United States v. Gould

Decision Date10 April 1962
Docket NumberNo. 18918.,18918.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. A. Harvey GOULD, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Edward F. Boardman, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., Don M. Stichter, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., Ramsey Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Roger P. Marquis, Hugh Nugent, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

William D. Jones, Jr., Jacksonville, Fla., David W. Foerster, Jones & Foerster, Jacksonville, Fla., A. Max Brewer, Crofton, Brewer & Holland, Titusville, Fla., for appellee.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and BROWN and BELL, Circuit Judges.

TUTTLE, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal by the Government from an order by the trial court dismissing a motion by the United States to vacate a judgment awarding $31,200.00 to the record title holder of land in a condemnation suit. The gist of the Government's case is that the lands involved were all subject to easement as public streets and as a city hall site in a subdivision, and that the owner of such land could not be entitled to anything more than nominal damages, but that notwithstanding this principle of law, the Government, acting through its local district attorney, has mistakenly assumed that clear title was in the condemnee and had stipulated that the amount might be received without further proof or litigation. The appellee-land owner claimed first that the lands involved had not been dedicated to any public servitude and, second, even if they had there is no justification for a reversal of the trial court's refusal to vacate the judgment on the ground of mistake.

The land in issue is known as Tract 1462 in the condemnation proceedings for Cape Canaveral Missile Test Annex in Brevard County, Florida. In connection with this acquisition of land for this project, the United States had acquired, either by purchase or condemnation, all of the land in a subdivision platted by the DeSoto Beach Improvement Company in 1922, except for the particular land here in controversy. In filing the condemnation proceedings for this land the Government sought to condemn "all of the avenues, drives, alleys, and streets lying east of the center line of Seminole Avenue, as shown on plat of DeSoto Beach re-Subdivision, recorded in Plat Book 3, page 17, of the public records of Brevard County, Florida, less and except the following described portions of Ocean Boulevard the exception is not of significance here and also that part of the civic center designated as The City Hall site on said plat of DeSoto Beach re-Subdivision."

We do not have in evidence before us Plat Book 3, page 17, of the public records of Brevard County. All we have that was before the trial court in connection with the proceedings here appealed from are the plats that were attached to the Government's declaration of taking. One of these plats, which the parties in the stipulated judgment agreed described Tract 1462, showed that the five streets which are the principal subject of this litigation, that is Poinsettia Drive, Palmetto Drive, Ponce de Leon Drive, Ocean Drive and Brevard Drive, running in a generally east and west direction, extended down to the waters of the Atlantic Ocean on the east. This plat also shows a line varying in width from 100 to 150 feet to the west of the Atlantic Ocean line designated "shoreline as previously constructed from deed descriptions."

Several things are apparent from this plat. The first is that the land sought to be condemned by the Government is depicted as "streets" extending to the ocean. The second is that there has been an accretion of between 100 and 150 feet of ocean front to these designated street areas at some time since the tract was first platted. Third, it is apparent that at one time in the past there has been a north-south boulevard denominated "Ocean Boulevard," which, as indicated on this plat, had been "closed." In the fourth place it is apparent that the eastern boundary of Ocean Boulevard, as it was originally platted, itself lay some distance from the edge of the waters of the Atlantic Ocean.

The condemnation proceedings indicated as the names of "purported owners" appellee Gould, one Rufus M. Robbins, and Brevard County, Florida. The complaint also added the paragraph as to "unknown owners."

The purported owners Gould and Robbins both filed claims to the property. Pending the trial of these claims, a stipulation was entered into by both Gould and Robbins, and the United States, represented by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, which included the following paragraph:

"3. That the sum of $31,200.00, inclusive of interest, is a fair, just and adequate compensation for the taking by plaintiff of the estate and interest in said property as described in paragraph 6 hereof."

Then paragraph 5 was as follows:

"That said compensation shall be paid and disbursed as follows: Unto those entitled thereto as a matter of law."

