United States v. Goodrich Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-CV-00154-TBR
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. GOODRICH CORPORATION (f.k.a. B.F. Goodrich Corporation); WESTLAKE VINYLS, INC.; and POLYONE CORPORATION DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF
v.
GOODRICH CORPORATION (f.k.a. B.F. Goodrich Corporation);
WESTLAKE VINYLS, INC.; and POLYONE CORPORATION DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-CV-00154-TBR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PADUCAH DIVISION

January 27, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is the Unopposed Motion to Approve Consent Judgment, DN 4. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED. The Court will enter a separate Order and Judgment contemporaneous to this Memorandum Opinion.

I. Background

The United States instituted this action alleging that defendants Goodrich Corporation, Westlake Vinyls Incorporated, and PolyOne Corporation are liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 94 Stat. 2767, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., for costs incurred and to be incurred related to the releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances at the B.F. Goodrich Superfund Site in Calvert City, Marshall County, Kentucky.¹ [DN 1, Complaint]. Thereafter, the United States filed a Notice of Lodging Proposed Consent Decree, which explained, "[t]he Consent Decree resolves the United States' claims against the Settling Defendants in the above-captioned action." [DN 3 at 1-2]. The United States informed the Court that it would publish a notice in the Federal Register to alert the

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public that a proposed settlement had been filed and to provide an opportunity for public comment as required by statute. Id. The United States then filed an Unopposed Motion to Approve Consent Judgment, stating that the proposed Consent Decree was published in the Federal Register on September 24, 2020, and during the subsequent 30-day period for public comment, no comments were received. [DN 4 at 3]. In the motion, the United States describes the substance of the Consent Decree as follows:

Under the proposed Consent Decree, the Defendants will implement the Remedial Action for the Site selected in EPA's Record of Decision, issued in September of 2018. Key elements of the remedy include the installation of a three-mile long sub-surface barrier wall around the perimeter of the onshore contamination; collection and treatment of groundwater within the containment area; recovery of non-aqueous phase liquid ("NAPL") from accessible onshore areas; dredging of contaminated sediments from the barge slip; closure of two ponds; recovery of NAPL from beneath the Tennessee River; and treatment of the groundwater plume beneath the river. The estimated cost of the cleanup work to be performed by the Defendants pursuant to the Consent Decree is $97,000,000. Under the Consent Decree, the Defendants have agreed to pay all of EPA's costs incurred in overseeing the construction of the Remedial Action. In return, the United States is providing certain covenants not to sue under Sections 106 and 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 or 9607, and Section 7003 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973, with respect to the Site. In addition, the Consent Decree provides protection from contribution claims pursuant to Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).

Id. at 2-3.²

II. Legal Standards

Before approving the proposed consent decree, the Court must assess whether the decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable. United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1435 (6th Cir. 1991). A consent decree's consistency with CERCLA and its protection of the

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public interest bear on a court's assessment of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness. Id. (citing Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Procs. re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1028 (D. Mass. 1989); United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Ala. 1977)) ("Protection of the public interest is the key consideration in assessing whether a decree is fair, reasonable and adequate."); Ford Motor Co. v. Mich. Consol. Gas. Co., No. 08-CV-13503-DT, 2012 WL 4498112, at *4 (E.D. Mich., Sep. 28, 2012) (citing United States v. County of Muskegon, 298 F.3d 569, 580-81 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cty. Gov't, 591 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2010)). As the Supreme Court recently described in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S.Ct. 1335, 1345 (2020), CERCLA was enacted "to address 'the serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution,'" and "to promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts [are] borne by those responsible for the contamination." Id. (quoting Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602, (2009); CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 4, (2014)).

III. Discussion

The first factor the Court must examine is fairness. In evaluating a consent decree's fairness, the Sixth Circuit has considered "the strength of plaintiff's case, the good faith efforts of the negotiators, the opinions of counsel, and the possible risks involved in the litigation if the settlement is not approved." Akzo, 949 F.2d at 1435 (citations omitted). It is notable that the Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection (KDEP) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have been working with numerous involved parties to clean up and to evaluate the further work needed at the B.F. Goodrich Site since the 1980s.³ It is clear to the Court that

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much time has been dedicated to studying the issues at the B.F. Goodrich Site and developing a cleanup plan. Additionally, it appears that Goodrich Corporation, PolyOne Corporation, and Westlake Vinyls have been aware of their potential liability for more than a decade.⁴ Thus, it is apparent that the plaintiff's case is strong and the defendants have had ample time to assess their exposure and negotiate their liability. The Court also takes note that in the Complaint, the United States cited the estimated value of the cleanup work under the EPA Administrator's Record of Decision as $108 million. [DN 1 at 6]. However, the parties agreed to financial assurance of $89 million in the consent decree. [DN 4-1 at 15]. This suggests to the Court that the consent decree was reached as a result of arm's length negotiations by good faith negotiators. Given these considerations, the Court finds that consent decree is fair.

The Court next considers the adequacy and reasonableness of the consent decree. As the Sixth Circuit outlined in Akzo, the reasonableness of a consent decree may be measured by "the nature/extent of hazards; the degree to which the remedy will adequately address the hazards; possible alternatives for remedying hazards; and the extent to which the decree furthers the goals of the statute." 949 F.2d at 1436 (citations omitted). Moreover, "[o]ne of the most important considerations when evaluating whether a proposed consent decree is reasonable is 'the decree's likely effectiveness as a vehicle for cleansing' the environment." Ford Motor Co., 2012 WL 4498112, at *6 (quoting Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cty. Gov't, 591 F.3d at 489). The time the parties have dedicated to studying the issues, developing a remedial plan, and negotiating the consent decree is, on its own, a significant indication that the cleanup measures required by the decree will be effective. Moreover, this Court must give considerable deference to the EPA in its evaluation of the issues and the planned response. Akzo, 949 F.2d at 1426 (citations omitted)

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("[I]n evaluating the efforts of an agency charged with making technical judgments and weighing complex data, we must give a proper degree of deference to the agency's expertise."). After reviewing the record documents and considering CERCLA's goals, in addition to the considerations above, the Court finds that the consent decree is adequate and reasonable.

Because the Court finds that the consent decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and that it complies with CERCLA and protects the public interest, the Court will grant the motion to approve the consent decree.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The Unopposed Motion to Approve Consent Judgment, DN 4, is GRANTED.

2. The Court will file along with this Memorandum Opinion a signed copy of the final consent decree.

3. The Court will enter a separate Order and Judgment contemporaneous to this Memorandum Opinion.

4. The Clerk is directed to close the case.

/s/
Thomas B. Russell, Senior Judge
United States District Court

January 27, 2021

cc: counsel

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CIVIL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff,

v.

Goodrich Corporation, PolyOne Corporation, Westlake Vinyls, Inc. Defendants.

REMEDIAL ACTION CONSENT DECREE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................ 1

II. JURISDICTION ......................................................................................................... 2

III. PARTIES BOUND ..................................................................................................... 2

IV. DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................ 3

V. GENERAL PROVISIONS ......................................................................................... 6

VI. PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK ........................................................................... 7

VII. REMEDY REVIEW ................................................................................................. 10

VIII. PROPERTY REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................. 10

IX. FINANCIAL ASSURANCE .................................................................................... 15

X. PAYMENTS FOR RESPONSE COSTS .................................................................. 17

XI. INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE ............................................................. 20

XII. FORCE MAJEURE...