United States v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 23 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-15276,15-15276 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDGAR ARNOLD GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 1:92-cr-01027-MP-AK-1
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
Edgar Garcia, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion, we affirm.1
Before reaching Garcia's arguments, we recount some of the history of his criminal case to place this appeal into context. Garcia was convicted in 1997 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 814(b)(1)(B) and 846; and use of a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
At sentencing, the sentencing court held Garcia responsible for 498.9 kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a base offense level of 28 under the drug-quantity tables in place at the time. The court added a four-level increase for Garcia's role in the offense and a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, yielding a total offense level of 36. That offense level and Garcia's criminal-history category of I established a guideline range of 151 to 188 months of imprisonment for the drug offense. Garcia faced a mandatory consecutive term of at least 60 months of imprisonment for the firearm offense.
After calculating the guideline range and hearing testimony from various witnesses, the district court applied a discretionary upward departure, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1, based on evidence that Garcia murdered a buyer who failed to pay for a marijuana shipment. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 (). The court found this "deliberate murder" an aggravating circumstance related to the offense of conviction. Looking to comparable guideline provisions—specifically § 2D1.1(a)(2) (), and § 2A1.1 ()—the court upwardly departed to an offense level of 39, which yielded a guideline range of 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. The court then sentenced Garcia to 300 months on the drug offense and a consecutive term of 60 months on the firearm offense.
Garcia appealed, and we affirmed his convictions and sentences. United States v. Garcia, 208 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2000). Among other errors asserted on appeal, Garcia claimed that, due to an extradition treaty between the United States and Canada, he could not be punished for the uncharged murder because he was extradited solely for the marijuana offense. Id. at 1260. We rejected that argument, explaining that the extradition treaty "does not restrict the scope of proof of other crimes that may be considered in the sentencing process" and that themurder was relevant conduct properly considered "as a matter germane to the determination of punishment for the extradited crime." Id. at 1261.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to this Court for further consideration in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We reinstated our previous opinion on remand because Garcia had failed to raise an Apprendi-type claim in his original briefing. See United States v. Garcia, 251 F.3d 160 (11th Cir. 2001) (unpublished table decision). We denied rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Garcia unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In 2015, Garcia filed a counseled 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion seeking a sentence reduction under Amendment 782, which reduced by two levels the base offense level for most drug-trafficking offenses. He contended that Amendment 782 had the effect of lowering his offense level from 39 to 37 and his guideline range from 262-327 months to 210-262 months.
Garcia argued that a reduction was warranted in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. In support, he cited his personal characteristics and post-sentencing conduct, including his family support and model behavior while in prison. He also addressed the nature and seriousness of the offense, maintaining that his original sentence included several errors, that this case was about marijuana, not murder, and that there were mitigating facts about the murder thatthe sentencing court did not take into account. He said that the court needed to hold an evidentiary hearing if it intended to deny a sentence reduction based on the § 5K2.1 upward departure. Garcia asked for a reduced sentence of 240 months. The government did not file a response.
The district court entered a detailed order denying Garcia's § 3582(c)(2) motion. After reviewing the procedural history of the case, which we have recounted above, the court addressed Garcia's eligibility for a sentence reduction. The court explained that eligibility is based on the amended guideline range, which is calculated "before considering any departure provision, such as 5K2.1." Based on the pre-departure calculations, the court determined that Amendment 782 would result in Garcia having a base offense level of 26, a total offense level of 32, and an amended guideline range of 121 to 151 months of imprisonment.
As for the § 5K2.1 upward departure, the district court noted that a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not a full resentencing, and it found that the upward departure for the murder still applied. Because the total offense level of 39 was "based primarily on the murder" and a comparison to the offense levels in other guideline provisions, the court explained, Garcia was "not entitled to a sentence reduction." "Furthermore," the court continued, "as § 3582 motions are discretionary, there is no abuse of discretion in denying this motion."
Finally, the district court addressed Garcia's arguments that a sentence reduction was warranted in light of the § 3553(a) factors and his post-sentencing conduct. The court summarized these arguments and then addressed one in particular: Garcia's claim that this case was about marijuana, not murder. The court responded that Garcia did not need to be charged with murder for that conduct to be considered as an aggravating factor at sentencing. Again noting that it was not conducting a full resentencing, the court stated that the sentencing court's original determination should stand.
Ultimately, the district court exercised its discretion to deny Garcia's § 3582(c)(2) motion. In making that determination, the court stated that it had considered "the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the circumstances of the case and associated murder, the public safety implications, and the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Garcia now appeals.
We review de novo a district court's legal conclusions as to the scope of its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Gonzalez-Murillo, 852 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2017). If a sentence reduction is authorized, we review for an abuse of discretion the court's decision to deny a reduction. United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d 1239, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 2010). Under this standard, the court is allowed a "range of choice." United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11thCir. 2005). When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we will affirm unless the court has applied the wrong legal standard, has failed to follow proper procedures, or has made a clear error of judgment. Jules, 595 F.3d at 1242; Drury, 396 F.3d at 1315.
Section 3582(c)(2) provides a limited exception to the general rule that criminal sentences may not be modified once imposed. Under § 3582(c)(2), a sentence reduction is available to defendants whose sentencing range has been lowered by a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Any reduction, however, must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statements. Id. § 3582(c)(2).
The binding policy statement that governs § 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, contemplates a two-step process. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826-27 (2010). First, the court must determine the defendant's eligibility for a reduction. Under § 1B1.10, a reduction is authorized only if a retroactive amendment has "the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1)-(2).
To determine the effect of an amended guideline, the court must calculate the range that would have applied if the amendment had been in effect at the time of sentencing. Id. § 1B1.10(b). The court must substitute the amended guidelinefor the one originally used and "leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected." Id. Notably, however, departures and variances are excluded from these calculations. See id. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A); see United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 761 (11th Cir. 1998) (). That is, the defendant's "applicable guideline range," and therefore his or her eligibility for a sentence reduction, is based on the range "determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), which is determined before consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A); see Gonzalez-Murillo, 852 F.3d at 1336.
If a prisoner is eligible, the district court then exercises "its discretion to decide whether, in consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, to reduce the sentence and, if so, by how much." Gonzalez-Murillo, 852 F.3d at 1335. At this second step, ...
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