United States v. Guillen-Rivas

• Decision Date: 19 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–cr–857–WFK–5 (WFK)(JMA).,11–cr–857–WFK–5 (WFK)(JMA).
• Citation: 950 F.Supp.2d 446
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Jose Celestino GUILLEN–RIVAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

950 F.Supp.2d 446

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Jose Celestino GUILLEN–RIVAS, Defendant.

No. 11–cr–857–WFK–5 (WFK)(JMA).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

June 19, 2013.

Ali Kazemi, Darren LaVerne, United States Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jeremy L. Gutman, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ II, District Judge.

Jose Celestino Guillen–Rivas (“Defendant” or “Guillen–Rivas”), is charged with three counts in a seventeen-count indictment against Defendant and nine co-defendants. Defendant moves this Court to sever his trial from that of the other defendants, arguing that judicial economy would not be well served by consolidating trials because the crimes with which he and his co-defendants have been charged are not comparable, were not part of the same series of acts, did not occur in the same state, and do not have substantially similar facts or participants. Defendant further moves this Court to sever the three charges against him, claiming the charges are unrelated to each other and a single trial would unfairly taint the jury's evaluation of the evidence against him on the more minor offenses with which he is charged. Finally, Defendant moves this Court to suppress certain post-arrest statements on the basis that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and to an attorney.

On May 31, 2013, this Court held an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress. At the end of that hearing, this Court denied Defendant's motion to suppress in its entirety. This decision supplements that order with the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. In addition, for the reasons stated below, this Court denies Defendant's motions to sever.

BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS OF FACT

On December 30, 2011, Defendant was indicted on charges of conspiracy to transport aliens unlawfully present in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 105.15 and 125.25(1), and making a false statement under oath in an immigration application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a). Indictment, Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 31, 34, 41. Defendant was the only individual charged in the latter two counts, although the indictment alleges that both conspiracies were committed with other persons. As discussed further below, Defendant was arrested on these charges on January 5,2012.

This Court held a suppression hearing (the “Hearing”) on May 30, 2013 to determine the admissibility of statements made by Defendant to law enforcement authorities at the time of his arrest. At the Hearing, the Government presented three witnesses: FBI Supervisory Special Agent Brian Dugan (“Agent Dugan”),¹ Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) Special Agent Michael Joseph (“Agent Joseph”), and HSI Supervisory Special Agent David Morris (“Agent Morris”) (collectively, the “Agents”). Hr'g Tr. at 5:2–6, 35:9–13, 56:14–16. Defendant did not present any witnesses.

Upon consideration of the evidence in the record, including the motion, Defendant's affidavit, and the evidence presented at the Hearing, the Court finds the following facts to be true.

Arrest of Defendant

On January 5, 2012, Agents Dugan and Joseph, along with several other government agents, arrested Defendant in front of his residence in Fairfax, Virginia. Id. at 6:14–7:10, 21:20–22:11, 57:12–24. Agent Dugan informed Defendant in English that he was being arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued in New York. Id. at 7:11–18, 22:19–23:3. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of one of the agent's vehicles for transport to HSI's office in Fairfax; Agent Dugan sat in the back seat with Defendant. Id. at 7:24–8:7, 24:19–25:6, 57:25–58:2.

Upon arrival at the Fairfax office, Defendant was taken directly to an interview room for processing. Id. at 8:8–11, 25:18–21. During processing, Agents Joseph and Dugan Defendant's handcuffs, inventoried Defendant's personal effects, and took photographs of Defendant's tattoos. Id. at 9:5–7, 25:22–26:5.

Defendant is a native Spanish speaker. Aff. of Jose Celestino Guillen–Rivas (“Guillen–Rivas Aff.”) at ¶ 2; Hr'g Tr. at 20:12–13. Agent Morris, who received training in the Spanish language and has used Spanish in his work for over a decade, entered the room about five minutes after Agents Joseph and Dugan began processing Defendant. Id. at 27:7–10, 41:7–42:16. Agent Morris informed Defendant in Spanish that he was under arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant issued in New York. Hr'g Tr. at 39:12–15. Agent Morris explained to Defendant the prosecution process, specifically explaining that Defendant would be moved to the local district court in Virginia, after which he would be taken to New York to face the charges against him. Id. at 39:16–20, 52:2–10. Although he did not specify how long the process would take, Agent Morris told Defendant that it might take some time before Defendant would arrive in New York. Id. at 52:11–23.

