United States v. Gov't of Guam
Decision Date | 25 April 2019 |
Docket Number | CIVIL CASE NO. 17-00113 |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNMENT OF GUAM; CHAMORRO LAND TRUST COMMISSION; and ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CHAMORRO LAND TRUST COMMISSION, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Guam |
Plaintiff United States of America seeks reconsideration of this court's ruling that it may not pursue money damages from Guam pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3614 of the Fair Housing Act. The reconsideration motion is denied.
Agravante v. Japan Airlines Int'l Co., 2007 WL 2175683, at *1-2 (D. Guam July 27, 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In its order filed on December 21, 2018, this court cited the Eleventh Amendment in concluding that, under the Fair Housing Act, the United States may not recover money damages from Guam on behalf of individuals allegedly injured by Guam's preferential treatment of native Chamorros. The United States now argues that, even if the Eleventh Amendment protects Guam from money damage claims filed directly by individuals, the United States, under Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), may seek damages on their behalf. This argument is grounded in an analogy to the remedies available for employment violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The plain language ofthe Fair Housing Act calls for a different conclusion in the present case.
In Garrett, the Supreme Court examined whether Congress had validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims asserted under Title I of the ADA. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it abrogated that immunity. The Court said that, "to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." 531 U.S. at 967-68. Because those requirements were not met, the Court held that, despite the attempt by Congress to make states liable for violations of Title I of the ADA, states were protected by the Eleventh Amendment immunity from such claims by individuals.
Footnote 9 of the Garrett decision noted that Title I of the ADA did set forth standards applicable to states that could be enforced by the United States (as opposed to individuals) in actions seeking money damages. Id. at 968 n.9. Seizing on that footnote, the United States argues in the present case that it should similarly be allowed to seek money damagesfrom Guam in this Fair Housing Act case. This court is unpersuaded.
Title I of the ADA governs disability discrimination in employment. For violations of Title I of the ADA, courts look to Title VII for remedies:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning employment.
In relevant part, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and (2) allow the Attorney General to bring Title I ADA civil actions on behalf of the United States against governments, government agencies, and political subdivisions. Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows aggrieved persons to intervene in such suits. In certain cases brought under § 2000e-5, courts may award compensatory damages to a "complaining party," which includes the Attorney General. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) and (2); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d). But those damages are capped. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). For example, respondents having more than 500 employees in a twenty-week period during the current or preceding calendar year have a maximum liability of $300,000 for such compensatory awards with respect to each complaining party. See42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D). While Congress was unsuccessful in its attempt to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title I ADA claims by individuals, states are liable when the Attorney General seeks damages from states under Title I of the ADA, but only up to the statutory cap on damages. The reference in footnote 9 in Garrett to the availability of damages should be read in the context of that cap.
This court notes that the parties have not challenged the concept that the Territory of Guam has immunity protections equivalent to those of a state. This court's order of December 21, 2018, stated that Guam has Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to FHA claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 3613. This court now modifies that statement in a manner that does not affect the court's ultimate ruling. Guam's immunity is more accurately viewed as that accorded a sovereign that is not a state covered by the Eleventh Amendment. See Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 381, 386 (D. Guam 1983) (). See also Marx v. Gov't of Guam, 866 F.2d 294, 298 (9th Cir. 1989) (); Capulong v. Dep't of Educ. of Guam, 2011 WL 1134986, at *1 (D. Guam Mar. 24, 2011) (). Whenever in its prior order this courtsaid that Guam was protected by the Eleventh Amendment, the order is amended to refer to Guam's sovereign immunity. This distinction leaves intact this court's conclusion that money damages for individuals' alleged injuries are barred in this case, even if sought by the United States.
That Guam's immunity as a sovereign bars money damage claims brought by individuals under § 3613 follows from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marx. The Ninth Circuit noted, "The Supreme Court and this court have recognized that territorial governments have a form of inherent or common law sovereign immunity." 866 F.2d at 297. Under that immunity, "[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). See also Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo, 227 U.S. 270, 273 (1913); Crain v. Guam, 195 F.2d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1052). Thus, Guam's sovereign immunity protects it from suit by individuals in much the same way as the Eleventh Amendment protects states. In that respect, Guam has protections far beyond those a municipality might claim.
While 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(b) provides that a court in a civil action brought by the Attorney General under § 3614(a) "may award such other relief as the court deems appropriate,including monetary damages to persons aggrieved," the Fair Housing Act, unlike Title I of the ADA, does not say that monetary damages may be awarded against a sovereign for injuries to individuals who may not sue on their own behalf. See McCardell v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 794 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2015) ( ); Mary's House, Inc. v. North Carolina, 976 F. Supp. 2d 691, 697 (M.D.N.C. 2013) ( ); Kalai v. Hawaii, 2008 WL 3874616, at *2 (D. Haw. Aug. 20, 2008) (). The United States is authorized by § 3614 to seek money damages on behalf of "persons aggrieved" from cities and other actors not protected by the Eleventh Amendment or other sovereign immunity, but the Fair Housing Act does not provide the kind of authority against states found in Title I of the ADA.
Aggrieved persons may intervene in a Fair Housing Act case, but the relief available "to any such intervening party" is only what is "authorized to be granted to a plaintiff in a civil action under section 3613 of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 3614(e). Intervention against a city might afford an aggrieved personmoney damages, but an aggrieved individual's Fair Housing Act money damages claim lodged directly against Guam under § 3613 would fail in light of Guam's immunity with respect to such claims....
To continue reading
Request your trial