United States v. Gaston
| Decision Date | 26 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:21-CR-36-JD-JPK |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JARCQUES GASTON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on the government's motion for pretrial detention. On March 18, 2021, Defendant Jarcques Gaston was charged with six counts of making false statements to firearms dealers, with three counts asserting violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and three counts asserting violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). An arraignment and detention hearing were held on March 22, 2021, and the detention hearing was continued to March 24, 2021. For the reasons set forth below, Gaston was ordered detained pending trial. This Opinion and Order follows to supplement the reasons explained by the Court during the hearing on March 24, 2021.
The parties dispute whether the government is entitled to a detention hearing in this matter, so the Court will resolve that issue first. The parties also disagree as to whether the government's proffer concerning uncharged conduct can support its motion to detain Gaston pending trial. While these disputes consume much of this opinion, the Court must ultimately decide whether there are any conditions or combination of conditions that can reasonably assure Gaston's appearance as required or the safety of the community. The government has the burden of showing not only that Gaston is a danger to the community or a flight risk, but also that there are no conditions that could mitigate those risks and provide reasonable assurances. The Court has considered all possible conditions and sees none that can reasonably assure the safety of the community.
The government's proffer and an analysis of the factors the Court must consider are discussed in more detail below. In brief, what is most concerning is the government's proffer that Gaston purchased multiple firearms, both those that gave rise to the charges in this case and others. The fact that Gaston purchased these firearms is not easily contested. And while Gaston might have done so lawfully in some instances, the whereabouts of at least one of these firearms is unknown, and two were later recovered from convicted felons - one was recovered from a convicted felon approximately twenty-two days after Gaston purchased it, and the other was recovered from a convicted felon approximately three months after Gaston purchased it. Additionally, although a good deal of the government's proffer of uncharged conduct appears to rest upon the testimony of witnesses this Court cannot evaluate, in at least two instances there is corroborating information. First, a 2018 battery charge involved an alleged victim with injuries that were seen by responding medical personnel. Second, a separate alleged victim's report of being assaulted and pistol whipped is supported by law enforcement's observation of injuries and the fact that law enforcement found Gaston carrying a firearm matching the description of the firearm that was reportedly used in the assault.
While the Court continued the detention hearing to allow for a review of whether Gaston's residence was suitable for electronic monitoring, even the most restrictive conditions cannot provide reasonable assurances of community safety. At least one firearm that Gaston purchased is unaccounted for, and any efforts to ensure that firearm is located and not provided to a felon would require Gaston's candor and cooperation. Unfortunately, however, Gaston gave incorrect information regarding certain details of his living situation to a probation officer, thereby thwarting attempts to locate any missing firearms and fashion conditions of release that would prevent Gaston from gaining access to them and otherwise protect against the potential for domestic orother violence. As explained below, these facts weigh heavily in favor of detention. But before turning to that issue, the Court first addresses the parties' arguments regarding the government's entitlement to a detention hearing and the standard for weighing evidence of prior conduct.
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 ("Bail Reform Act"), courts "shall hold" detention hearings in two instances. The first instance is when the case involves any one of the enumerated serious offenses outlined in § 3142(f)(1), the so called "(f)(1)" cases involving allegations of particularly dangerous criminal activity. The second instance is when one of the "serious" concerns about risk of flight or obstruction of justice are present, the so called "(f)(2)" cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). Once one of these conditions is met, a hearing is held "to determine whether any condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." Id. § 3142(f). That is, there can be no detention hearing-and therefore no detention-unless an (f)(1) or (f)(2) criterion is met. Even then, detention is only proper where, after a hearing, "the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." Id. § 3142(e).
In the instant case, the government has moved for a detention hearing under Section 3142(f)(1)(E), which allows for such a hearing in a case that involves:
any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence that involves a minor victim or that involves the possession or use of a firearm or destructive device (as those terms are defined in section 921), or any other dangerous weapon, or involves a failure to register under section 2250 of title 18, United States Code[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(E). The government asserts that a detention hearing is proper because the acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) is a felony "that involves the possession or use of a firearm . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(E). Gaston, in turn, argues that"acquisition" as used in Section 922(a)(6) is not the same as "possession" as used in Section 3142(f)(1)(E). (Def.'s Mem. 1-2, ECF No. 13) ("The possession or use of a firearm simply is not involved in proving the felony offense defined by §922(a)(6).").
"When interpreting a statute, we begin with the text." Loja v. Main St. Acquisition Corp., 906 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2018). "A word or phrase in a statute should not be interpreted in a vacuum; rather, 'the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.'" Id. (quoting Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016)). Even when a statute is "awkwardly phrased," there are times when its "text and context together reveal a straightforward reading." See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 962 (2016). And while the parties have not addressed all of the various (and at times competing) cannons of statutory construction, a review of the relevant text shows that, even under the most restrictive reading of the text (which is the one Gaston advances), the Bail Reform Act provides for a detention hearing here.1
Perhaps the Bail Reform Act is not entirely clear as to whether the Court should look solely at the elements of the crime charged when determining if a detention hearing is required under Section 3142(f)(1)(E), or should instead consider the broader facts and circumstances surrounding the crime charged in an individual case. As noted above, Section 3142(f)(1)(E) provides for adetention hearing in a case that involves "any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence . . . that involves the possession or use of a firearm . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(E). Under the most restrictive reading of this section, the clause "that involves the possession or use of a firearm" modifies "any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence," and thus restricts the term "felony" to the elements of the crime charged. Gaston argues for this restrictive reading and asserts that such an interpretation would prohibit a detention hearing under Section 3142(f)(1)(E) for the current charges. But the Court need not decide, and expresses no view on, whether this restrictive reading is the proper interpretation of the Bail Reform Act, because even under such a reading, Gaston's argument fails.
Gaston was charged with, inter alia, three violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). The essential elements of a Section 922(a)(6) charge are:
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). Here, each charge under Section 922(a)(6) alleges a false statement "in connection with the acquisition of a firearm," not an attempted acquisition. (Indictment, ECF No. 1 (Counts 1, 3, 5)). Gaston thus asks the Court to conclude that the "acquisition" of a firearm does not always involve the "possession" of a firearm, but the controlling case law precludes any such argument.
When evaluating the definition of "acquisition" as used in Section 922(a)(6), the Supreme Court of the United States noted that "[t]he word 'acquire' is defined to mean simply 'to come into possession, control, or power of disposal of.'" Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 820, 94S. Ct. 1262, 1267 (1974) ().2 Any effort to parse the definition of "acquire" in Huddleston to argue that "control" or "power of disposal of" somehow connote terms distinct from "possession" fails when one considers that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has supported...
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