United States v. Gaines

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Newsom, Circuit Judge
• Citation: United States v. Gaines, 154 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2025)
• Docket Number: 24-10117
• Decision Date: 10 September 2025
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua Eugene GAINES, Defendant-Appellant.

154 F.4th 1317

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua Eugene GAINES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 24-10117

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Filed: September 10, 2025

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cr-00165-LCB-HNJ-1

Michael B. Billingsley, U.S. Attorney Service-Northern District of Alabama, DOJ-USAO, Northern District of Alabama-Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, John Mark Hundscheid, DOJ-USAO, Huntsville, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Alexandria Darby, Federal Defender Organization-Northern District of Alabama, Federal Public Defender-NAL, Huntsville, AL, Deanna Lee Oswald, Brodsky Fotiu-Wojtowicz, PLLC, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Newsom, Brasher, and Ed Carnes, Circuit Judges.

Newsom, Circuit Judge:

After pleading guilty to a crime classified by Alabama law as a Class D felony, Joshua Gaines was caught in possession of a firearm. He was charged with and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—colloquially, the federal "felon-in-possession" statute. Gaines appealed, arguing, as relevant here, that the government had presented insufficient evidence to convict him and, therefore, that the district court erred in refusing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal. For reasons we will explain, we agree with Gaines that the statute doesn't cover his conduct. Accordingly, we vacate Gaines's conviction and remand to the district court with instructions to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal.

I

In November 2019, Joshua Gaines pleaded guilty in an Alabama court to the crime of "receiving stolen property in the third degree." Gov't Trial Ex. 2, at 1, Dkt. No. 74-2 (citation modified). Alabama law classifies that offense as a Class D felony. See Ala. Code § 13A-8-18.1(b). Before pleading guilty, Gaines's lawyer told him (and a state-provided "Explanation of Rights and Plea of Guilty" form confirmed) that he would receive a "non-prison" sentence of 13 to 31 months, suspended—meaning that it would be deferred provided that he continued to satisfy his terms of probation. See Gov't Trial Ex. 2 at 4; Jury Trial Tr. II, at 260:16-22, Dkt. No. 89.

Gaines's lawyer was right. Given Gaines's criminal history, the applicable law foreclosed a sentence that included any actual prison time. Under Alabama law at the time, a Class D felony generally triggered a "definite term of imprisonment" of "not more than 5 years or less than 1 year and 1 day"—but, importantly, it also mandated that any sentence be "in accordance with subsection (b) of Section 15-18-8." See Ala. Code § 13A-5-6(a)(4) (2019) (amended 2023). Section 15-18-8(b), in turn, barred judges from imposing prison sentences on Class D felons who hadn't been convicted of either (1) three or more felonies or (2) two or more serious felonies. See Ala. Code § 15-18-8(b), (e) (2019) (amended 2023). Instead, for those offenders, it required a sentence of "probation, drug court, or a pretrial diversion program," or confinement in "a consenting community corrections program" for "a period not exceeding two years"—or, if no community corrections program existed, in a "high-intensity probation under the supervision of the Board of Pardons and Paroles." Id.

After pleading guilty, Gaines was given a 24-month suspended sentence and was placed on probation for two years. Following his sentencing, Gaines signed a "Registration of Felons" form notifying him that, pursuant to the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, he couldn't possess a firearm.

Six months later, police officers stopped a car in which Gaines was a passenger. The officers discovered a gun in the car, and Gaines admitted that it was his. The officers arrested Gaines and took him to jail.

II

The government indicted Gaines on two counts: (1) possession of a firearm after having "been convicted in any court of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and (2) possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).

At trial, after the government rested, Gaines moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, contending, as relevant here, that there was insufficient evidence to prove the key fact underlying count one—namely, that he had been convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court denied Gaines's motion but gave him leave to refile at the close of all evidence. He did so, but the district court again denied relief. Although the jury acquitted Gaines on the § 5861(d) count, it convicted him on the § 922(g)(1) count. He was thereafter sentenced to 51 months in prison and three years of supervised release.

Before us, Gaines presents assorted challenges to evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and sentencing determinations. Because we hold that Gaines is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the § 922(g)(1) count, we needn't reach any of the remaining issues.¹

III

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, "the verdict must stand if the[re] is substantial evidence to support it, that is unless no trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation modified). Here, Gaines's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence turns on the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1) is colloquially—indeed, almost ubiquitously—known as the "felon-in-possession" statute. See, e.g., United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 889 (11th Cir. 2025). As it turns out, though, it doesn't actually use the word "felon." If it did, this would be an easier case. After all, Gaines was convicted of a crime that Alabama law expressly classifies as a Class D felony, and he thereafter possessed a firearm.

But alas, § 922(g)(1) doesn't prohibit felons from possessing firearms. Rather, its terms are more precise: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of[ ] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to] possess in or affecting commerce[ ] any firearm or ammunition." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The question for us is whether § 922(g)(1), as written, covers Gaines's conduct. We conclude that it does not.²

The case turns on the meaning of one statutory phrase—"convicted . . . of[ ] a crime punishable by"—and one term—"imprisonment." In the discussion that follows, we will explain the proper interpretation of both and then apply § 922(g)(1), so interpreted, to Gaines's case.

A

First up, "convicted . . . of[ ] a crime punishable by." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). That phrase might be understood in either of two different ways. Perhaps, as the government argues, it should be read in an "offense-specific" manner, such that a reviewing court looks to the term of imprisonment generally authorized by the statute underlying the predicate conviction, without regard to the defendant's particular circumstances. Alternatively, as Gaines contends, it could be read in a "defendant-specific" manner, such that its application turns on the length of the term of imprisonment to which the defendant himself was potentially subject given the circumstances of his case.

On its face, § 922(g)(1)'s would seem to suggest the government's preferred offense-specific understanding. Most notably, the phrase "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" modifies the word "crime"—not some other term in the statute, such as "person" or "convicted."³ So, the argument goes, a reviewing court should examine the "punish[ment]" available for the "crime" of conviction generally, rather than the defendant's particular conduct. Moreover, as we have clarified in another context, "[b]y their very nature, 'able' and 'ible' words connote a person's or thing's character, quality, or status—which, importantly for present purposes, exists independent of any particular facts on the ground." Barton v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2018). So, one might say, just as in Barton "an alien [could] be rendered inadmissible regardless of whether he is actually seeking admission," id., a crime can be "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" regardless of whether the defendant himself is actually subject to imprisonment for such a term, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). Finally, it's worth noting that before the Supreme Court's decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 130 S.Ct. 2577, 177 L.Ed.2d 68 (2010)—more on that shortly—a number of our sister circuits had interpreted § 922(g)(1) in an offense-specific manner. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated by United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled by United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hill, 539 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008), overruled by United States v. Brooks, 751 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Guzman-Tlaseca, 546 F.3d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 2008) (interpreting the materially identical 21 U.S.C. § 802(44)), overruled by United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881, 883 (8th Cir. 2011).

But—and it's a big but—whatever the merits of the offense-specific interpretation of § 922(g)(1), we think that analogous Supreme Court precedent forecloses it and requires the defendant-specific reading instead. First, there is Carachuri. There, the Court examined a "maze" of statutory provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537. 560 U.S. at 567, 130 S.Ct. 2577. The baseline provision allows certain immigrants subject to removal to apply for discretionary relief if, among other things, they haven't been "convicted of any aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). In relevant part, the term "aggravated...