United States v. General Motors Corporation

• Decision Date: 25 May 1961
• Citation: 194 F. Supp. 754
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

194 F. Supp. 754

UNITED STATES of America v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

May 25, 1961.

George D. Reycraft, Washington, D. C., for United States of America; Sanford M. Litvack, Washington, D. C., Arthur H. Kahn, Antitrust Division, Dept. of Justice, New York City, of counsel.

Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, for General Motors Corp.; Bruce Bromley, New York City, Aloysius F. Power, Detroit, Mich., Allen F. Maulsey, John W. Barnum, New York City, of counsel.

SUGARMAN, District Judge.

General Motors Corporation has been indicted in this district charged with a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. A. § 2.

The indictment was filed on April 12, 1961. The defendant now moves for an order:

"(1) transferring this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, at Chicago, Illinois, pursuant to Rule 21(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or, if the Court shall determine that it does not sufficiently appear from the face of the indictment that the offense charged was committed in that District and Division,

(2) directing the United States of America to furnish a bill of particulars of the indictment in respect of the district or districts and division or divisions in which the United States of America claims that the offense charged was committed, without prejudice to the right of defendant to obtain additional particulars."

The second and alternative branch of the motion is withdrawn. The government on argument of the motion conceded that the alleged offence was committed in more than one district and that the proposed transferee district is one of the districts in which the commission of the offence is charged.

The government urges that the movant has failed to satisfy the requirement of showing that the interest of justice dictates the granting of the proposed transfer. In support of this conclusion, the government argues that

"The liberal venue provision of the Clayton Act permits the Government to proceed against a corporation such as General Motors in virtually any District and Division in the United States without regard to the substantiality of the contacts with the forum, the location of the company's main place of business, or the availability of witnesses and documents."¹

It is at least doubtful whether the special venue provision relied upon does apply to criminal prosecutions.²

However, it is of no moment which venue statute applies because Rule 21(b), 18 U.S.C.A. applies in any event.

As the government's memorandum in opposition to the motion shows:

"The purpose of the Rule was not to require trial of a criminal case in the `best' or `most convenient' forum for the defendant, its purpose was to prevent the trial of a case in a jurisdiction selected by the Government without regard to the nature or the existence of any substantial relationship between the forum and the offense charged."

The offence charged in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the indictment is:

"18. For many years continuously up to and including the date of the return of this indictment, the defendant has monopolized the aforesaid trade and commerce in the manufacture and sale of railroad locomotives in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, entitled `An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' as amended (c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2) commonly known as the Sherman Act.

"19. General Motors has monopolized the above described trade and commerce by acquiring and maintaining power over price in the sale of railroad locomotives and the power to exclude its competitors from the railroad locomotive industry. General Motors has exercised its power over price and has excluded competitors from the railroad locomotive industry by its acts and conduct."

In amplification of the charge, the indictment alleges that for many years, through such activities as selling at a loss to stifle competition, price and production juggling, applying economic pressure on customers and suppliers, unlawful location of plants and facilities, unreasonable advertising expenditures and generally by becoming too "big" in the affected commerce, the defendant has run afoul of the antitrust laws.

To sustain the jurisdiction and venue laid in this district, the indictment specifies nine acts in furtherance of the alleged monopolization, these acts being meetings for formulation of policy in aid of the offence charged, or conduct implementing such policies.

In support of the transfer, the defendant General Motors Corporation has demonstrated that virtually all of its means of refuting the charge made by the government are unavailable to it unless the motion is granted. On the other hand, the inconvenience to the prosecution will be practically nil.

The manufacture and sale of locomotives by defendant is conducted by its Electro-Motive Division, with plant and offices at La Grange, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago. The defendant functions under a...