United States v. Grimley

• Decision Date: 17 November 1890
• Citation: 34 L.Ed. 636,11 S.Ct. 54,137 U.S. 147
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. GRIMLEY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

137 U.S. 147

11 S.Ct. 54

34 L.Ed. 636

UNITED STATESv.GRIMLEY.

November 17, 1890.

Sol.Gen. Taft, for the United States.

Henry W. Putnam, for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 147-149 intentionally omitted]

BREWER, J.

John Grimley, the appellee, was, on the 28th day of May, 1888, found guilty by a court-martial of the crime of desertion, and sentenced to be imprisoned six months.While serving out this sentence at Fort Warren, Massachusetts, he sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.That court, on June 25, 1888, discharged him from custody.The United States appeal to the circuit court for said district, which, on the 27th day of February, 1889, affirmed the decree of the district court.38 Fed. Rep. 84.From this decision the United States has brought this appeal.The circuit court found that the petitioner was 40 years of age at the time of his alleged enlistment, although he represented himself to be but 28; and, under section 1116 of the Revised Statutes, ruled that the enlistment was void, and that Grimley never became a soldier, and was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court-martial.That section reads: 'Recruits enlisting in the army must be effective and ablebodied men, and between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five years, at the time of their enlistment.'

It cannot be doubted that the civil courts may in any case inquire into the jurisdiction of a court-martial, and, if it appears that the party condemned was not amenable to its jurisdiction, may discharge him from the sentence.And, on the other hand, it is equally clear that by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial, and that no mere errors in their proceedings are open to consideration.The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.That being established, the habeas corpus must be denied, and the petitioner remanded.That wanting, it must be sustained, and the petitioner discharged.If Grimley was an enlisted soldier, he was amenable to the jurisdiction of the court-martial; and the principal question, the one ruled against the government, is whether Grimley's enlistment was void by reason of the fact that he was over 35 years of age.

This case involves a matter of contractual relation between the parties; and the law of contracts, as applicable thereto, is worthy of notice.The government, as contracting party, offers contract and service.Grimley accepts such contract, declaring that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in the government's offer.The contract is duly signed.Grimley has made an untrue statement in regard to his qualifica- tions.The government makes no objection because of the untruth.The qualification is one for the benefit of the government, one of the contracting parties.Who can take advantage of Grimley's lack of qualification?Obviously only the party for whose benefit it was inserted.Such is the ordinary law of contracts.Suppose A., an individual, were to offer to enter into contract with persons of Anglo-Saxon descent, and B., representing that he is such descent, accepts the offer and enters into contract; can he thereafter, A. making no objection, repudiate the contract on the ground that he is not of Anglo-Saxon descent?A. has prescribed the terms.He contracts with B. upon the strength of his representations that he comes within those terms.Can B. thereafter plead his disability in avoidance of the contract?On the other hand, suppose for any reason it could be contended that the proviso as to age was for the benefit of the party enlisting, is Grimley in any better position?The matter of age is merely incidental, and not of the substance of the contract.And can a party by false representations as to such incidental matter obtain a contract, and thereafter disown and repudiate its obligations on the simple ground that the fact in reference to this incidental matter was contrary to his representations?May he utter a falsehood to acquire a contract, and plead the truth to avoid it, when the matter in respect to which the falsehood is stated is for his benefit?It must be noted here that in the present contract is involved no matter of duress, imposition, ignorance, or intoxication.Grimley was sober, and of his own volition went to the recruiting office and enlisted.There was no compulsion, no solicitation, no misrepresentation.A man of mature years, he entered freely into the contract.But in this transaction something more is involved than the making of a contract, whose breach exposes to an action for damages.Enlistment is a contract, but it is one of those contracts which changes the status, and where that is changed, no breach of the contract destroys the new status or relieves from the obligations which its existence imposes.Marriage is a contract; but it is one which creates a status.Its contract obligations are mutual faithfulness; but a breach of those obligations does not destroy the status or change the relation of the parties to each other.The parties remain husband and wife no matter what their conduct to each other,—no matter how great their disregard of marital obligations.It is true that courts have power, under the statutes of most states, to terminate those contract obligations, and put an end to the marital relations.But this is never done at the instance of the wrong-door.The injured party, and the injured party alone, can obtain relief and a change of status by judicial action.So, also, a foreigner by naturalization enters into new obligations.More than that, he thereby changes his status;he ceases to be an alien, and becomes a citizen, and, when that change is once accomplished, no disloyalty on his part, no breach of the obligations of citizenship, of itself, destroys his citizenship.In other words, it is a general rule accompanying a change of status, that when once accomplished it is not destroyed by the mere misconduct of one of the parties, and the guilty party cannot plead his own wrong as working a termination and destruction thereof.Especially is he debarred from pleading the existence of facts personal to himself, existing before the change of status, the entrance into new relations, which would have excused him from entering into those relations and making the change, or, if disclosed to the other party, would have led it to decline admission into the relation, or consent to the change.By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier.His relations to the state and the public are changed.He acquires a new status, with correlative rights and duties; and although he may violate his contract obligations, his status as a soldier is unchanged.He cannot of his own volition throw off the garments he has once put on, nor can he, the state not objecting, renounce his relations and destroy his status on the plea that, if he had disclosed truthfully the facts, the other party, the state, would not have entered into the new relations with him, or permitted him to change his status.Of course these considerations may not apply where there is insanity, idiocy, infancy, or any other disability which, in its nature, disables a party from changing his status or entering into new relations.But where a party is sui...