United States v. Garcia, 74-4126.
Decision Date | 19 March 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 74-4126.,74-4126. |
Citation | 526 F.2d 958 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Lopez GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
William B. Clarkson, Houston, Tex. (Court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.
Anthony J. P. Farris, U.S. Atty., Ronald H. Tonkin, James R. Gough, Jr., Anna E. Stool, Asst. U.S. Attys., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before JONES, WISDOM and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.
The appellant Garcia and another were charged with narcotics offenses in a three-count indictment filed on June 17, 1974. Count One accused the defendants of a conspiracy. By Count Two they were charged with possessing heroin with the intent to distribute it, and Count Three charged the distribution of heroin.
The case was set for trial on August 20, 1974. Garcia moved for a continuance and the motion was granted. On August 20, 1974, the United States Attorney filed an information pursuant to the provisions of the applicable statute.1 The information stated:
At the trial Garcia testified on his own behalf and on direct examination stated that in 1967 he had plead guilty to a narcotics offense for which he had served ten years in prison. Garcia was convicted on the second and third counts of the indictment. The first count was dismissed. At the sentencing the court referred to the information and said "It is my recollection that the defendant admitted his identification and it was he that had been convicted at that time." Counsel for the appellant responded "I believe he testified to that fact, Your Honor." Nothing more was said at the trial regarding the prior conviction. After hearing a request that Garcia be given medical treatment the court imposed concurrent second offender sentences of twenty years imprisonment and five years special parole on each count.
On appeal it is contended that the provisions of 21 U.S.C.A. § 851(b) for a second offender sentence were not complied with. Notwithstanding the failure of the appellant to raise the question in the district court, it will be considered by this Court on its merits.
Although this Court has reduced the enhanced portion of a sentence where the information charging a prior conviction was not filed before trial or before entry of a plea of guilty as required by 21 U.S.C.A. § 851(a)(1),2 a similar result is not permitted where the provisions of subsection (b) have not been fulfilled. The requirements as to sentencing can be carried out on a remand if that which was done is not in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements.
If Garcia's admission of a narcotics conviction identified it as the offense set forth in the information it could be plausibly urged that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. But there was no identity of offenses and it is doubtful that a substantial compliance would suffice. Nor was the statutory ritual waived.
The sentence will be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing under the statute quoted. The court fixed the special parole term at five years. By statute the special parole term is fixed at not less than six years. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A).
The other contentions of Garcia have received the consideration of the Court. They are without merit. The judgment of conviction is affirmed, the sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for resentencing of the appellant as herein outlined.
Judgment of conviction affirmed, sentence vacated and cause remanded.
1 (a)(1) No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. Upon a showing by the United States...
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