United States v. Gibson Wine Co.
| Decision Date | 20 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | 1:15-cv-1900-AWI-SKO |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. GIBSON WINE CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Doc. 39)
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("United States" or "Government") brought the instant environmental protection action against Gibson Wine Company ("Gibson") related to Gibson's winemaking activities in Sanger, California. This action proceeds on the Government's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), filed on December 1, 2016. On December 13, 2016, Gibson filed a motion to strike portion of the Government's first and second causes of action and the entirety of the Government's third cause of action. Gibson contends that many of the Government's allegations are premised on inapplicable regulatory authority and now-vacated findings by the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health ("DOSH").
The United States responds that Gibson's motion is not the appropriate subject of a motion to strike—the motion seeks dismissal of three of the Government's four causes of action and injects factual allegations that conflict with the allegations of the complaint. The United States contends, even if the Court were to hear the substance of the claims despite Gibson's use of the incorrect procedural vehicle, Gibson's arguments are without merit.
In Gibson's reply, it disclaims any intent to challenge the legal sufficiency of the Government's complaint. It further explains that its reference to factual material outside of the complaint "is solely for the purpose of explaining the significance of the accurate statement of statutory defenses and elements of" the Government's claims. Doc. 48 at 2. Gibson asks that its motion only be considered as a motion to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f).
For the following reasons, Gibson's motion to strike will be denied.
This Court summarized the allegations of the Government's original complaint in its April 25, 2016 order. Doc. 21. In short, the Court explained the alleged release of anhydrous ammonia from the Gibson facility and the Government's three original corresponding causes of action.
Gibson's winemaking facility in Sanger, California, uses refrigeration systems requiring the storage and use of anhydrous ammonia. The United States alleges that on September 11, 2012, the Gibson facility experienced a 284-pound release of anhydrous ammonia from its refrigeration system. A cloud of the ammonia formed and the facility was evacuated. One of Gibson's contract employees died from exposure to the ammonia.
The Government's three original causes of action were as follows: (1) violation of the general duty clause of Section 112(r)(1) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), premised on Gibson's alleged failure to meet ten requirements relating to ammonia storage and use; (2) violation of Section 103 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9603, based on delayed notification of the National Response Center ("NRC") after the alleged release of ammonia in a reportable quantity; and (3) violation of Section 304 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act ("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(1), based on delayed notification of the State Emergency Response Commission ("SERC") after the alleged release of ammonia in a reportable quantity. After the Court's April 25, 2016 order, the Government amended its complaint. See Docs. 35(granting unopposed motion to amend), and 36 (Government's FAC). The three claims that the Court previously detailed were re-alleged, and the Government alleged a fourth cause of action (that it inserted as its first cause of action)—violation of the Risk Management Plan ("RMP") regulations established under Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA, applicable only to facilities storing regulated substances exceeding a threshold amount, (to wit, 10,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia) based on alleged failures to meet nine requirements relating to ammonia storage and use, different from the ten failures alleged under the general duty clause of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA.
The Government's first cause of action, violation of the RMP regulations of Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA is applicable only if it can show that Gibson operated a process involving the use of anhydrous ammonia in an amount exceeding 10,000 pounds. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.1, 68.10, 68.115, 68.130. The Government's section cause of action, violation of the General Duty Clause of Section 112(r)(1) of the CAA applies if Gibson used any amount of anhydrous ammonia at its facility. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 68.1 ()
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may strike "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." A matter is "redundant" if it presents "the needless repetition of allegations or the inclusion of allegations that 'are foreign to the issue.'" Lexington Ins. Co v. Energetic Lath & Plaster, Inc., 2015 WL 5436784, *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015) (quoting Wilkerson v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 170 (E.D.Cal.2005)). A matter is immaterial if it has "no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded." Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993). A matter is impertinent if it "consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question." Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527. A matter is scandalous if it improperly casts a derogatorylight on a party to the action. Lexinton Ins. Co., 2015 WL 5436784 at *10. If an allegation does not fall within one of those categories it is not appropriately stricken under Rule 12(f).
The purpose of Rule 12(f) is to "avoid the expenditure of time and money that ... arise[s] from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Sidney -Vinstein v. A.H.Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983); accord Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). However, because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice and because motions to strike often needlessly extend litigation, broad motions to strike are generally disfavored. See Andren v. Alere, Inc., 2017 WL 168605, *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2016); Kratz Aerial Ag Service, Inc. v. Slykerman, 2016 WL 1090361, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (citing Spring v. Fair Isaac Corp., 2015 WL 7188234, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015)); Atcherley v. Hanna, 2016 WL 70028, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016) (citation omitted). Such motions should not be granted "unless it is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the proceedings." Andren, 2017 WL 168605 at *3 ); see Park v. Welch Foods, Inc., 2014 WL 1231035, *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014) () (quoting In re Walmart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F.Supp.2d 609, 614 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
In ruling on a motion to strike, much like ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must assume that all of the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint are true and view the pleading in the light most favorable to the pleader. See Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973 (); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Energetic Lath & Plaster, Inc., 2015 WL 5436784, *11 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015); Patterson v. Two Fingers LLC, 2015 WL 2345658, *3 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2015); Holmes v. Elec. Document Processing, Inc., 966 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2013). A motion to strike does not test the substantive sufficiency of a pleading. See Yamamoto v. Omiya, 564 F.2d 1319, 1327 (9th Cir. 1977) () (citation and internal quotationmarks omitted); Granger v. Lowe's Home Centers, LLC, 2014 WL 4976134, *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2014). However, insofar as a motion incorrectly designated a motion to strike could have been properly brought as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may construe it as such. Knapp v. Art.com, Inc., 2016 WL 3268995, *6 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2016); Granger, 2014 WL 4976134 at *3; Rhodes v. Placer County, 2011 WL 1302240, *22 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011). Similarly, if a party improperly submits evidence in support of a motion to strike, the court may construe that motion as a motion for summary judgment. See Mullane v. Hilton Hotels Corp, 634 F.Supp.2d 1130, 1157 (D. Haw. 2009) (). A court should only consider the underlying merits of an improperly designated motion if construing the motion in that manner would not deprive the non-moving party of a meaningful opportunity to respond. See Ewing v. Megrdle, 2014 WL 2159363, *18 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (); Garcia v. Valenzuela, 2014 WL 683795, *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014) ().
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to...
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