United States v. Godwin, Case No.: 3:09cr102/LAC/EMT
| Decision Date | 10 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:09cr102/LAC/EMT,Case No.: 3:12cv235/LAC/EMT |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. THARON DOUGLAS GODWIN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This matter is before the court upon Defendant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Supporting Memorandum of Law (docs. 72, 73). The Government filed a response (doc. 76) and Defendant filed a reply (doc. 78). The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Defendant has not raised any issue requiring an evidentiary hearing and that the § 2255 motion should be denied. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases 8(a) and (b).
On October 21, 2009, Defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with possession with intent to distribute more than one hundred marijuana plants ("Count One") and possession of firearms by a convicted felon ("Count Two") (doc. 1). On November 17, 2009, the Government filed a notice indicating its intent to seek enhanced penalties because of Defendant's prior felony drug convictions arising out of this court (see doc. 16). Represented by retained counsel Eric Stevenson, Defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement on December 4, 2009 (docs. 22, 23, 61).Defendant, who was 67 years old at the time of the proceedings, admitted the truth of the facts alleged by the Government and acknowledged his understanding that he faced an enhanced sentence of ten years to life imprisonment on Count One, and up to ten years imprisonment on Count Two (doc. 61 at 10-11). Defendant also admitted that he was the same individual who had previously been convicted in this court of marijuana offenses in October of 1991 (id. at 11). When asked if anyone had made any promises to him other than what was in his written plea agreement, Defendant responded, "Just what's in the document, Your Honor" (id. at 13-14). The court reminded Defendant that although he had the opportunity to cooperate with the Government, there was no guarantee that any efforts at cooperation would result in a substantial assistance motion or a reduction in his sentence (id. at 16).
The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") was disclosed to the defense on January 20, 2010 (docs. 25, 33 ). Defendant had a total offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of II (doc. 33, PSR ¶¶ 26-47, 50-51). The corresponding guidelines range was 46-57 months. However, due to the application of the statutory mandatory minimum on Count One because of Defendant's prior felony drug conviction(s), the guidelines range became 120 months pursuant to § 5G1.1(b) (id. PSR ¶¶ 80-82).
The court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 120 months on Count One and 57 months on Count Two (doc. 62 at 11; doc. 31). Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal twenty days after judgment was entered (doc. 34). The court granted attorney Stevenson's May 3, 2010 motion to withdraw, in light of Defendant's professed desire to proceed pro se on appeal (docs. 39, 43, 44). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Defendant's appeal in May of 2010 for want of prosecution (doc. 49). Defendant filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which this court dismissed after Defendant's appeal was reinstated (docs. 56, 63, 65, 67). In May of 2011, the Eleventh Circuit again dismissed Defendant's appeal for want of prosecution (doc. 71). Defendant filed the instant § 2255 motion in May of 2012. In the present motion, Defendant separates his claims into three grounds for relief, but in each he alleges that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for his failure to raise various objections to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. The Government opposes the motion in its entirety.
General Standard of Review Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, and therefore the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to § 2255 are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), provides that it must be shown that the alleged constitutional violation "has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent . . . ."
The law is well established that a district court need not reconsider issues raised in a section 2255 motion which have been resolved on direct appeal. Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994). Once a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal, it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343 (quotation omitted). Broad discretion is afforded to a court's determination of whether a particular claim has been previously raised. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963) ().
Because a motion to vacate under section 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal, issues which could have been raised on direct appeal are generally not actionable in a section 2255 motion and will be considered procedurally barred. Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234-35; Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011). An issue is "'available' on direct appeal when its merits can be reviewed without further factual development." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232 n.14 (quoting Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055). Absent a showing that the ground of error was unavailable on direct appeal, a court may not consider the ground in a section 2255 motion unless the defendant establishes (1) cause for not raising the ground on direct appeal, and (2) actualprejudice resulting from the alleged error, that is, alternatively, that he is "actually innocent." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted). To show cause for procedural default, a defendant must show that "some objective factor external to the defense prevented [him] or his counsel from raising his claims on direct appeal and that this factor cannot be fairly attributable to [defendant's] own conduct." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1235. A meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause. See Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1344.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal and are properly raised by a § 2255 motion regardless of whether they could have been brought on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503 (2003); see also United States v. Franklin, 694 F.3d 1, 8 (11th Cir. 2012). In order to prevail on a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was below an objective and reasonable professional norm and that he was prejudiced by this inadequacy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000); Darden v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2013). In applying Strickland, the court may dispose of an ineffective assistance claim if a defendant fails to carry his burden on either of the two prongs. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
In determining whether counsel's conduct was deficient, this court must, with much deference, consider "whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Dingle v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007). Reviewing courts are to review counsel's performance in a highly deferential manner and "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2000) (); Lancaster v. Newsome, 880 F.2d 362, 375 (11th Cir. 1989) (). Counsel's performance must be evaluated with a high degree of deference and without the distorting effects of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To show counsel's performance was unreasonable, a defendant must establish that "no competent counsel would havetaken the action that his counsel did take." Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315.
With regard to the prejudice requirement, a defendant must establish that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In...
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