United States v. Gharib

Decision Date12 August 2021
Docket Number4:14-CR-53(1)
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CYRUS GHARIB
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARCIA A. CRONE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court are Defendant Cyrus Gharib's (“Gharib”) Petition Requesting Compassionate Release Pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 and 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (#471), wherein he asks the court to grant him a reduction in sentence and immediate release. The Government filed a response in opposition to the motion (#476), and Gharib filed a reply (#478). The Government filed a supplemental response to the motion (#482) pursuant to a court order requesting additional briefing. United States Probation and Pretrial Services (“Probation”) conducted an investigation and recommends that the court deny Gharib's motion for compassionate release. Having considered the pending motion, the Government's response the reply, the Government's supplemental response Probation's recommendation, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be denied.

I. Background

On April 14, 2016, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas returned a multi-count Indictment charging Gharib and eleven codefendants with various drug offenses. Gharib was charged in Count 1 with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with the Intent to Distribute Anabolic Steroids, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; in Count 2 with Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (“GHB”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and in Count 9 with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with the Intent to Distribute Marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On June 22, 2015, Gharib pleaded guilty to Count 2 of the Indictment pursuant to a non-binding plea agreement. On February 29, 2016, the court sentenced him to 151 months' imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Gharib did not appeal his conviction or sentence, but on January 25, 2017, he filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in which he challenged his sentence on the basis that he was no longer a career offender in light of an intervening change in the law. On February 4, 2019, this court dismissed his motion with prejudice, which dismissal was upheld on appeal when the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to issue a Certificate of Appealability on October 1, 2019. Gharib is currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution Florence (“FCI Florence”), located in Florence, Colorado. His projected release date is December 10, 2024.

II. Compassionate Release

On December 21, 2018, former President Trump signed the First Step Act of 2018 into law. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. The Act, in part, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which gives the court discretion, in certain circumstances, to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment:

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that-
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the [BOP] that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This provision is commonly referred to as “compassionate release.”

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Prior to the First Step Act, only the Director of the BOP could file a motion seeking compassionate release. See United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Prior to the passage of the First Step Act . . . courts lacked the power to adjudicate motions for compassionate release.”), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 920 (2020); Tuozzo v. Shartle, No. 13-4897, 2014 WL 806450, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2014) (denying petitioner's motion for compassionate release because no motion for his release was filed by the BOP). The First Step Act amended § 3582(c) by providing a defendant the means to appeal the BOP's decision not to file a motion for compassionate release on the defendant's behalf. United States v. Cantu, 423 F.Supp.3d 345, 347 (S.D. Tex. 2019); United States v. Bell, No. 3:93-CR-302-M, 2019 WL 1531859, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2019). The plain language of the statute, however, makes it clear that the court may not grant a defendant's motion for compassionate release unless the defendant has complied with the administrative exhaustion requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Franco, 973 F.3d at 467 (holding that the statutory requirement that a defendant file a request with the BOP before filing a motion for compassionate release in federal court “is not jurisdictional but that it is mandatory”); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Even though [the] exhaustion requirement does not implicate [the court's] subject-matter jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition.”); United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) ([T]he exhaustion requirement . . . presents a glaring roadblock foreclosing compassionate release.”). Thus, before seeking relief from the court, a defendant must first submit a request to the warden of his facility to move for compassionate release on his behalf and then either exhaust his administrative remedies or wait for the lapse of 30 days after the warden received the request. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Franco, 973 F.3d at 467 (“The text . . . outlines two routes a defendant's motion can follow to be properly before the court. Both routes begin with the defendant requesting that ‘the [BOP]' ‘bring a motion on the defendant's behalf.'); United States v. Harris, 812 Fed.Appx. 106, 107 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Springer, 820 Fed.Appx. 788, 791 (10th Cir. 2020) (defendant “was required to request that the BOP file a compassionate-release motion on his behalf to initiate his administrative remedies” (citing Raia, 954 F.3d at 595)); Alam, 960 F.3d at 833-34; United States v. Soliz, No. 2:16-190-3, 2020 WL 2500127, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2020) (§ 3582(c)(1)(A) does not provide this Court with the equitable authority to excuse [defendant's] failure to exhaust his administrative remedies or to waive the 30-day waiting period.” (quoting United States v. Reeves, No. 18-00294, 2020 WL 1816496, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 9, 2020))).

Here, Gharib appears to have exhausted his administrative remedies. On February 18, 2021, Gharib submitted a request for compassionate release to Warden C. Carter (“Warden Carter”), the warden of the facility where he is housed. On March 8, 2021, Warden Carter denied Gharib's request, explaining that he did not meet the criteria for a debilitated medical condition for a reduction in sentence. Although Gharib complied with the exhaustion requirement before filing his motion for compassionate release, nothing in the motion indicates that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to release him from confinement.

B. Criteria for Release

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that when a defendant moves for compassionate release he must establish three criteria. United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2021). First, he must meet one of two conditions listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A)-either the defendant has extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) or the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, and meets the additional requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Id. at 391. Second, the defendant “must show that compassionate release is consistent with the applicable policy statements from the [United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”)].” Id. at 392. Third, the defendant “must convince the district judge to exercise discretion to grant the motion after considering the § 3553(a) factors.”[1] Id.; accord United States v. Keys, 846 Fed.Appx. 275, 276 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2021).

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not define the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may merit compassionate release. Rather, Congress elected to delegate its authority to the Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (directing the Commission to “describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples”); Cooper, 996 F.3d at 287; Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392. Prior to the passage of the First Step Act, the Commission issued a policy statement set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which, along with its commentary, describes what reasons qualify as extraordinary and compelling.[2] However, § 1B1.13 references only motions filed by “the Director of the [BOP]-not an individual defendant.[3]...

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