United States v. Garza
| Decision Date | 24 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | EP-11-CR-3021-KC |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ISIDRO GARZA JR., MARTHA CATALINA GONZALEZ GARZA, AND TIMOTEO GARZA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this day, the Court considered Defendant Isidro Garza's "Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Rights" ("Motion"), ECF No. 895, and Defendant Timoteo Garza's "Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Rights," ECF No. 896. In his motion, Defendant Timoteo Garza adopted the arguments presented in Isidro Garza's Motion arguing that "the law and argument made in Isidro Garza's Motion to Dismiss is equally applicable to Timoteo." Mot. to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Rights. Upon due consideration, the Court finds that both Motions should be DENIED.
The Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas ("Tribe") hired Isidro Garza ("Isidro") to manage the Tribe's casino. See United States v. Garza, 593 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Tribe placed Isidro's wife, Martha Garza ("Martha") and her son, Timoteo Garza ("Timoteo") on the payroll. Id. In the Superseding Indictment, the government alleges that Isidro improperly used hundreds of thousands of dollars of the Tribe's money for personal expenditures. See id. at 386-87; Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 74.
On December 6, 2004, the government arrested Isidro and, on December 9, 2004, filed an indictment against him. Indictment, ECF No. 8. On the same day, the government indictedMartha and Timoteo. Id. The government charged Isidro, Timoteo (collectively "Defendants"), and Martha with various offenses relating to the misappropriation of tribal funds and tax evasion. Garza, 593 F.3d at 387-88.
The judicial proceedings began before the Honorable Alia Moses in the Del Rio Division of the Western District of Texas.1 See Order ("Recusal Order") 1, 21, July 12, 2011, ECF No. 865. In August of 2005, Defendants filed a "Motion to Transfer, or Alternatively, to Disqualify." Garza, 593 F.3d at 387; Recusal Order 7. Defendants argued that Judge Moses had political ties to a potential defense witness. Garza, 593 F.3d at 387. After considering the issues, Judge Moses ultimately denied the motion to disqualify. See Garza, 593 F.3d at 387; Recusal Order 7-9.
Almost a year later, on April 26, 2006, Defendants renewed their argument that Judge Moses should disqualify herself. See Garza, 593 F.3d at 387; Recusal Order 13. Two weeks later, Judge Moses sua sponte transferred the case to the Honorable Walter S. Smith, Jr. in the Waco Division of the Western District of Texas. Garza, 593 F.3d at 387; Recusal Order 16. Defendants then filed a motion to transfer their case either back to Del Rio or to San Antonio. Garza, 593 F.3d at 387. Judge Smith denied the motion, and several attorneys for Defendants withdrew because of the long distance between Del Rio and Waco. See id. at 388. Judge Smith then ordered a several month continuance to "allow the new attorneys the chance to prepare." Id.
On October 24, 2006, Defendants pleaded guilty. Arraignment / Rearraignment for Isidro, Oct. 24, 2006, ECF No. 463; Arraignment / Rearraignment for Timoteo, Oct. 24, 2006,ECF No. 466; see also Government's Consolidated Resp. ("Response") 4, ECF No. 902. After several continuances, sentencing was set for May, 17, 2007. See Minutes Entry, Oct. 25, 2006, ECF No. 526; Resp. 4. But on the day of sentencing, Defendants withdrew their pleas. See Minutes Entry, May 17, 2007, ECF No. 513; Minutes Entry, May 25, 2007, ECF No. 526; Resp. 4-5. Several attorneys then withdrew from the case, and the trial date was pushed back again. See Order, May 31, 2007, ECF No. 531; Resp. 4-5.
On October 1, 2007, the trial finally began. Jury Trial, Oct. 1, 2007, ECF No. 572. After a nine-day trial, the jury found Isidro and Timoteo guilty of multiple counts of Conspiracy to commit the offenses of Theft from an Indian Tribal Organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and Theft by Officers or Employees of Gaming Establishments on Indian Lands in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1168. Garza, 593 F.3d at 388. The jury also found Martha and Isidro guilty of various acts of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Id. Finally, the jury found Martha, Isidro, and Timoteo guilty of Conspiracy to Evade the Payment of Taxes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id.
