United States v. Gonzalez-Renteria
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION 1:17-CR-292-03-ELR-AJB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ARTURO GONZALEZ-RENTERIA Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Arturo Gonzalez-Renteria's (“Defendant” or “Gonzalez”) Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Defendant's Statutory Right to Speedy Trial (“Motion to Dismiss”). [Doc. 343]. For the reasons stated below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED but that the indictment against him be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Gonzalez and his codefendants Marcos Damian, Edgar Guerrero Cruz, Jose Calvillo, Manuel Hernandez Herrera, and Juan Vallejo-Pedraza were charged in a superseding indictment returned on September 26, 2017 with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (Count One (Damian, Cruz Gonzalez, Calvillo, Herrera, and Vallejo-Pedraza)), aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance; namely, at least a 100 kilograms of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana (Count Two (Cruz, Calvillo, Vallejo-Pedraza)) aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance; namely, at least a 1, 000 kilograms of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana (Count Three (Damian, Cruz, Calvillo, Vallejo-Pedraza), aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance; namely, at least a 1 kilogram of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of heroin (Count Four (Damian)), aiding and abetting possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance; namely, at least a 5 kilograms of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine (Count Five (Cruz, Herrera, Vallejo-Pedraza), conspiracy to import a controlled substance into the United States; namely at least 1, 000 kilograms of a mixture and a substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana (Count Six (Vallejo-Pedraza)), beginning in or about April 2015, conspiracy to engage in money laundering (Count Seven (Cruz, Vallejo-Pedraza), and beginning in or about January 2017, conspired to engage in money laundering (Count Eight, Damian, Gonzalez, Herrera)). [Doc. 34-1 at 2-10].[1]
Gonzalez sets out the following facts underlying his motion to dismiss: He was indicted and arrested on or about August 23, 2017. [Doc. 343 at 1 (citing [Doc. 1])]. He filed Motions to Suppress on March 6, 2018, [id. (citing [Docs. 121-22])], the Government responded on April 12, 2018, [id. (citing [Docs. 135-36])], and he replied on May 21, 2018, [id. (citing [Doc. 149)]. He notes that an evidentiary hearing was held on September 25, 2020, [id. (citing [Doc. 325])], the Government filed their post-argument brief on October 27, 2020, [id. (citing [Doc. 327])], and the defense filed reply briefs on November 13 and 20, 2020, [id. (citing [Docs. 330, 332])]. He notes that the transcript was filed on December 18, 2020, [id. at 2 (citing [Doc. 335])], and asserts that all the necessary documents and pleadings have been available since that date.
Gonzalez argues that the Court has had this case since the final pleadings were filed on the Motions to Suppress on November 20, 2020, over 375 days ago, or at the time the transcript was filed on December 18, 2020, over 350 days ago, or upon the expiration of the last Court Order suspending operations on May 2, 2021, over 200 days ago. [Id.]. He therefore argues that the Speedy Trial Act has been violated and the case must be dismissed. [Id. at 2-3]. Gonzalez argues, considering the relevant factors, dismissal with prejudice is warranted. [Id. at 3-4].
First, he contends that, while the Government has alleged serious offenses, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when the evidence against him is considered. [Id. at 4]. He argues that the Government's only evidence is recorded conversations about a possible cocaine transaction and one recorded conversation involving an alleged heroin transaction, that the Government never found him in possession of any drugs or money, and that heroin has never been located or seized in the conspiracy. [Id. at 5]. Gonzalez contends that the fact that the Government's evidence is weak supports the indictment being dismissed with prejudice. [Id.].
Second, he contends that there was no justification for the length of time that has passed, which factors a dismissal with prejudice. [Id. at 6]. He asserts that the Government has no affirmative justification for allowing the Speedy Trial Act to run in this case. [Id.]. Finally, Gonzalez argues that the third factor-the impact of a re-prosecution the administration of justice-does not weigh heavily in either direction, as the interests of administration of justice and of speedy prosecution tend to cancel each other out. [Id. at 7]. He does note that he has been incarcerated for over four years. [Id.].
