United States v. Griggs

• Decision Date: 12 October 2021
• Docket Number: 3:20-cr-00087-N-1
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RAYMOND GRIGGS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RAYMOND GRIGGS, Defendant.

No. 3:20-cr-00087-N-1

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

October 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID C. GODBEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on defendant Raymond Griggs' motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or, in the alternative, a motion for a 90-day continuance of the trial. (Doc. 25.) On October 4, 2021, the government filed an opposition (doc. 30). The issues have been fully brief, and the matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Griggs' motion is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Griggs' request for dismissal of the indictment is denied, and his request for a 90-day continuance of the trial date is granted.

I. Background

On February 26, 2020, Griggs was charged in a one-count indictment with making a false statement on an income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). (Doc. 1.) That same day, an arrest warrant was issued for his arrest. (Doc. 3.) Then, on February 28, 2020, the Court held Griggs' initial appearance and arraignment. (Docs. 6, 8.) On March 6, 2020, the Court issued its Pretrial Order and scheduled Griggs' trial to begin on May 4, 2020, and it was anticipated to last for one week. (Doc. 12.)

On March 13, 2020, Chief Judge Lynn issued Special Order No. 13-5, which suspended all trials in the Northern District of Texas from that date until May 1, 2020, and it also excluded

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all time periods pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). (Doc. 30, Ex. 1.) Then, on April 22, 2020, Chief Judge Lynn extended all continuances under Special Order No. 13-5 until May 31, 2020. (Doc. 30, Ex. 2.) On March 19, 2020, the government filed a motion to continue (doc. 14), and on March 23, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Pretrial order (doc. 15). The Court found that the ends of justice would be served by a continuance and set a new trial date of July 6, 2020.

On June 19, 2020, Chief Judge Lynn issued an Amended Special Order 13-5, and it suspended all trials through July 17, 2020. (Doc. 30, Ex. 3.) On July 8, 2020, in a Second Amended Special Order 13-5, Chief Judge Lynn extended that date to July 31, 2020. (Doc. 30, Ex. 4.) On September 14, 2020, the government requested that the Court set a new trial date. (Doc. 22.) On September 18, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Pretrial Order, and a new trial date of April 5, 2021 was set. (Doc. 23.) In support of its Amended Pretrial Order, the Court referenced § 3161(h)(7)(A) and Chief Judge Lynn's Special Orders and determined that the ends of justice served by a continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. On March 25, 2021, the Court issued another Amended Pretrial Order and set a new trial date of October 25, 2021. (Doc. 24.) The Court, once again, found that the ends of justice served by a continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial under § 3161(h)(7)(A).

II. Discussion

A. Griggs' Speedy Trial Act rights have not been violated.

The Speedy Trial Act is found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. Under the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant must be brought to trial “within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial

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official of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” Untied States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)). “The Speedy Trial Act is designed to ensure a federal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and to reduce the danger to the public from prolonged periods of the defendant's release on bail.” United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1312, 1315 (5th Cir. 1990)). Under the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant must be tried within seventy non-excludable days of the indictment. Id. When more than seventy non-excludable days pass between the indictment and the trial, the “indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Forester, 836 F.2d 856, 858 (5th Cir. 1988)). Certain days are excluded from the calculation if they fall within the Speedy Trial Act's definition of “excludable days.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1); Gonzales, 897 F.2d at 1315). “[T]he [Speedy Trial] Act recognizes that criminal cases vary widely and that there are valid reasons for greater delay in particular cases.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 (2006). When a defendant moves to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, “[t]he defendant has the burden of proof of supporting [his] motion [to dismiss].” Johnson, 29 F.3d at 942 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 372 n.11...