United States v. Golden
| Decision Date | 06 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 19-00545 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JESSE GOLDEN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM
Jesse Golden seeks in two Motions revocation of his pretrial Order of Detention and immediate release on bond. The Court denies the Motions for the reasons that follow.
On September 17, 2019, Golden was charged with possession of a firearm and 100 live rounds of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). (Indictment 1-2, ECF No. 1.) The grand jury found he knew at the time he possessed the firearm that he was previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year. (Id.)
Golden was ordered temporarily detained after his arraignment on October 3 and detained pending trial after an evidentiary hearing before Magistrate Judge Rueter on October 7. See generally (Arraignment Minute Entry, ECF No. 5); (Pretrial Detention Order, ECF No. 9).1 Judge Reuter concluded the Government proved by clear and convincing evidence that "no condition or combination of conditions" of releasewould "reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community." (Pretrial Detention Order 1.) He further found "[t]he strength and nature of the case against the defendant, combined with the strong likelihood that the defendant will be incarcerated for a significant period of time, establishes the defendant's danger to the community and increases the high risk that defendant will not appear as required by the Court." (Id. at 2.)
Golden now moves to revoke Judge Reuter's Order of Detention and for release on bond pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3145(b). In a pro se Motion, he argues his constitutional rights have been violated during his detention amid the COVID-19 pandemic.2 See (Mot. for Release 9, ECF No. 62). His FDC Philadelphia unit was temporarily locked down to prevent the spread of COVID-19 after he and other inmates tested positive for the virus. See (id. at 2-3); (Gov't Resp. 4, ECF No. 66). He alleges during lockdown he was barred from communicating with his family and attorney, denied access to computers, recreation, commissary and showers and deprived of sanitized or washed bed linens and cleaning agents for several days. See (id. at 3-4, 6-7). He claims FDC Philadelphia has been slow to adopt preventive measures to protect inmates from COVID-19, certain officers do not wear masks around the facility and inmates are not being well-fed. See (id. at 8, 13-15). He believes his experience has caused him duress and violated his rights to due process, equal protection and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 7-12.)
In a counseled Supplemental Motion, Golden also argues the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)factors favor his release. (Suppl. Mot. for Release 5, ECF No. 64.) He did not engage in violent behavior or illegal use of the firearm he possessed or commit his offense while on probation, parole or release pending trial. See (id. at 5-7). He claims there is no evidence his activity was inherently dangerous and his criminal history does not involve acts of violence. See (id. at 6-7). He says he presents "no demonstrable risk of flight" as he is a lifelong Philadelphia resident with family ties to the area and no financial means to flee. See (id.). Golden further contends the COVID-19 pandemic will cause him to be detained pretrial longer than normal because of the delay in jury trials. (Id. at 8.) While he awaits trial, his risk of further exposure to COVID-19 is heightened in detention given poor conditions and his inability to socially distance at FDC Philadelphia. See (id. at 8-12).
Golden proposes conditions of release to reasonably assure his appearance in court and the safety of the community. (Id. at 1-2.) He suggests he can live with his partner, who will act as his third party custodian, and child on twenty four hour home confinement; execute a $50,000 personal recognizance bond co-signed by his partner; surrender any passports; report to pretrial services and undergo any treatment as directed; and refrain from possessing any dangerous weapon, excessive use of alcohol, use of narcotics or unprescribed controlled substances, committing another crime and having contact with witnesses or victims of his crimes except through counsel or investigators. See (id. at 4-5).
The Government responds that COVID-19 does not warrant releasing Golden, who is twenty-nine years old, in good health and has already recovered from the virus "without any apparent consequence." (Gov't Resp. 5.) While many FDC Philadelphiainmates tested positive for COVID-19 in late October and November, following the lockdown period nearly all inmates were found to have recovered and most who had been infected, including Golden, remained asymptomatic throughout. (Id. at 4.) Contrary to Golden's allegations, FDC Philadelphia provided health care, laundry, meals and other essential services throughout lockdown. (Id.) Lockdown has ended and normal services, including legal visits, have resumed. (Id. at 4-5.)
The Government also argues Golden's continued detention is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142. See (Govt Resp. 2); (Gov't Suppl. Mem. 2, ECF No. 68). Golden's incentive to flee is the fifteen-year mandatory minimum he faces in a case where the evidence against him is strong. (Gov't Resp. 2.) He remains a danger to the community based on his offense and criminal history. (Id.)
"Pretrial detainees are not within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment but are entitled to the protections of the Due Process clause." Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Pretrial detainees in federal custody are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 91 (3d Cir. 2018). The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause contains an "equal protection component." See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991); see also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2001).
"The touchstone for the constitutionality of detention is whether conditions of confinement are meant to punish or are 'but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.'" Hope v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir.2020) (quoting Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008)). "The ultimate question is whether conditions are reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective." Hope, 972 F.3d at 326 (internal quotations and citation omitted). "[I]f a restriction is not related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees." Bell v. Wolfish, 414 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
The Supreme Court instructs that:
In determining whether restrictions or conditions are reasonably related to the Government's interest in maintaining security and order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion, courts must heed our warning that such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.
Id. at 540 n.23 (citations omitted); Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (same). The Third Circuit instructs the "legitimate objectives and difficulties of managing a detention facility" and the objectives of detention must be considered in assessing whether conditions of confinement are meant to punish. Hope, 972 F.3d at 326. "[C]ourts must acknowledge that practical considerations of detention justify limitations on many privileges and rights." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
If a regulation "neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, it does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as incorporated through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, so long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate end." McKelvie, 239 F.3d at 317. Prisoners arenot a suspect class. See id. And "the right of access to the courts is not absolute." Id. (citing United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1972)).
Section 3145(b) of Title 18 of the United States Code allows a defendant to move to revoke pretrial detention ordered by a magistrate judge in the court with original jurisdiction over his offense. A district court reviews the magistrate judge's decision de novo. See United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (3d Cir. 1985).
A court may order a defendant's pretrial detention if it finds "that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).3 The Government bears the burden of proving a defendant's flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. See United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1986).
Courts must consider several factors to determine whether a set of conditions may accommodate a defendant's release, including:
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