Still speaking in Spanish, Agent Morris read Defendant his Miranda rights from a preprinted form. Id. at 9:10–22, 40:22–41:6, 42:17–43:1, 53:19–22, 59:7–20. After reading each line in Spanish, Agent Morris paused and asked Defendant if he understood what had been read to him and the rights described. Id. at 43:13–25. Defendant consistently stated he understood. Id. at 44:1–45:16. Defendant did not ask any questions regarding his Miranda rights and did not request an interpreter. Id. at 39:24–40:2, 46:1–3. This Court notes that, during the Hearing, the Court asked Agent Morris to read one of the lines of the Miranda warnings in Spanish from the same pre-printed form and, based on this Court's knowledge of Spanish, found Agent Morris' reading to be correct and comprehensible. Id. at 54:5–16.

Defendant had some questions about the prosecution process following his arrest, including when he would see an attorney. Id. at 12:17–18, 13:22–14:10, 17:22–19:2. The agents explained Defendant would be able to see an attorney in Alexandria, Virginia, where the district court was located. Id. at 19:3–19, 31:1–22. If Defendant wanted to speak with an attorney immediately, then the agents would end the interview and take him to Alexandria. Id. at 19:14–19, 31:1–22. At no time did the agents inform Defendant that he could not see an attorney until he arrived in New York. Id. at 14:11–15:3, 40:3–19, 55:12–20, 62:10–14. Although Defendant asked general questions about when he would see an attorney, at no point did Defendant ask to consult with an attorney, either during the Miranda warnings or thereafter. Id. at 12:14–24, 16:17–19, 33:20–34:6, 46:18–19, 60:16–61:17.

Defendant indicated he was willing to speak with the agents without an attorney present, and he signed a waiver of his Miranda rights on the same pre-printed form from which Agent Morris had read Defendant's rights to him. Hr'g Gov. 1A; Hr'g Tr. at 10:4–19, 59:18–22. Agents Dugan and Joseph signed the waiver form as witnesses. Hr'g Ex. 1 A; Hr'g Tr. at 10:1–14, 59:23–60:1. Agent Morris then left the interview room. Hr'g Tr. at 13:4–8, 47:18–21, 60:14–15.

None of the agents threatened Defendant to induce him to speak with them. Id. at 15:11–24, 47:1–13. None of the agents made any promises to convince Defendant to speak with them. Id. at 15:13–24, 47:3–11, 61:22–24. None of the agents suggested to Defendant that it would be in his best interests to speak with them. Id. at 15:15–24, 47:5–17, 52:24–53:10, 61:25–62:5.

Agents Dugan and Joseph questioned Defendant in English for less than forty-five minutes. Id. at 16:24–25, 63:6–7. Defendant did not indicate that he had any difficulty understanding the agents, nor did he ask for an interpreter. Id. at 13:11–17, 16:6–16, 61:5–15. Defendant's answers were responsive and demonstrated he understood the questions being asked of him. Id. at 16:12–13, 61:8–12. After the agents finished their questioning, Defendant was transported to Alexandria. Id. at 63:18–20.

ANALYSIS

I. Suppression

Defendant moves to suppress his post-arrest statements on the grounds that (a) he did not understand that he had an immediate right to an attorney and (b) he was improperly coerced into making statements by the agents. See generally Def.'s Br. In an affidavit to this Court, Defendant stated one of the agents urged him to sign a waiver of his Miranda rights, representing “that it would be to [Defendant's] benefit if [Defendant] spoke to him right away and answered his questions.” Guillen–Rivas Aff. at ¶ 5. Defendant further contends the Agents did not tell him he could have immediate access to an attorney in Virginia and that, to the contrary, one of the agents told Defendant that an attorney would not be assigned to represent Defendant until he arrived in New York, which might take as long as three weeks. Id. at ¶ 6. By the affidavit alone, Defendant claims he did not understand that he was entitled to speak with an attorney right away and to have an attorney present with him during any questioning by the agents. Id. Defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing and was not subject to cross-examination.

Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is “entitled to counsel ‘at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.’ ” United States v. Reed, No. 11 Cr. 487, 2012 WL 2053758, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012) (Sullivan, J.) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)); see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009) ( “[O]nce the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.”). Interrogation by government agents qualifies as...