United States v. Gray, Civ. A. No. 4128.

Decision Date14 July 1970
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 4128.
Citation315 F. Supp. 13
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. James E. GRAY, d/b/a Gray's Motel.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty., Providence, R. I., Gary T. Brinsfield, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Kenneth M. Beaver, Providence, R. I., for defendant.

OPINION

PETTINE, District Judge.

This is an action brought by the Attorney General, on behalf of the United States, pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5.

Jurisdiction is based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345.

The defendant resides in North Kingstown, in the District of Rhode Island, and owns and operates a motel therein known as Gray's Motel which provides lodging for transient guests for periods of one day or more.

The complaint alleges that the defendant follows a policy and practice of refusing Negroes admission to and use of the facilities of said motel on the same basis as that afforded to white persons.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Gray's Motel, consisting of 22 units and individual cabins, is an unincorporated business located on U. S. Highway No. 1 in Kingston, Rhode Island and has been owned and operated by the defendant and his wife for approximately 24 years.

It provides lodging for transient guests and about 20% of its business is with military and military-related personnel from the Quonset Naval Air Station and the Davisville Seabee Base located nearby.

There is no question but that it is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1)1 and that its operations affect commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c).2

The accusation against the defendant that he had denied Negroes the full use and enjoyment of his motel because of their race is based on his conduct as it pertained to Mr. Henry May on July 2, 1966, and to Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence Burrell and Mr. William Bolden and his daughter Sybil on August 17, 1968.

The very nature of this case requires a detailed finding of the facts as they pertain to the specific accusations relative to the defendant's conduct concerning each of these individuals and his operational practice toward guests seeking accommodations.

HENRY MAY

On July 2, 1966, Mr. Henry May, a New York resident, en route to Newport, Rhode Island at about 7:00 a. m., inquired at a service station in the Kingston area about nearby accommodations. As a result, he phoned Gray's Motel and testified that he spoke with a person who identified himself as James Gray and on inquiry was told that a cabin was available for $15 a day. Within fifteen minutes thereafter, Mr. May arrived at the motel and parked his car in one of the vacant spaces in front of the units.

The essence of the accusation must stem from the ensuing vis a vis conduct of the parties. Mr. May testified that as he entered the motel office and approached the desk, Mr. Gray looked at him and then continued talking on the phone for about ten minutes. When Mr. Gray completed his telephone conversation, he asked if he could help, whereupon Mr. May identified himself by name and as the individual who had phoned fifteen minutes before and was informed that a cabin was available. Mr. Gray denied he talked with anyone and Mr. May's insistence that he called and Mr. Gray's repeated denials kindled tense feelings between them, as is evident from May's following testimony:

"I became very indignant about the fact that the man denied I had conversation with him and began to insist that he at least recognize that he had spoken to me by phone. In the process of my insistence that he had at least spoken to me he asked me was that my car in front of the unit. I said yes. He said, `Mister, you will have to remove your property.' In that split second I realized I might be classified as a trespasser and turned around. I proceeded to remove my auto from his presence."

There was further testimony that following this incident, Mr. May went across the street to a garage and after allegedly seeing a police car pull up to the motel and "a great deal" of police traffic, with Gray looking out of the motel, he phoned the F.B.I., since he was unable to make contact with the N.A.A.C.P. or C.O.R.E. An agent of the F.B.I. arrived and advised him he would not be molested and that he should proceed to find accommodations elsewhere.

An F.B.I. report of this incident was made and introduced as an exhibit. However, its recitation that confirmation of a reservation was denied by Gray because he saw that May was a Negro and that Gray said no lodgings of any type were available is not supported by the evidence. The parties never reached this point. While in the motel, May never did ask for accommodations and Gray never did say none were available. Mr. May himself testified he didn't ask because after the response he had received, he just didn't feel it was safe. "I don't think I'd feel safe having my bags where * * *"

Mr. Gray's answer to all this is simply that he has no recollection nor any record of such an incident.

