United States v. Glover, H-70-Cr-9.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. H-70-Cr-9.,H-70-Cr-9.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Charles Holland GLOVER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

321 F. Supp. 591

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Charles Holland GLOVER, Defendant.

No. H-70-Cr-9.

United States District Court, E. D. Arkansas, E. D.

December 10, 1970.

James G. Mixon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff.

Giles Dearing, Wynne, Ark., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EISELE, District Judge.

At the conclusion of the government's case and at the conclusion of the entire case, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal. The principal contention, which gave the Court great concern, was that there was no evidence that the defendant "forcibly" intimidated and interfered with Special Agent George B. Stewart of the F.B.I. Indeed, the indictment did not even refer to the use of "force," although this would not render it defective because it referred specifically to the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 111, which provides:

"Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees. Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

The Court decided to reserve its decision on the question and to submit the case to the jury upon instructions which included, inter alia, the following:

"There are three essential elements of the offense that must be proved before you may find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in the indictment.

"First, you must find that the defendant has interfered with or intimidated an officer of the F.B.I. while that officer was engaged in the performance of his official duties.

"Second, you must find that the interference or the intimidation was wilful; and

"Third, that the intimidation or interference must have been forcible. You must be the judges as to what act or acts would constitute force or the threat of force. I instruct you that you may find that a threat of future force is sufficient to warrant a finding of a forcible interference or intimidation.

"If you find that one or more of these three necessary elements was missing, then you must acquit the defendant of the charge."

The jury found the defendant guilty. Thereafter the defendant filed a "Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict of the Jury." The defendant relies principally upon the case of Long v. United States, 4 Cir., 199 F.2d 717. The government has filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and it, too, relies principally upon the Long decision.

The government concedes that the adverb "forcibly" as used in § 111 does apply to and modify the verbs "intimidates" and "interferes." Nevertheless the government contends that upon the facts of this case a jury could properly find that the threat which constituted the alleged interference and intimidation was made in a context which would justify the conclusion that it was made "forcibly." Specifically, the government contends that the word "forcibly" embraces a "threat of force" and that there is no requirement that this threat of the use of future force should be immediate. It argues that there should be no distinction between a threat of future force which intimidates and a threat of present force which intimidates.

There was circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant placed on Special Agent Stewart's official vehicle a sticker reading, "The Knights Of The KU KLUX KLAN Is Watching You" (Government's Exhibit 1). Special Agents Stewart and Wanamaker had had a brief encounter with the defendant around noon of the day in question, at which time they had questioned him about a recent bombing and his participation in the Ku Klux Klan, which he denied. Later that day, about 4:00 p. m., Special Agent Wanamaker, as he was turning the corner in front of his office, saw Glover walking away from Special Agent Stewart's car, at which time he noticed the sticker on the car. Special Agent Wanamaker proceeded to his office, where he found Stewart; together they returned to the street, inspected the sticker on the car, and proceeded across the street to question Glover. Glover denied placing the sticker on the car, and when Special Agent Stewart asked him again, he replied, "You already had your first warning; you won't get a second." Wanamaker's testimony was supported by Special Agent Stewart's testimony concerning what transpired after they returned to the street. Glover denied placing the sticker on the car and denied making the statement, but admitted that he walked by the car and did in fact make a special trip from across the street, around the car, and back across the street. Special Agents Stewart and Wanamaker also testified that when they arrested the defendant at approximately 5:30 p. m. the same day they found in his possession a sticker identical to the one placed on the car, together with other Klan literature. (Government's Exhibit 2). In addition, there was evidence, offered by the government but excluded by the Court, that the defendant had recently attended a rally conducted by the Ku Klux Klan near Forrest City, and had been given certain Klan literature which was found in his automobile at the time he was arrested. (See Government's Exhibit 3.) There was, however, no competent evidence that the defendant belonged to the Ku Klux Klan and, indeed, he specifically denied membership in that organization. During the course of Special Agent Stewart's testimony, the Court asked Stewart:

COURT: "Was there any forcible interference with you by this defendant or any intimidation, use of force, or just

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