United States v. Guaranty Trust Co of New York
| Decision Date | 24 February 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 402,402 |
| Citation | 50 S.Ct. 212,280 U.S. 478,74 L.Ed. 556 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The Attorney General and Mr. John Lord O'Brian, Asst. to Atty. Gen., for the United States.
Mr. Charles Bunn, of St. Paul, Minn., for respondents mortgage trustees.
[Argument of Counsel from page 479 intentionally omitted] Mr. Henry C. Carlson, of Minneapolis, Minn., for respondents executors of Sheriff's Estate.
On July 26, 1923, the federal court for Minnesota appointed a receiver of the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad upon a creditor's bill, which was later consolidated with suits to foreclose its mortgages. The usual order issued for proof of claims. The United States presented four claims arising under title 2 of Transportation Act 1920, February 28, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 457-469. As to each claim it asserted that, by section 3466 of the Revised Statutes, U. S. C. tit. 31, § 191 (31 USCA § 191), it was entitled to preference and priority over the claims of all other creditors, secured or unsecured. Opposing creditors conceded that the railroad was insolvent within the meaning of section 3466. United States v. Butterwoth-Judson Corporation, 269 U. S. 504, 46 S. Ct. 179, 70 L. Ed. 380. The insistence that the United States did not have priority was rested, among other grounds, upon the origin and character of its claims. The master and the District Court denied the United States priority over any creditor. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decree, but limited its decision to a denial of priority over secured creditors and those whose claims were preferred by local law or by the rule of Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 25 L. Ed. 339. It did not consider the relation of the government's claims to those of general creditors, because it concluded that the estate would not realize more than enough to satisfy the secured and preferred creditors, and because general creditors were not parties to the appeal. 33 F.(2d) 533. A writ of certiorari was granted. 280 U. S. 546, 50 S. Ct. 40, 74 L. Ed. —.
Title 2 of Transportation Act 1920, comprising sections 200 through 211 (41 Stat. 457-469), is headed 'Termination of Federal Control.' Section 207 (41 Stat. pp. 462, 463), provides that the 'indebtedness of each carrier to the United States, which may exist at the termination of Federal control, incurred for additions and betterments made during Federal control and properly chargeable to capital account * * * shall, at the request of the carrier, be funded for a period of ten years from the termination of Federal control, or a shorter period at the option of the carrier'; and also that any other then existing indebtedness to the United States should be evidenced by notes payable in one year from the termination of federal control, or less at the option of the carrier. For both classes of debts, the carrier is to pay interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, and, in the discretion of the President, to give such security as he may require.1 Two of the claims of the United States here in question are based on promissory notes made pursuant to this section. Each of the two notes is in the amount of $625,000. One is dated May 27, 1922, and is due March 1, 1930, 10 years after termination of federal control; the other is dated April 1, 1923, and is payable on demand. Each bears interest at 6 per cent., payable semiannually, and is secured by a deposit of the company's series A 50-year refunding and extension mortgage bonds, dated January 1, 1912.
The third claim arose under section 209. That section (41 Stat. at p. 466) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, upon certification by the Interstate Commerce Commission, to advance to any carrier, on account of the guaranty of operating income there provided for the six months following the termination of federal control, sums 'necessary to enable it to meet its fixed charges and operating expenses'-the advances to be 'secured in such manner as the Secretary may determine'; and provides for repayment by the carrier of any amount proved to have been paid in excess of the guaranty. Compare Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 172, 48 S. Ct. 466, 72 L. Ed. 838. The amount claimed by the United States under this section is $292,022.23, which sum the Interstate Commerce Commission certified had been advanced in excess of the guaranteed amount. See Guaranty Settlement With Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., 86 I. C. C. 691.
The fourth claim arose under section 210 (p. 468). 'For the purpose of enabling carriers * * * properly to serve the public during the transition period immediately following the termination of Federal control,' that section, as amended by Act of June 5, 1920, c. 235, § 5, 41 Stat. 874, 946, authorizes loans by the government to carriers, if a loan is required by a carrier 'to meet its maturing indebtedness, or to provide itself with equipment or other additions and betterments.' The loans are to be made only on security; for a period not in excess of 15 years; and, if application therefor is made to the Interstate Commerce Commission within 2 years from the termination of federal control. And no loan can be made, unless the Commission first finds and certifies that the loan is necessary to enable the applicant to meet the transportation needs of the public; 'that the prospective earning power of the applicant and the character and value of the security offered are such as to furnish reasonable assurance of the applicant's ability to repay the loan within the time fixed therefor, and to meet its other obligations in connection with such loan * * * and that the applicant * * * is unable to provide itself with the funds necessary for the aforesaid purposes from other sources.' The claim under this section is on a promissory note for $1,382,000 dated April 1, 1921, which was given in consideration of a loan of that amount, made to enable the company to pay a maturing issue of its outstanding mortgage bonds. The note is payable in 10 years, with interest semiannually at the rate of 6 per cent. and is secured by a deposit of the company's series A, 50-year refunding and extension mortgage bonds, dated January 1, 1912. See Loan to Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., 67 I. C. C. 321, 323; Bonds of Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., 67 I. C. C. 362.
The alleged priority of the United States under section 3466 (31 USCA § 191) over mortgages and over unsecured claims preferred by local law (compare Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80, 49 S. Ct. 321, 73 L. Ed. 621), or by the rule of Fosdick v. Schall, supra, was discussed in the lower courts and was argued by counsel before this Court. But we have no occasion to consider these questions. For, we are of opinion that it was the purpose of Congress that section 3466 (31 USCA § 191) should not apply to any indebtedness of the railroads to the United States arising under sections 207, 209 or 210 of Transportation Act 1920.
During federal control, the government had been obliged to provide most of the new capital required for equipment, improvements, and extensions,2 and some of the funds needed to meet current interest and dividend payments.3 The Federal Control Act, March 21, 1918, c. 25 s 6, 40 Stat. 451, 455, appropriated $500,000,000 to 'be used by the President as a revolving fund for the purpose,' among other things, of providing 'terminals, motive power, cars, and other necessary equipment.' The Act of June 30, 1919, c. 5, 41 Stat. 34, appropriated $750,000,000 more. The Transportation Act, 1920, § 202 (41 Stat. 459; 49 USCA § 72) and § 210(e), 41 Stat. 468, made a similar provision in appropriating, for the purposes of title 2, $500,000,000, in addition to the sums otherwise available, and in addition to the general appropriations made in sections 204(g) and 209(g), (h), and (i) ( 41 Stat. 461, 466, 467; 49 USCA §§ 73, 77).
These appropriations were made in order to meet a pressing need. At the time of the passage of...
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