Thereafter, the trial court sustained a summary judgment in favor of Gould and as against the Robbins' interest, holding that Gould held title to the property. This decision was appealed on behalf of Robbins, and the trial court's judgment in this regard was affirmed by this Court. Robbins v. Gould, 5 Cir., 278 F.2d 116.

Before this decision was made the judgment of the district court, however, the United States, apparently coming to the conclusion that it had been too precipitant as to the matter of entering the stipulation, since it now believed that only nominal damages were payable to the owner of these "streets," including the accretions to the streets, filed a petition to vacate judgment seeking relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.1

The motion here was filed within the period of one year. The basis for said motion is stated in the following terms:

"1. Said judgment awarding compensation for Tract No. 1462 is void and inequitable for the reason that:
"a. Said judgment is based upon a stipulation for judgment, said stipulation is predicated upon the erroneous understanding of the plaintiff that defendant A. Harvey Gould was the owner at the date of taking of the real property described herein as Tract 1462, subject only to a determination of the claims of the defendants Florence N. Robbins and Theodore Robbins.
"b. Although counsel for plaintiff entered into said stipulation for judgment in good faith, it was based upon an understanding that defendant A. Harvey Gould was the owner in fee when said understanding was without foundation in fact, since the said A. Harvey Gould did not hold title to or own those certain avenues, drives, alleys and streets described in the Declaration of Taking as being within Tract No. 1462 nor did the said defendant own the strips of shore frontage at the East end of said streets. Therefore, said stipulation was null and void and without legal effect."

This motion was opposed by Gould, who, after the remittitur was entered from the Court of Appeals affirming the fact that Gould had title to the property, filed a motion to dismiss the petition to vacate judgment. Gould's motion generally asserted that the judgment had been agreed to by stipulation, that the Court of Appeals had affirmed title in Gould, and that no mutual mistake had been shown warranting the setting aside of the judgment. Without assigning the basis of his ruling, the trial judge granted Gould's motion and dismissed the Government's petition to vacate judgment. We do not know, therefore, whether the trial court granted the motion on the theory that the title in Gould was res adjudicata, whether it was necessary to find mutual mistake, or by holding on the merits against the Government's claim that the documents on their face demonstrated that the owner of the streets was not entitled to receive more than nominal damages.

While it is always unsatisfactory in litigation for a court to be compelled to undo...

To continue reading

Request your trial
52 cases
  • State of Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • March 14, 1968
    ...The rule is to be liberally construed to accord justice. See, e. g., In re Casco Chemical Co., 335 F.2d 645 (5 Cir.); United States v. Gould, 301 F.2d 353 (5 Cir.); Radack v. Norwegian American Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538 (2 Cir.); Patapoff v. Vollstedt's, Inc., 267 F.2d 863 (9 Cir.); 3......
  • Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville Develop. Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • June 19, 1968
    ..."In the process of this exploration, it should be kept in mind that rule 60(b) is to be given liberal construction. United States v. Gould, 5 Cir. 1962, 301 F.2d 353; Michigan Surety Co. v. Service Machinery Corp., 5 Cir., 1960, 277 F.2d 531; Serio v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cir. 1959, 266 ......
  • Walker v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • September 27, 1990
    ... . Page 819 . 912 F.2d 819 . Debra WALKER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, . v. . The UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN . DEVELOPMENT, Defendant-Appellant, . v. . The HOUSING ... See United States v. Gould, . Page 826 . 301 F.2d 353, 357-58 (5th Cir.1962) (United States entitled to relief from consent ......
  • York Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 20, 1971
    ...to amend the judgment to include York Chrysler. Wagner v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 282 F.2d 392 (3rd Cir. 1960); cf. United States v. Gould, 301 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1962). B. York's Appeal from $49,000 Judgment Against Them in Favor of Chrysler Credit Chrysler Credit Corporation obtained the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT