United States v. Gibert

Citation677 F.3d 613
Decision Date20 April 2012
Docket Number10–4875,10–4851,Nos. 10–4848,10–4904.,10–4852,s. 10–4848
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jeffrey Brian GIBERT, Defendant–Appellant.The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Gerald Benfield, Defendant–Appellant.The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. John Carlton Thurman Hoover, Defendant–Appellant.The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael Monroe Grooms, Defendant–Appellant.The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Gene Audry Jeffcoat, Defendant–Appellant.The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED: Steven Michael Hisker, Duncan, South Carolina, for Appellants. Nathan S. Williams, Office of the United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lori S. Murray, Law Office of Lori S. Murray, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant Gerald Benfield; T. Micah Leddy, The Leddy Law Firm, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for John Carlton Thurman Hoover; Joseph M. McCulloch, Jr., Law Office of Joseph M. McCulloch, Jr., for Appellant Michael Monroe Grooms; Debra Y. Chapman, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant Gene Audry Jeffcoat. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Jonathan R. Lovvorn, Kimberly D. Ockene, Aaron D. Green, The Humane Society of the United States, Washington, D.C.; Emily L. Aldrich, Hunton & Williams LLP, Los Angeles, California; Gregory N. Stillman, Hunton & Williams LLP, Norfolk, Virginia; Joseph P. Esposito, William E. Potts, Jr., Andrew E. Walsh, Hunton & Williams LLP, Washington, D.C., for The Humane Society of the United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee.

Before GREGORY and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and LIAM O'GRADY, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge KEENAN wrote the opinion, in which Judge GREGORY and Judge O'GRADY joined.

OPINION

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

The primary question in this appeal is whether Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting a criminal prohibition against animal fighting. Jeffrey Brian Gibert and certain other defendants (collectively, Gibert) were indicted for their roles in organizing, operating, and participating in “gamefowl derbies,” otherwise known as “cockfighting.” Gibert entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of conspiring to violate 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (the animal fighting statute), which prohibits, among other things, “sponsor[ing] or exhibit[ing] an animal in an animal fighting venture.” The term “animal fighting venture” is defined in the statute, in relevant part, as “any event, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, that involves a fight conducted or to be conducted between at least 2 animals for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment.” 7 U.S.C. § 2156(g)(1).

In his plea agreement, Gibert reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the animal fighting statute. He argued in the district court, and now argues to this Court, that Congress' power under the Commerce Clause does not extend to the enactment of legislation prohibiting animal fighting ventures. Gibert contends that animal fighting is inherently an intrastate activity that has no substantial affect on interstate commerce and, thus, is a matter reserved for regulation by the states, rather than by the federal government. He also advances an argument regarding the scienter requirement of the animal fighting statute, contending that the government was required to prove that he had knowledge that the animal fighting venture “was in or affected interstate commerce.” Upon our review of the parties' arguments, we hold that the animal fighting statute is a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. We also hold that the statute does not require the government to prove the defendants' knowledge regarding the particular venture's nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, we affirm Gibert's convictions.

I.

In November 2009, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Gibert, 1 alleging one count of participating in a conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one count of participating in, and/or aiding and abetting, an unlawful animal fighting venture, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The indictment alleged that Gibert and his co-defendants each entered one or more roosters in one or more “cockfighting derbies” held in Swansea, South Carolina in July 2008 and April 2009.

The indictment described a “cockfighting derby” as a series of fights between roosters, in which the owner of the rooster with the most victories in a series of fights wins a monetary “purse,” which is comprised of the derby participants' entry fees minus the amount retained by the derby organizers. Before the fights, the roosters are equipped with a knife, gaff, or other sharp instrument that is affixed to the roosters' legs. As stated in the indictment, [t]he fight is ended when one rooster is dead or refuses to continue to fight. If not killed during the fight, the losing rooster is typically killed after the fight.” Spectators not otherwise involved in the fights pay an admission fee to attend the derbies, and gambling routinely occurs between the spectators and the owners of the roosters. Paraphernalia, such as gaffs, tie cords, cages, training equipment, medication, and veterinary supplies, some of which are manufactured in or transported from other states, are sold before or during the fights.

Gibert initially entered a plea of not guilty, and filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in which he asserted that the animal fighting statute is unconstitutional because, in enacting the statute, Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. Gibert also filed a motion seeking a jury instruction that would require the government to prove that he had knowledge that the animal fighting venture was an event “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”

After the district court denied these motions, Gibert entered a conditional guilty plea to Count I of the indictment alleging a conspiracy to violate the animal fighting statute. In his written plea agreement, Gibert stipulated that the government could satisfy its burden of proving the elements of 7 U.S.C. § 2156, including that he: (A) [ ] knowingly sponsored or exhibited; (B) [a]n animal; (C) [i]n an event that was in or affecting interstate commerce and that involved a fight between at least two animals for the purpose of sport, wagering or entertainment; and (D) [w]hich event also violated State Law.” 2 Pursuant to the plea agreement and its Rule 11 Addendum, Gibert reserved the right to challenge on appeal Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause to enact the animal fighting statute, as well as the district court's ruling that the government need not establish as an element of the offense Gibert's knowledge that the cockfighting derbies affected interstate commerce.3

The district court accepted Gibert's plea and sentenced him to a three-year term of probation and a monetary fine.4 Gibert appeals his conviction, raising on appeal the legal issues he identified in his Rule 11 Addendum. 5

II.
A.

We first address Gibert's argument that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause in enacting the animal fighting statute. We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute. United States v. Buculei, 262 F.3d 322, 327 (4th Cir.2001). Although we conduct our review of the statute de novo, we view the statute with a “presumption of constitutionality in mind,” because [d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000).

B.
i.

Because congressional findings of fact are an important consideration in determining whether a federal statute may survive a challenge under the Commerce Clause, see id. at 611–14, 120 S.Ct. 1740, we begin our analysis by discussing the legislative history of the animal fighting statute. Congress' prohibition of animal fighting is a relatively recent addition to the Animal Welfare Act of 1966 (the AWA), which is contained in Title 7, Chapter 54 of the United States Code. The AWA initially was enacted to “prevent theft and sale for use in research of pet cats and dogs, and also to foster humane treatment by dealers and research facilities of cats, dogs, and certain other laboratory animals.” H.R.Rep. No. 94–801 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 758, 759 (discussing legislative history of the AWA). The scope of the AWA was extended in 1970 to cover “most live or dead warm-blooded animals,” and to include activities such as exhibitions and auction sales. Id.

In its current form, the AWA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme which covers, among other things, the licensing of certain animal dealers and exhibitors (7 U.S.C. § 2133), the marking and identification of, and recordkeeping concerning, animals sold in commerce (7 U.S.C. §§ 2141, 2142), requirements concerning the importation of live dogs (7 U.S.C. § 2148), the standards and certification process for humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals (7 U.S.C. § 2133), regulations concerning the acquisition, storage, and treatment of animals in research facilities (7 U.S.C. §§ 2137, 2140, 2143), and the purchasing of, and standards of care for, animals...

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