Defendants then timely appealed. Garza, 593 F.3d at 388. On January 26, 2010, the Fifth Circuit vacated the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because the district court's sua sponte transfer of venue violated Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 391. The Fifth Circuit issued its mandate on February 23, 2010, and remanded the case to Judge Smith in Waco. See id.; Recusal Order 16; J. 1, ECF No. 787. On March 4, 2010, Judge Smith sua sponte transferred the case back to Judge Moses in Del Rio. Order, ECF No. 789.
With the case now back in Judge Moses's court, the issue of recusal was again at the forefront. On May 11, 2010, the government requested Judge Moses consider the previouslyfiled motion for recusal. Recusal Order 17. By October 1, 2010, Judge Moses had not ruled on the motion for recusal, and Isidro filed a motion urging Judge Moses to rule on it. See Def.'s Mot. to Reurge all Previous Mots. and to Extend Ellis Deadline 1 ("First Reurging & Extension Request"), ECF No. 844.2 In the same motion, Isidro requested an extension of the plea deadline. Id. On October 8, 2010, Judge Moses issued an amended scheduling order extending the plea deadline and the trial date. Am. Scheduling Order ("October Order"), Oct. 10, 2010, ECF No. 845. In her October Order, Judge Moses stated that the delay was necessary to allow counsel time to prepare for trial, and found "that the interest of justice served by taking this action outweighs the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. at 1.
Almost two months later, on November 29, 2010, Isidro again filed a motion reurging the recusal motion, and requesting an extension of the plea deadline. Def.'s Second Mot. to Reurge all Previous Mots. and to Extend Ellis Deadline 1 ("Second Reurging & Extension Request), ECF No. 846. Just three days later, on December 2, 2010, Isidro filed another motion requesting a ruling on the recusal motion. Def.'s Mot. Requesting Ruling on Recusal Mot., ECF No. 847. On December 6, 2010, Judge Moses issued an amended scheduling order, extending the plea deadline and the trial date. Am. Scheduling Order ("December Order"), Dec. 6, 2010, ECF No. 849. In her December Order, Judge Moses stated that the delay was necessary to allow counsel time to prepare for trial, and once again found "that the interest of justice served by taking this action outweighs the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. at 1.
On January 19, 2011, Isidro again filed a motion reurging the recusal motion, and requesting an extension of the plea deadline. Def.'s Third Mot. to Reurge all Previous Mots. and to Extend Ellis Deadline 1 ("Third Reurging & Extension Request), ECF No. 850. On January 21, 2011, Judge Moses granted Isidro's motion, and again issued a new scheduling order with the same language regarding the interests of justice. See Order Granting Mot. for Continuance, Jan. 21, 2011, ECF No. 851; Am. Scheduling Order ("January Order") 1, Jan. 21, 2011, ECF No. 852.
On July 12, 2011, Judge Moses sua sponte recused herself. Recusal Order 20-21. On July 13, 2011, the Clerk of the Western District of Texas randomly assigned the case to this Court in El Paso, Texas.
On August 26, 2011, this Court held a lengthy status conference. See generally Status Conference Tr., ECF No. 901. The parties detailed the complexity of the case — both substantively and procedurally. See id. at 3:4-12:12. Although the Court was reluctant to further extend the trial date, the Court ultimately decided an April trial date in San Antonio was in the interest of justice. See id. at 3:4-12:12, 15:7-16; 17:4-8.
Defendants argue the Court should dismiss the Indictments against them based on the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 ("Speedy Trial Act" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b). See Mot. 4-9. The government responds that neither Defendants' constitutional nor statutory rights have been violated. Resp. 1-9. The Court examines each of Defendants' arguments in turn.
Defendants contend that 415 days have elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act since the remand from the Fifth Circuit, and thus dismissal is warranted. Mot. 3. The government responds that only forty-eight days have elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act since the Fifth Circuit's mandate, and thus dismissal is not warranted. Resp. 6.
Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act to serve both the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (); Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 501 (2006) () (quoting S. Rep. No. 96-212, at 29 (1979)). The public has an interest in swift justice because a timely trial has a potentially greater deterrent effect, and a timely trial reduces the defendant's opportunity to commit crimes while on pretrial release. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 501. And the criminal defendant has an interest in a speedy trial to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, to minimize the defendant's anxiety and concern, and to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (...
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