United States v. Galloway

Decision Date21 May 2020
Docket NumberCriminal No. RDB-10-0775
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CHARLES LEONARD GALLOWAY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
MEMORANDUM ORDER

Defendant Charles Leonard Galloway ("Defendant" or "Galloway") is currently serving a 235-month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute 1 kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (Judgment & Commitment Order ("J&C"), ECF No. 364; Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction, ECF No. 508.) Galloway, having been incarcerated since June 21, 2010, has accordingly served almost 10 years of his sentence. (Inmate Data, ECF No. 543-2.)

Now pending is Galloway's Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) which has been supplemented by the Office of the Federal Public Defender pursuant to Standing Order 2019-04 of this Court. (ECF Nos. 535, 543 *SEALED*). The Government opposes the motion. (ECF No. 547) (*SEALED*). The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the reasons stated herein, Galloway's Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (ECF No. 535) is GRANTED. Galloway's sentence is reduced to time served and upon expiration of a 14-day quarantine period, he shall be released to the custody of his wife, Cantra Galloway, at her residence in Baltimore, Maryland and commence a 5-year period of supervised release.

BACKGROUND

On December 15, 2010, the grand jury for the District of Maryland returned a four-count Indictment charging Galloway and others with conspiracy to distribute 1 kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); possession with intent to distribute a detectable amount of heroin on August 2, 2010, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 2); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking on August 2, 2010, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 3); and possessing a firearm on August 2, 2010, after being convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Count 4). (ECF No. 1.) The Government subsequently obtained a Superseding Indictment which did not alter the charges against Galloway. (ECF No. 159.)

Before trial, on December 16, 2011, the Government filed a notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. (ECF No. 169.) On February 15, 2012, this Court granted Galloway's oral motion for self-representation and ordered the Federal Public Defendant for the District of Maryland to act as standby counsel. (Letter Order, ECF No. 240.) Galloway's trial commenced on March 19, 2012. Ultimately, the jury convicted Galloway only as to Count 1 of the Indictment. (Jury Verdict, ECF No. 292.) The Government dismissed Count 2, this Court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 3, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to Count 4. (Sentencing Hearing Tr. 4:15-24, ECF No. 379.)

Sentencing proceedings commenced after trial. The Presentence Report prepared by the United States Probation Office did not find that Galloway had participated in violence during the conspiracy for which he was convicted. (ECF No. 379 at 72:24; PSR ¶¶ 7-10.) During the sentencing hearing, this Court determined that an offense level of 38 and a criminal history category of III applied, producing a Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months of imprisonment. (ECF No. 379 at 55:8-18.) This Guidelines calculation was based in part on a finding that Galloway had attempted to obstruct justice during his trial by contacting a Government witness in an effort to influence her testimony. (Id. at 54:23-55:5.) As a result of the Government's § 851 notice, Galloway faced an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years. (Id. at 89:12-17.) Ultimately, this Court imposed a sentence of 292 months of imprisonment, a sentence which exceeded the 20-year mandatory minimum but fell at the low end of the Guidelines range. (J&C, ECF No. 364.)

In September 2016, Galloway submitted a Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to Guidelines Amendment 782. (ECF No. 505.) The Government consented to the reduction. (ECF No. 507.) This Court granted Galloway's Motion and reduced Galloway's sentence to 235 months. (Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction, ECF No. 508.)

On March 29, 2019, Galloway filed the presently pending Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) which has been supplemented by the Office of the Federal Public Defender pursuant to Standing Order 2019-04 of this Court. (ECF Nos. 535, 543 *SEALED*). The Government opposes the motion. (ECF No. 547) (*SEALED*).

ANALYSIS

The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, established significant changes to the procedures involving compassionate release from federal prison. Before the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) provided the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") with sole discretion to file compassionate release motions with the Court. With the passage of the First Step Act, defendants are now permitted to petition federal courts directly for compassionate release whenever "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a reduction in sentence. The Act permits a defendant to seek a sentence reduction after he "has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the Defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Once these mandatory conditions are satisfied, this Court may authorize compassionate release upon a showing of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" and after weighing the factors presented in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

I. Administrative Exhaustion Requirements.

There is no dispute that Galloway has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). On August 7, 2017, Galloway's request for compassionate release was denied by the Warden of Federal Correctional Institution — Elkton. (Denial Letter, Sept. 20, 2017, ECF No. 543-5.) On December 3, 2018, after his transfer to Federal Correctional Institution — Schuylkill ("FCI Schuylkill"), Galloway submitted another request for compassionate release which was denied. (Denial Letter, Dec. 13, 2018, ECF No.543-6.) Galloway subsequently submitted an institutional petition, but has not yet received a response from the Bureau of Prisons.

II. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons.

Galloway has presented extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his release from incarceration. The United States Sentencing Commission is charged with defining "what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction" under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). The Commission has determined that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist where "suffering from a serious physical condition" and/or a "serious functional or cognitive impairment . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he is not expected to recover." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). Additionally, the Commission has authorized the Bureau of Prisons to identify other extraordinary and compelling reasons "other than, or in combination with" the reasons justified by the Commission. Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D).

Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5050.50 sets forth the BOP's procedures for implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3582. The regulation states that the BOP will consider reductions in sentences for "inmates who have an incurable, progressive illness or who have suffered a debilitating injury from which they will not recover." Program Statement 5050.50 at 5. The regulation goes on to identify an exceedingly narrow class of individuals who will be considered for a sentence reduction: those who are "completely disabled, meaning the inmate cannot carry on any self-care and is totally confined to a bed or chair" and those who are "capable of only limited self-care and [are] confined to a bed or chair more than 50% of wakinghours." Id. In opposing the Petitioner's request for compassionate release, the Government places great emphasis on the BOP's Program Statement.

The BOP's Program Statement does not constrain this Court's analysis. The BOP cannot limit the physical ailments presenting "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for release identified by the Sentencing Commission. The Sentencing Commission has been appointed by statute to identify the circumstances giving rise to "extraordinary and compelling reasons" justifying a sentence reduction and has granted the Bureau of Prisons limited authority to identify additional reasons for sentence reductions. To the extent that the Bureau of Prisons has used its limited authority to narrow the class of individuals entitled to release, it has exceeded that authority. Additionally, as Judge Blake of this Court has recognized, the First Step Act embodies Congress's intent to reduce the Bureau of Prison's authority over compassionate release petitions and authorizes the district courts to exercise their "independent discretion to determine whether there are 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' to reduce a sentence." United States v. Bryant, CCB-95-0202, 2020 WL 2085471, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2020).

In this case, the Court need not reach beyond the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" identified by the Sentencing Commission because Galloway has shown that he is "suffering from a serious physical condition" and a "serious functional or cognitive impairment . . . that substantially diminishes [his] ability . . . to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he is not expected to recover." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). Specifically, BOP medical records indicate that Galloway suffers...

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