis for his beliefs, opinions and convictions.The Supreme Court held that a person is not excluded from conscientious objector exemption because his objection to participation in war is founded upon considerations of public policy or opposition to governmental activities in the fields of domestic or foreign affairs.Welsh stated that he believed the taking of any life was morally wrong, that all human life is valuable and that he would not injure or kill another human being.The plurality opinion of Mr. Justice Black states the requirement of 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) in these words:

That section exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.398 U.S. at 344.

Giving full consideration to the Supreme Court opinions in Seeger and Welsh, we do not believe the statements contained in Fuller's Form 150 made out a prima facie case for conscientious objector classification.He speaks of self evident truths which are stifled by hypocrisy that he found in churches he attended, but does not identify these truths or claim that they fill a place in his life comparable to that of religion in the lives of others.Nor can we...