United States v. Greenlaw
| Decision Date | 06 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cr-00098-JAW-06,1:18-cr-00098-JAW-06 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MALCOLM GREENLAW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Six months ago, the Court denied an inmate's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The inmate again moves for compassionate release, claiming changed circumstances warrant his early release. While the Court concludes that the inmate's medical conditions may heighten his risk of complications from COVID-19, the seriousness of his offense, the likelihood he will reoffend and the need for the sentence served to fulfill the sentence imposed continue to preclude his release. The Court dismisses the motion without prejudice.
On July 29, 2019, the Court sentenced Malcolm Greenlaw to forty-eight months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, no fine, and a $100 special assessment for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, including heroin and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). Min. Entry (ECF No. 300); Am. J. (ECF No. 306).
On July 20, 2020, Mr. Greenlaw filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Def.'s Mot. for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 368) (Def.'s First Mot.). On October 2, 2020, the Court denied Mr. Greenlaw's motion, concluding that despite his serious medical conditions, "the likelihood that he will reoffend, along with the short amount of time he has served, the need for rehabilitation, and principles of just punishment and deterrence, caution against release." Order on Mot. for Compassionate Release at 1 (ECF No. 397) (Order Dismissing Def.'s First Mot.).
On November 30, 2020, Mr. Greenlaw filed pro se a second motion for compassionate release. Def.'s Second Mot. for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 399). On December 8, 2020, the Court ordered Mr. Greenlaw to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss his motion for compassionate release for failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 400). On December 28, 2020, Mr. Greenlaw responded, Resp. to Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 401), and the same day the Court accepted Mr. Greenlaw's representations that he exhausted his administrative remedies for purposes of filing his second motion for compassionate release. Order (ECF No. 402).
On December 29, 2020, the Court appointed counsel to represent Mr. Greenlaw in his compassionate release motion, Appointment of Counsel & Scheduling Order (ECF No. 405). On January 19, 2021, after several extensions of time, Mr. Greenlaw filed an amended second motion for compassionate release. Am. Pet. for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 411) (Def.'s Am. Second Mot.). On February 4, 2021,the Government responded in opposition. Opp'n to Def.'s Second Mot. for Compassionate Release re: First Step Act (ECF No. 415) (Gov't's Opp'n).
On March 9, 2021, the Government filed a notice, informing the Court that Mr. Greenlaw "refused to have administered to him the Moderna-manufactured COVID-19 vaccine." Gov't Notice/Correspondence Regarding Def.'s Refusal of COVID-19 Vaccination at 1 (ECF No. 417) (Vaccine Refusal Notice). Mr. Greenlaw replied on March 19, 2021, contending that his refusal to take the Moderna vaccine "does not [a]ffect the Court's analysis." Def.'s Reply to Gov't's Suppl. Correspondence (ECF No. 420) (Def.'s Resp. to Vaccine Refusal Notice).
Mr. Greenlaw incorporates the allegations in his first and second motions for compassionate release, and again moves the Court for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Def.'s Am. Second Mot. at 1. Mr. Greenlaw recounts the procedural history and facts, noting that the Court already determined that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 1-4. He then turns to the merits, first arguing that his type-2 diabetes "places him at high risk of death from COVID-19 and are compelling and extraordinary circumstances." Id. at 6. He states that "COVID-19 is rampant inside [his] prison" but notes that COVID-19 "does not need to be rampant or prevalent in a prison to be considered a factor in granting compassionate release." Id. at 8-9. He asserts that if released he would live with hisbrother in Lebanon, Maine, where the risk from COVID-19 is "significantly lower" than at FCI Allenwood. Id. at 10.
Mr. Greenlaw next argues that the "applicable sentencing factors support reducing [his] sentence for early release." Id. at 11. He states that he has "served approximately 31 months of the 48 month sentence" and with good time, he is "approximately 10 months shy of release." Id. He also contends that his "conviction involves a non-violent drug offense, and his early release will not pose a danger to society." Id. He asserts that he "stopped his involvement in the conspiracy nearly two years before his arrest," "severed all ties with any members of the conspiracy, including his estranged wife, Samantha Johnson," and "is nearly 5 years removed from the conspiracy and criminal activity." Id. at 12. He claims he is "now several years removed from his substance taking, has engaged in treatment since being arrested, and will continue with treatment on supervised release." Id. Finally, he argues that his "longstanding sobriety while incarcerated, treatment, and available treatment through supervised release all greatly diminish the likelihood he will reoffend if released early," and contends that early release does not lessen the deterrent effect or pose a risk to the community. Id. at 13.
The Government "concedes that [Mr. Greenlaw] has exhausted the administrative remedies" and "further recognizes that [his] diagnosis of Type 2 diabetes mellitus continues to qualify as 'extraordinary and compelling,'" but "opposes [his] request for the reasons stated by the Court in its Order—which applywith equal force today—as [he] has failed to demonstrate that his circumstances have changed in such a way that his release should be granted." Gov't's Opp'n at 1-2. The Government provides background, noting that Mr. Greenlaw's "projected release date, accounting for earned and projected good time credit, is December 17, 2021." Id. at 3. The Government also reports that FCI Allenwood Medium has only two inmates and thirty-three staff who tested positive for COVID-19. Id. at 4. Finally, the Government claims that on January 27, 2021, FCI Allenwood's Residential Drug Abuse Program resumed and Mr. Greenlaw is "an active participant" and "is currently in phase 2 of 3 of the 500-hour program." Id. at 5.
The Government agrees that Mr. Greenlaw has exhausted his administrative remedies and turns to the merits of his motion, conceding that type-2 diabetes is an "extraordinary and compelling reason" warranting release, but argues the Court should deny Mr. Greenlaw's motion. Id. at 5, 7. First, the Government contends that Mr. Greenlaw still poses a "significant danger to the safety of the community." Id. at 8. It argues the drug trafficking offense is "serious" and Mr. Greenlaw "diminishes the seriousness of that crime" by seeking early release. Id. The Government states that he "offers little in the way of specifics about how he plans to avoid recidivating, other than participating in supervised release," and asserts that he "still has approximately 6 months to go before he completes the Residential Drug Abuse Program." Id.
The Government further argues that the § 3553(a) factors weigh against release. Id. at 9. It contends that Mr. Greenlaw's sentence was necessary and therequested reduction would neither "promote respect for the law," nor "provide just punishment," nor "afford adequate deterrence." Id. It claims that Mr. Greenlaw's "completion of the Residential Drug Abuse Program prior to release will promote available 'correctional treatment in the most effective manner.'" Id. at 9-10 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)).
Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court addressed the legal standard for deciding a motion for compassionate release on several occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 1:17-cr-00123-JAW-01, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199085, at *16-23 (D. Me. Oct. 27, 2020). Put succinctly, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) permits a court to modify a term of imprisonment when (1) "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant" the movant's release, (2) release is consistent with "the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)," and (3) release comports with "applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . .." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).2
The United States Sentencing Commission issued a policy statement under United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13 for addressing compassionate release motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A).3 This policy statement requires that the movant must meet the "requirements of subdivision (2)," which provides that a court must determine that "the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2018) (U.S.S.G). Section 3142(g) sets forth four factors that a court must consider before releasing a person pending trial. They include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, specifically whether the crime is a crime of violence or involves a controlled substance; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
The policy statement also provides criteria for determining whether "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist to release the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. These reasons include certain...
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