United States v. Gilmore
Decision Date | 15 November 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 15-3114,15-3114 |
Citation | 841 F.3d 909 |
Parties | United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jeremy Gilmore, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Branden A. Bell, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Melody Brannon, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant–Appellant.
James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney (Barry R. Grissom, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Before HOLMES, SEYMOUR, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
The district court denied Jeremy Gilmore's motion to reduce his sentence in accordance with a retroactive sentencing amendment because his term of imprisonment was not “based on” a guidelines sentencing range, as is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
In May 2009, Mr. Gilmore was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Due to his two prior drug felonies, the district court sentenced him to a mandatory life sentence. After we affirmed his conviction, Mr. Gilmore filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court granted Mr. Gilmore's motion, but instead of setting aside the conviction it ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding an appropriate remedy. At a status conference, the two sides informed the court they had agreed that a sentence reduction to 168 months would be fair. Mr. Gilmore's attorney gave the following explanation for how the two sides reached this total:
The two parties reduced their agreement to writing and submitted it to the district court for its approval. The agreement was intended “to achieve a result that may have occurred had the defendant not received ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id . at 51. The sentencing agreement provided that Mr. Gilmore would admit to knowingly committing one count of conspiracy—the crime for which he was initially convicted—in exchange for the government's agreement, among other things, not to file any additional charges against Mr. Gilmore and its proposal of 168 months as the appropriate disposition of the case. While the sentencing agreement recognized that it “d[id] not offend the now advisory guidelines,” it did not expressly reference any particular guidelines range. Id . at 51. The court accepted the parties' agreement, agreed to be bound by it, and resentenced Mr. Gilmore to 168 months of imprisonment.
In July 2014, almost two years later, Mr. Gilmore filed a motion, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), to reduce his sentence in accordance with Amendment 782. Amendment 782 was an amendment to the sentencing guidelines that was made retroactive by the Sentencing Commission in 2014. It reduced by two levels the offense levels assigned to the quantities that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum penalties in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,973 (Aug. 1, 2014). When the government and Mr. Gilmore recalculated his sentence, they had used § 2D1.1 to determine his base offense level to be 32. Mr. Gilmore was therefore seeking a reduction to a base offense level of 30. The drop in his base offense level would have reduced his guideline sentencing range from 168–210 months to 135–168 months. Accordingly, Mr. Gilmore sought a reduction in his sentence from 168 months to 135 months, the low end of the guideline range.
To be afforded a sentencing reduction under § 3582(c)(2), a defendant must show that his term of imprisonment was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Mr. Gilmore argued that his 168 month sentence mirrored the low end of a guideline sentence corresponding to a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of IV, and was thus “based on” a guidelines sentencing range. The district court, relying on Freeman v. United States , 564 U.S. 522, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011), dismissed Mr. Gilmore's motion, concluding it lacked jurisdiction to reduce his sentence.1 It reasoned that it was not authorized to reduce Mr. Gilmore's sentence because it was based on the parties' stipulation and not on “ ‘a sentencing range that [had] subsequently been lowered’ by the Sentencing Commission.” Aplt. App. at 109 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) ). This appeal followed.
Mr. Gilmore contends the district court erred in concluding that it lacked authority to reduce his sentence. As a general rule, a district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). “However, Congress has established a few narrow exceptions to this rule of finality,” United States v. Williams , 575 F.3d 1075, 1077 (10th Cir. 2009), including the one at issue here. “We review de novo the scope of a district court's authority in a proceeding under § 3582(c)....” Id. at 1076.
“To ask whether a particular term of imprisonment is ‘based on’ a Guidelines sentencing range is to ask whether that range serves as the basis or foundation for the term of imprisonment.” Freeman , 564 U.S. at 535, 131 S.Ct. 2685 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In United States v. Graham , 704 F.3d 1275, 1277–78 (10th Cir. 2013), we explained the divided nature of the Court in Freeman with respect to this issue. Then, applying the rule from Marks v. United States , 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (), we held that “Justice Sotomayor's concurrence is the narrowest grounds of decision and represents the Court's holding.” Graham , 704 F.3d at 1278. We stated:
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence charted a middle ground between the plurality and the dissent. She observed Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits the parties to “agree that a specific sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case.” Id. at 2696–97 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). If the parties do so, she reasoned, the imposed sentence is “ ‘based on’ the agreed-upon sentencing range.” Id. Accordingly, when the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea is based on a Guideline sentencing range that is retroactively amended, the defendant is entitled to the amendment. Id. at 2697–99. But, when the plea deal does not “use” or “employ” a Guideline sentencing range, the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the amendment. See id.
Justice Sotomayor's reasoning is applicable here. In her view, “the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to [a (C) agreement] is ‘based on’ the agreement itself, not on the judge's calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Freeman , 564 U.S. at 534, 131 S.Ct. 2685 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). She explained that a court can say a (C) agreement was “based on” a sentencing range when it “call[s] for the defendant to be sentenced within a particular Guidelines sentencing range,” id. at 538, 131 S.Ct. 2685, or when the agreement makes “clear that the basis for the specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the offense to which the defendant pleaded guilty.” Id . at 539, 131 S.Ct. 2685. Thus, if a plea agreement does not itself use or employ a guideline sentencing range, she concluded, then the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of a retroactive Sentencing Guideline Amendment.
Mr. Gilmore disputes the applicability of Freeman, contending that the sentencing agreement in this case is fundamentally different than a (C) agreement. In Freeman, he says, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence was contingent on the fact that a (C) agreement binds the court to a specific sentence, and the sentence it imposes is therefore automatically “based on” the agreement. But here, Mr. Gilmore maintains, the sentencing agreement did not bind the court. Instead, it stated that “[i]t is solely within the Court's discretion whether to accept the proposed agreement and sentence as an appropriate disposition of the case.” Aplt. App. at 51.
But context matters. The agreement in this case was produced after the district court held in a § 2255 proceeding that Mr. Gilmore had received constitutionally deficient...
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