United States v. Glispie, 101420 FED7, 19-1224
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM.|
|Party Name:||United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeremy Glispie, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Judge Panel:||Before Ripple, Rovner, and Brennan, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||October 14, 2020|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|
Argued September 25, 2019
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 1:18-cr-10002-JES-JEH-1 - James E. Shadid, Judge.
Before Ripple, Rovner, and Brennan, Circuit Judges.
Jeremy Glispie stands convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Based on his prior convictions for residential burglary under Illinois law, the district court further determined that he was an "armed career criminal" under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment.
In due course, Mr. Glispie appealed to this court. He maintained that the Illinois residential burglary statute is too broad to be considered "generic burglary" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). He submitted that the "limited-authority" doctrine, as implemented in Illinois, rendered the Illinois burglary statute broader than the federal definition of generic burglary and that, consequently, his burglary convictions could not be used to enhance his sentence. In his view, Illinois residential burglary does not require an unlawful or unauthorized entry, separate and apart from an entry or remaining with the intent to commit a crime.
Upon taking the matter under advisement, we first noted that generic burglary under the ACCA requires 1) "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into or remaining in," 2) "a building or other structure," 3) "with intent to commit a crime." United States v. Glispie, 943 F.3d 358, 363 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)). We further noted that, under the above definition, "the entry itself must be unlawful; an intent to later commit a crime or theft, without more, does not meet this requirement." Id. (citing Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 264-65 (2013)). Therefore, if Mr. Glispie's understanding of the Illinois residential statute were correct, the state offense indeed would be broader than generic burglary. Consequently, a conviction under that statute could not be used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA.
Our examination of the Illinois residential burglary statute convinced us that Mr. Glispie had raised an...
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