United States v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 08 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:17-CR-20639-TGB-MKM |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL GRIFFIN et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
UNITED STATES, Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL GRIFFIN et al., Defendants.
No. 2:17-CR-20639-TGB-MKM
United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
June 8, 2022
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS (ECF NOS. 170, 172, 174, 181, 182)
TERRENCE G. BERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This criminal case involves charges of drug trafficking, conspiracy, carrying firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking and violent crimes, and murder.[1]
Defendants Griffin and Epps have filed a number of motions to suppress evidence seized in this case. Specifically,
• Defendants Griffin and Epps move to suppress evidence seized during forensic examinations of a number of cell phones (ECF Nos. 170, 182)
• Defendant Griffin moves to suppress cell-site location information and other records seized pursuant to an order issued by a Michigan judge (ECF No. 172)
• Defendants Griffin and Epps move to suppress cell-site location information seized pursuant to orders issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (ECF Nos. 174, 181)
Having reviewed the briefing in this case and heard oral argument on the issues therewithin, the above motions will be DENIED for the reasons stated below.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court incorporates by reference the factual background set out in the Court's Order Resolving Defendants' Pretrial Motions. (ECF No. 238).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment declares that the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The “core” of the Fourth Amendment is the right of a citizen to be “free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
Probable cause demands an assessment of whether there is “a ‘fair probability,' given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1985)). When evaluating an application and affidavit for a search warrant, the magistrate judge must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity' and ‘basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
III. ANALYSIS
a. Motions to Suppress Forensic Cell Phone Examinations (ECF Nos. 170, 182)
During the Louisiana stop, police seized six cell phones from the Charger. A Louisiana judge authorized search warrants for each of the devices.[2] Defendants Griffin and Epps now challenge the forensic examination of those phones, arguing that the warrant affidavit was fatally deficient in establishing probable cause to search the phones.
The job of a magistrate evaluating a search warrant application is “simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . ., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 381 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “[T]here must . . . be a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought.” Id. (citing United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original). In reviewing a magistrate's determination, a court need only ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed, Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, and “an issuing
magistrate's discretion should only be reversed if it was arbitrarily exercised.” United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 2000).
The warrant application at issue here essentially restates the facts of the Louisiana traffic stop and includes a statement of Trooper Beaudoin that the device is “believed to contain evidence” of the crimes of drug possession, possession of a firearm with a controlled substance, and carrying a firearm by a convicted felon, all in violation of various Louisiana statutes. See Cell Phone Aff., ECF No. 171-1, PageID.755-58 (filed under seal). Defendants correctly point out that there is little explanation of how Beaudoin formed that belief, such as a statement about Beaudoin's training and/or experience regarding drug interdiction, or other facts or statements connecting the alleged drug trafficking discovered in the Louisiana stop to the cell phone in question. Defendants argue that the warrant is therefore fatally deficient. The question is whether, even though the application did not explicitly draw this connection between the criminal activity described in the application and the phone, the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding such a nexus existed.
A magistrate may “infer a nexus . . . depending upon the type of crime being investigated, the nature of the things to be seized, the extent of an opportunity to conceal the evidence elsewhere, and the normal inference that may be drawn as to likely hiding places.” United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal marks
omitted). United States v. Olaya, a recent case in this district, illustrates the point as applied to cell phones. No. 15-CR-20200, 2017 WL 1967500, (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2017) (Michelson, J.). In Olaya, investigators obtained a warrant to search the phone of suspect who was believed to have participated in a series of home invasions. Id. at *1-2. Like this case, the warrant application in Olaya “provided facts pertaining to the three home invasions and [the defendant's] suspected participation in those crimes, ” but the affiant failed to “say[] that based on his training and experience, a group committing a crime is likely to use cell phones to communicate” or otherwise articulate facts that would “tie” the phone in question to the investigation. Id. at *5-6.
In Olaya, Judge Michelson found that the type of crime described in the affidavit was such that “the gap in [the] affidavit can be bridged by a strong inferential chain.” Id. at *6. The same logic holds here. The affidavit sets out a factual basis describing the investigation, explaining that Defendants had been arrested while travelling from Texas to Birmingham, Alabama with what police then believed was a kilogram of heroin. Cell Phone Aff., ECF No. 171-1, PageID.756. The affidavit further stated that Bibb, Epps, and Griffin gave conflicting stories about “the length of the trip and when they departed Birmingham.” Id. While Epps and Griffin both said they were there for several days-but staying in different locations-Bibb eventually admitted that the three had only been in Texas for less than a day. The affidavit noted that a field test
performed on the substance found concealed in the vehicle indicated the presence of heroin. Id.
From the facts laid out in the warrant application, a magistrate could infer that the three travelers appeared to be connected to drug trafficking, and that their whereabouts and prior communications were undoubtedly relevant to that offense. Courts have recognized the importance of cell phones in coordinating criminal enterprises, particularly drug trafficking conspiracies. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 952 F.3d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 2020) (recognizing “numerous cell phones” as “tools of the drug-trafficking trade”); United States v. Gonzalez, 512 F.3d 285, 294 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Darden, 353 F.Supp.3d 697, 719-20 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (reaching same conclusion and collecting cases).
Second, the particularized facts suggest the probability that evidence might be found on the phones in question. Defendants were suspected of travelling from Alabama to Texas, apparently to purchase a large quantity of what police then believed to be heroin. It stands to reason that coordinating that travel, communicating with one another and with whomever they acquired the package from, and navigating their route would have involved the use of one or more of the cell phones seized by the LSP. Additionally, the facts laid out in the warrant establish that Griffin and Epps arrived in Houston with Bibb, but then separated from her at some point before reconnecting later in the day. ECF No. 171-1,
PageID.756. Such arrangements were almost certainly facilitated by one or more of the cell phones in question, as were, most likely, any meetings or communications that related to the acquisition of the suspected kilo of heroin found in their vehicle.
Finally, the affidavit also disclosed that there were six cell phones, but only three people. Id. The unusual number of cell phones (six for three people) suggests potential criminal behavior. See United States v. Taylor, 471 Fed.Appx. 499, 516 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that possession of ten cell phones among three people was “a telltale sign of drug dealing” and collecting cases.). The facts in the affidavit, taken together in context, create a reasonable basis to draw a nexus between this alleged drug trafficking and the phone. In sum, the same sort of “strong inferential chain” that was present in Olaya is also found here, connecting the alleged drug trafficking conspiracy at issue to the cell phones found in the vehicle. Olaya, 2017 WL 1967500 at *6.
Moreover, even if probable cause were lacking, courts will not suppress evidence “obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated...
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