United States v. Goodrich

• Decision Date: 12 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–2919.,12–2919.
• Citation: 739 F.3d 1091
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff–Appellee v. Damon E. GOODRICH, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

739 F.3d 1091

UNITED STATES of America Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Damon E. GOODRICH, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 12–2919.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Sept. 27, 2013.

Filed: Jan. 9, 2014.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 12, 2014.

William J. Raymond, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, argued (Raymond C. Conrad, Jr., Fed. Public Defender, on the brief), for appellant.

Damon E. Goodrich, Forest City, AK, pro se.

Paul S. Becker, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, argued (Tammy Dickinson, U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Damon Goodrich on all counts of a three-count indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (“Count 1”); possession with intent to distribute less than fifty kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D) (“Count 2”); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (“Count 3”). The district court ¹ sentenced Goodrich to 33 months' imprisonment on Counts 1 and 2, and 90 months, to run consecutive to Counts 1 and 2, on Count 3. Goodrich seeks reversal of the guilty verdict or, in the alternative, remand for resentencing. First, he alleges that the evidence presented against him was the fruit of two unlawful searches of his home. Second, he claims that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a conviction. Third, he contends that the district court's sentence, particularly its upward variance on Count 3, was substantively unreasonable. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. Background

On the evening of May 21, 2009, three Kansas City, Missouri police officers responded to a report of a break-in at a house that Goodrich rented. When they arrived, a witness told police he heard a gunshot. The officers could see people moving inside the house. One intruder left the house and ran toward a nearby wooded area. While fleeing, this suspect dropped a bag of marijuana and two handguns and was eventually arrested. Police arrested a second intruder attempting to exit the house through a window.

Goodrich arrived at the house shortly after the police. Advised of a gunshot, the officers organized a protective sweep of the house for additional intruders or possible victims. They asked Goodrich to open the front door. He initially refused, but he relented after officers informed him that if he did not unlock the door, they would force their way in. Once inside, officers conducted a 20 to 25 minutes, room-by-room sweep of the house. They looked under beds and blankets, in closets, and anywhere they believed suspects could be hiding or victims might be found. During the search, they observed a firearm on a bed and an open diaper box containing individually wrapped baggies of marijuana in a bedroom.

After the search, Police Detective Darryl Ward arrived on the scene. Based on the responding officer's report, Ward determined that a second search was needed. Ward sought Goodrich's consent but he initially denied living at the house. After a search through the police database matched Goodrich to the address, and police found utility bills in the mailbox in his name, Goodrich admitted to living in the house.

Detective Ward gave Goodrich a consent-to-search form, which advised Goodrich of his right to refuse and the potential use of any evidence found during the search. An officer read the form aloud to Goodrich, who also read it himself and admitted that he understood it. When Goodrich asked what would happen if he did not consent to the search, Detective Ward stated officers would obtain a search warrant. Mr. Goodrich signed the form.

In the second search, police found a loaded pistol and $1,000 in cash in one bedroom. They recovered $13,000 in cash and several clear plastic bags containing a “green, leafy substance” in the next bedroom. They discovered another loaded pistol and several scales in the kitchen. Finally, a search of the living room revealed $10,000 in cash in a briefcase, an industrial size roll of shrink wrap, a box of ammunition matching the caliber of one of the pistols, and a ballistic vest.

Police tested several bags of the leafy substance; tests revealed that the bags contained approximately 5760 grams of marijuana. Police developed a partial genetic profile from the gun. The profile matched Goodrich, though officers did contaminate the sample by getting some of their own DNA on the gun.

On this evidence, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Goodrich. Count 1 charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Count 2 charged him with possession with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D). Count 3 charged him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The parties stipulated that Goodrich had at least one prior felony conviction.

Goodrich pleaded not guilty. He then moved to suppress all of the evidence discovered in the searches of his home, claiming that the searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The magistrate judge rendered, and the district court adopted, a report and recommendation granting in part and denying in part the motion to suppress.

After a three-day trial, the jury found Goodrich guilty on all three counts. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months each on Counts 1 and 2, and 60 months on Count 3. The court sentenced Goodrich to 33 months on Counts 1 and 2, to be served concurrently, and 90 months on Count 3, to be served consecutively.

II. Discussion

Goodrich appeals, renewing his objection to the search and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction. In the alternative, he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

A. Motion to Suppress

Goodrich alleges that the protective sweep and the consent search each violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

We review the factual findings of the district court “in support of its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error.” United States v. Hogan, 539 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We review de novo its legal conclusions. Id. We “will affirm the district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear a mistake was made.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted)

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ...” As the Supreme Court observed, “a search or seizure carried out in a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

1. Protective Sweep

Goodrich acknowledges that he gave police consent to enter his home, but argues that the consent was coerced. He avers that he only agreed to unlock the house door for the protective sweep after officers threatened to “break the door down” if he did not open it. He also claims he was handcuffed at the time. He argues that no consent obtained through “duress and threats of property damage” can be valid consent, and thus the protective sweep was unlawful. The officers testified they would have forced entry if Goodrich had not unlocked the door, but they never handcuffed Goodrich.

The validity of a protective sweep does not hinge on Goodrich's consent. In exigent circumstances, police may enter a dwelling without the owner or occupant's consent. “[L]egitimate concern for the safety of individuals may constitute ‘exigent circumstances' justifying warrantless entr[y]” into a home. United States v. Antwine, 873 F.2d 1144, 1147 (8th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). Here, a witness told arriving police that a gun had been fired. Police captured one of the suspects with a firearm. Based on the circumstances, the police could have reasonably believed that a shooting victim or an additional armed suspect might be in the house. This reasonable belief justified warrantless entry of the house, with or without Goodrich's consent.

Goodrich also contends that the search exceeded a reasonable scope, stretching more than half an hour and including a search in boxes and “other places that could not reasonably be expected to hold suspects or victims.” Officers testified that the search lasted 20 to 25 minutes and that their search was confined to searching beds, closets, and other places a person might hide. Police conducted a methodical search of a multi-room, multi-story home to look for potential victims or suspects. The reasonableness of any exigency-based search requires a highly fact-intensive inquiry. Taking into account the facts recited, we hold that the 20 to 25 minutes search did not exceed the scope presented by the exigent circumstances present here. We hold that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering Goodrich's home without a warrant based on exigent circumstances at that time. The search remained within the circumference of a reasonable search for suspects or victims.

2. Consent Search

Goodrich next challenges the consent search, alleging that police used threats to coerce his consent. He claims officers handcuffed him after the first search, and threatened to “get angry” and “destroy the house while they were searching it” if they had to get a warrant rather than his consent. The government presented, and the court below accepted, a different version of events. The...