LAWRENCE AND FREIDA BURRELL

On or about the first of August, 1968, Lawrence Burrell of Washington, D. C., in contemplation of attending an International Conference at the University of Rhode Island as a United States Department of State employee and of then remaining in the area for a vacation, contacted Gray's Motel through the American Automobile Association for the purpose of securing a reservation for himself and Mrs. Burrell for a fourteen-day period from August 17 through August 31, 1968.

On August 9, 1968, Mr. Burrell received from Gray a confirmatory letter of the deposit and assurance that the room which he had requested would be held for him.

On August 17, 1968, Mr. & Mrs. Burrell arrived at the motel at approximately 4:30 p. m. Mr. Burrell entered and approached a lady at the desk. He informed her he was Mr. Burrell who had reservations, whereupon she entered a back room and Mr. Gray came out and said he was sorry but that the reserved room was still occupied, in that although the occupants weren't there, the luggage had not been removed. On inquiry from Burrell, Gray stated he had no other vacancies and returned the deposit check. After asking for and getting directions to the University, the Burrells left.

The next day at the University, he told his supervisor what had happened and that he intended to write to the AAA. The supervisor advised Burrell that a law may have been violated and that she would check with her husband, a Justice Department official.

The testimony of Mr. Burrell established that Gray was not antagonistic; treated him courteously; that he, Burrell, did not ask if there would be any vacancies during the fourteen-day period nor did he go back seeking any.

WILLIAM AND SYBIL BOLDEN

Mr. William Bolden, brother-in-law of Mr. Burrell, wishing to spend part of his vacation with him, wrote to Gray's Motel for reservations in early August or late July of 1968. He received a letter stating a room was available next to that reserved for Burrell. A deposit was mailed by Bolden as requested and a confirmatory letter of receipt and reservation was received.

On August 17, 1968, he arrived at the motel around 9:00 p. m. and approached a lady at the desk informing her he was William Bolden who had reservations. Mr. Gray was contacted. He told Bolden he was sorry but that there was a wedding party in the room and though the people themselves were not there, the luggage had not been removed and the people could not be located. Bolden told Gray he had his six year old daughter with him and could not continue traveling and asked if some other motel could be recommended, whereupon directions were given to one nearby. No inquiry was made as to possible vacancies the next day.

The defendant's answer to the Burrell and Bolden incidents is that he had overbooked his motel and that rooms were not denied because of race or color. On the contrary, he offered proof that over the years he has accepted reservations from Negroes, some of whom stayed for prolonged periods. The plaintiff contends that this position is untenable because the record shows other rooms were available on August 17, 1968, and that the Negro personnel who had been given reservations in the past were members of the armed forces and that Gray, enjoying 20% of his business from the Quonset and Davisville bases, knew that discrimination as to any of them would place his establishment off limits to all such service personnel, thus resulting in a loss of all this business.

From the maze of confused testimony presented in this case on behalf of the government, its distillation leaves us with few certainties as to whether or not rooms were available when Mr. Burrell and Mr. Bolden arrived there.

The ugly stain of racial discrimination cannot find its dye in the scanty evidence presented by the plaintiff that certain specified rooms were available and were refused to Bolden and Burrell.

As to Mr. May, the court discounts completely the position being urged by the United States. The demeanor of this witness and the record testimony causes me to conclude that in July, 1966 when May approached the desk, he became "irked," using his own word, at having been kept waiting while Mr. Gray finished his phone call and at the subsequent denials by Gray that he had made a previous call, fifteen or so minutes prior to his arrival. It became a matter of stubborn desire by May to receive from Gray this acknowledgment which was not forthcoming and as a consequence the availability of rooms was never discussed. There simply is no evidence that rooms were requested by him or even inquired about. Being ordered to remove his car was the aftermath and end result of tense dialogue between them, and to me, no inference of discrimination can be based on such evidence.

The Bolden and Burrell cases of August 17, 1968 are premised on the theory that having made...

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