The Government responds and admits that a Speedy Trial Act violation has occurred, but argues that the length of the violation is much less than Gonzalez asserts and includes no time before May 3, 2021. [Doc. 351 at 1]. The Government therefore admits that the indictment should be dismissed but argues that that, considering all the relevant factors, dismissal without prejudice is appropriate. [Id.].
The Government contends that zero days of non-excludable time passed on the speedy trial clock before Gonzalez filed his motions to suppress. [Id. at 2]. The Government argues that the time period under the Speedy Trial Act does not begin until the last codefendant's arraignment and Calvillo was not arraigned in this Court until October 11, 2017. [Id.]. The Government notes that it filed an unopposed motion to exclude time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161, which the Court granted, and so no days of non-excludable time passed between Calvillo's arraignment on October 11, 2017 and January 3, 2018. [Id. at 3 (citing Docs. 60, 83)]. It notes that Defendants filed a joint motion to continue the pretrial conference, which the Court granted, and then at the pretrial conference the Court granted the Government's motion for a mental competency hearing and for additional time to file suppression motions until March 8, 2018. [Id. (citing Docs. 104, 108, 110)]. The Government notes that the Court issued a report and recommendation as to Cruz's competency on March 6, 2018, and during the time for objections to that report, Gonzalez filed two motions to suppress evidence. [Id. at 4 (citing Docs. 119-22]. The Government notes that it replied to Gonzalez's motions to suppress on April 12, 2018, he filed his reply on May 21, 2018, and the Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on August 21, 2020 that was later moved to September 20, 2020. [Id. at 5-6 (citing Doc. 125, 149, 290, 307)]. The government argues that all this time is excludable under the Speed Trial Act. [Id. at 4-5]. The Government notes that, following the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted post-hearing briefs and the transcript was filed on December 18, 2020. [Id. at 6 (citing Docs. 319, 325, 327, 330, 332, 335)]. The Government argues that zero days of non-excludable time therefore elapsed until December 18, 2020. [Id. at 6-8].
Finally, the Government argues that General Orders on this Court related to the COVID-19 pandemic excluded time under the Speedy Trial Act through May 2, 2021. [Id. at 8 (citing Docs. 266, 269, 278, 287, 297, 299, 304, 315, 320, 333, 337, 338)]. Since May 2, 2021, the Government contends that 208 days of non-excludable time have elapsed. [Id. at 9 (citing Docs. 341, 343)].
The Government therefore admits that a Speedy Trial Act violation has occurred, but argues that dismissal should be without prejudice. [Id.]. It contends that the seriousness of the offense heavily favors dismissal without prejudice and that the strength of the evidence is not a relevant consideration under the first factor.
[Id. at 10-11]. Regardless, the Government argues that actual evidence produced in its wiretap investigation, contrary to Gonzalez's arguments, is substantial and weighs in favor of a dismissal without prejudice. [Id. at 11-13].
Next, the Government argues that the sole cause of the delay in this matter is the result of the time it has taken the Court to address the litany of complex legal challenges in Gonzalez's pending motions. [Id. at 14]. Because the delay is not attributable to either party, the Government argues that dismissal without prejudice is appropriate. [Id. at 14-15]. Finally, the Government argues that the third factor favors dismissal without prejudice because the public has an interest in seeing participants in largescale drug and money laundering conspiracies held accountable. [Id. at 15-16]. It contends that, contrary to Gonzalez's argument, the third factor is not always neutral and there was no evidence here of any prejudice cause by a delayed trial date. [Id. at 16].
Gonzalez did not file a reply brief. [See Dkt.].
Under the Speedy Trial Act:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
When a court determines that a violation of the Speedy Trial Act has occurred, dismissal may be with or without...
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