United States v. Goodwin
Decision Date | 16 September 2021 |
Docket Number | 2:20-cv-20118-MSN |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. OSCAR GOODWIN, JR., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
ORDER ADOPTING IN PART THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Defendant's Motion to Suppress (ECF No 46) entered June 9, 2021. Defendant filed his objections on July 9, 2021 (ECF No. 55). The Government filed its response to Defendant's objections on July 23, 2021 (ECF No. 56).
For the following reasons, the Court will ADOPT in part the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59, a district court may refer a motion to suppress to a magistrate judge for the preparation of a report and recommendation. “The magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required proceedings and enter on the record a recommendation for disposing of the matter, including any proposed findings of fact.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(1). If a party files timely objections to the recommendation, the district court must consider those objections de novo and “accept, reject, or modify the recommendation.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). Failure to object to a magistrate judge's findings or conclusions results in waiver of those objections. Fed. R. Crim. P 59(b)(2).
“The filing of objections to a magistrate [judge]'s report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues-factual and legal-that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S 140, 147 (1985). Therefore, objections to a magistrate judge's report must be “specific.” Fed. R Crim. P. 59(b)(2). Vague, general, or conclusory objections are improper, will not be considered by the reviewing court, and are “tantamount to a complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 Fed.Appx. 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) () ; Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.Supp.2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“An ‘objection' that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate [judge]'s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection' as that term is used in this context.”) The Court need not review-under a de novo or any other standard-those aspects of a report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150- 52 (1985).
In her Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge sets forth proposed findings of fact. (ECF No. 46 at PageID 76-86.) In his objections, Defendant makes six specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings in a numbered paragraphs. The Court addresses each in turn below.
1. The Defense objects to any assertion that she [Ms. Maclin] was seated in a lawn chair with a bottle of water at the time she was presented with a consent to search form, as stated by Agent Pugh. (Docket Entry (DE) 50, Sentencing Hearing Transcript June 21, 2021 (Tr.) at 9, Ln. 12-14).
As to Agent Pugh's testimony about the events surrounding the search of Ms. Maclin's apartment, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Agent Pugh's detailed recollections have more indicia of reliability than Ms. Maclin's. (ECF No 46 at PageID 89.) The Magistrate Judge therefore recommended that Agent Pugh's testimony should be accredited in full. (Id.)
Having presided over the evidentiary hearing, the Magistrate Judge “had the opportunity to view [each] witness on the stand and assess [the witness's] demeanor, ” Peveler v. United States, 269 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001), and thus is “in the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses” she heard during the evidentiary hearing. United States v. Woodruff, 830 F.Supp.2d 390, 402 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (Mays, J.) (quoting United States v. Robinson, No. 1:07-CR-1, 2007 WL 2138635, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. July 23, 2007)). “Credibility determinations of the magistrate judge who personally listened to the testimony of a witness should be accepted by a district judge unless in his de novo review of the record he finds a reason to question the magistrate judge's assessment.” United States v. Brown, No. 1:07-CR-9, 2007 WL1345463, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May 7, 2007); see also United States v. Tyler, 2:10-CR-20124-STA, 2011 WL2551177 (W.D. Tenn. June 27, 2011); United States v. Tuggle, No. 2:10-cr-20042-JPM-tmp, 2011 WL 692812, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2011) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 412 Fed.Appx. 735, 743 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Upon a de novo review of the record, there is some confusion as to exactly when Ms. Maclin was seated in the lawn chair. Agent Pugh's testimony, as cited by Defendant in his objection, does not actually say that Ms. Maclin was seated in a lawn chair at the time she signed the consent to search form. Agent Pugh's testimony was actually in regards to Ms. Maclin's demeanor:
(ECF No. 50 at PageID 103.)
(Id. at PageID 103-04.)
The Court acknowledges that, given the chronology of the questioning, Agent Pugh's testimony could be interpreted as saying Ms. Maclin was seated in the lawn chair prior to him presenting her with the consent to search form. However, the following exchanges occurred with Agent Pugh during cross-examination:
(ECF No. 50 at PageID 127.)
In summarizing Agent Pugh's relevant testimony, the Magistrate Judge's Report recites Agent Pugh's testimony in the order it was given as set forth above. (ECF No. 46 at PageID 77.) To the extent this creates an inference that Ms. Maclin was seated in the lawn chair at the time she signed the consent to search form, this is not clear from the record of Agent Pugh's testimony, and Defendant's objection is therefore SUSTAINED. From this Court's de novo review of the record, Agent Pugh's testimony reflects that deputies with the Shelby County Sheriff's Office (“SCSO”) SWAT Team performed a “call out” in which they instructed everyone inside the apartment to come outside. Ms. Maclin and another woman then exited the apartment into a breezeway. Ms Maclin and the other woman appeared calm. Ms. Maclin and the other woman remained in the breezeway while Agent Pugh went to his vehicle to get his notebook and the consent to search form. Agent Pugh returned to the breezeway, explained the consent to search form to Ms. Maclin, Ms. Maclin was given a chance to read it, and she signed it. Approximately 19 minutes later, Agent Pugh began taking an opening video of the scene and the apartment. At the beginning of this recording, Ms. Maclin can be seen just outside the apartment conversing in a relaxed manner while sitting in a chair in the breezeway. So, at some point after Ms. Maclin exited the apartment into the breezeway, but before Agent Pugh began recording his opening video 19 minutes later, Ms. Maclin sat down in a lawn chair in the breezeway outside of the apartment, but it remains unclear whether this happened before or after she signed the consent to search form. Or if it happened before she signed the consent to search form, whether she remained seated when she was presented with and then signed...
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