United States v. Guillen
| Decision Date | 03 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | 17-CR-1723-WJ |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ETHAN GUILLEN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements Discovered as a Result of Unlawful Search and Seizure, filed September 13, 2017 by Defendant Ethan Guillen (hereinafter "Defendant" or "Ethan") (Doc. 31). Having reviewed the relevant pleadings of the parties, having considered the testimony and evidence presented at the suppression hearing and having considered the oral and written arguments of counsel, the Court denies the motion as to the lawfulness of the entry into the residence and the search, and denies Defendant's request to suppress physical evidence seized as a result of the search. The motion is granted only to the extent that Defendant's initial self-incriminating statement to law enforcement is suppressed, but the motion is denied in all other respects.
The Court held a three-day hearing on the motion on January 18, 19, and 25, 2018, and the parties were given the opportunity to submit written closing arguments, which they have done. (Docs. 62 and 63). A hearing was held on Monday, April 16, 2018 for oral argument on the written closing arguments. In their written closings, the parties tendered what amounted to requested findings of fact by referring to the transcripts from the hearing, and submitted what amounted to conclusions of law. The Court notes that the facts are largely undisputed although the parties disagree on the legal significance of those facts (for example, whether Defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda), but the Court will also note where the facts are disputed (for example, whether Defendant gave verbal consent to law enforcement to enter the home).
Defendant's motion seeks suppression of all evidence and statements made by Ethan derived from the alleged illegal search of his home and effects, and from unlawful seizure and interrogation. According to the criminal complaint, on May 31, 2017, law enforcement responded to a 911 call which came in around 3:00 p.m. from someone who was later identified as Defendant's ex-girlfriend, "MC." MC had found an explosive device (a pressure cooker bomb) under her bed. A timer was used to turn on a soldering iron that was to heat up and start the fuse which then was to ignite the pressure cooker bomb. Fortunately the bomb did not detonate. The Albuquerque Police Department ("APD") Bomb Squad was inspecting the device at MC's home when Special Agent Zachary Rominger ("SA Rominger") arrived.1 The pressure cooker held approximately six pounds of black powder, nuts, bolts and a rubbery-like substance in a plastic bag that was later identified as "homemade napalm." Law enforcement concluded that the pressure cooker and its contents were an improvised explosive device ("IED"). SA Rominger interviewed MC and her mother about MC's past relationship with Ethan. MC explained she had dated Ethan for about six months, and after breaking up in June 2016 she made it clear she wanted no further contact with him, but he continued to try and communicatewith her. For a while, the school provided her with an escort to class in an effort to stop Ethan's harassment.
After interviewing MC, four law enforcement officers went to Defendant's home at around 9:43 p.m. that same day.2 Of the four officers, only APD Detective Larranga had a lapel camera video and had the good sense to have the device turned on recording events that were occurring. The Court notes that J. Edgar Hoover died in 1972 so perhaps the time has come for federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the ATF to follow the lead of other law enforcement agencies such as the APD and require agents to record most of their encounters with members of the public. Recording such encounters assists trial judges in making factual findings.
The officers did not have a warrant to search Defendant's house. When agents knocked on the front door, Ethan and his brother Tyler Guillen ("Tyler") opened it. Upon entry the officers conducted a protective sweep of the house, but no evidence was collected at this time. Defendant contends that the entry was illegal because Ethan did not consent to the entry either verbally or nonverbally.
Reynaldo Guillen ("Mr. Guillen"), Ethan's father, returned home about 18 minutes from the time the agents entered the home and was interviewed by the agents about a pressure cooker and a soldering iron. Reynaldo said he recently bought a pressure cooker for Ethan and he asked Ethan where it was. Ethan told Reynaldo that it was at his mother's house, but a call to the mother revealed that she did not have it. Reynaldo had several conversations with his ex-wife Lori Valdez ("Ms. Valdez") that evening in order to determine whether she had the pressure cooker. Ms. Valdez said she did not know but would have to look, and at the hearing shetestified that she did not look for the pressure cooker that evening. Tr. at 475. Ethan then changed his story and said the pressure cooker was at the home of his recently deceased uncle.
Mr. Guillen consented to a search of the residence and signed a search consent form. Defendant at no time objected to the search. The search did not uncover the soldering iron which Mr. Guillen said he owned, but in the backyard agents found a white plastic table with large burn marks on it and a piece of fuse stuck on it.3 Agents found a backpack next to the bed, which contained white duct tape (which matched the duct tape found on the IED), black duct tape, latex gloves, scissors, super glue and zip ties.
SA Rominger questioned Ethan at the kitchen table for about 50 minutes, during which time Ethan denied having any involvement with making the device. SA Rominger then told Ethan that the evidence indicated that he had made the IED, and Ethan stated, "Yes, I made it." At that point, SA Rominger read Defendant his Miranda rights. Ethan acknowledged that he understood those rights and waived them and agreed to speak with both SA Rominger and SA Greene. Defendant explained how he constructed the IED, entered MC's apartment through the back door of her balcony while MC was out and plugged the IED into a timer set for 1:30 a.m. Ethan's post-warning statements were recorded by Det. Larranaga's lapel camera. Ethan described how, after putting the device in place, he then listened to a police scanner and waited to hear about an explosion. Ethan told SA Rominger that he wanted MC dead and that he did not care that the explosion could have injured or killed nearby people. The agents followed Ethan into his room where Ethan showed them his computer and the components he used for building the IED which were in his backpack, including the white duct tape, the gloves and the super glue.
The complaint states that officers were unable to locate both a pressure cooker and a soldering iron which had been purchased by Mr. Guillen, but information about the pressure cooker and soldering iron was obtained as a result of the agent speaking with Ethan at the house. In discovery, ATF agents disclosed that these additional items were later obtained from Ethan's bedroom:
Agents also disclosed in discovery that certain items were obtained from the backyard of the residence, including:
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). It is a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law" that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). The Fourth Amendment "applies equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property," Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980), and only prohibits searches and seizures that are unreasonable. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a seizure occurs and the Fourth Amendment applies "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains hisfreedom to walk away." 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) ().
As long as "a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). "[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270 at 1274; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1980) ().
For purposes of this discussion, the Court will refer to the transcripts for the motion hearing by their page numbers....
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