United States v. Halgat
| Decision Date | 26 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:16-cr-00265-GMN-CWH |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JEREMY JOHN HALGAT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Before the court are Jeremy John Halgat's Motion to Dismiss for Outrageous Government Conduct and/or Pursuant to the Court's Supervisory Powers (ECF No. 864), filed August 13, 2018, the government's response (ECF No. 1192), filed September 27, 2018, and Halgat's reply (ECF No. 1266), filed October 11, 2018.
Defendants Perez, Morales, Henderson, Garcia, Palafox, Coleman, Neddenriep, Davisson, and Voll moved to join the motion. (ECF Nos. 902,914, 937, 956, 986, 1013, 1027, 1053, 1079).
Garcia, Henderson, Coleman, and Voll also moved to join Halgat's reply. (ECF Nos. 1286, 1296, 1302, 1315).
On June 14, 2017, a federal grand jury seated in the District of Nevada, returned a superseding criminal indictment charging defendant Halgat with Conspiracy to Participate in a Racketeering Enterprise, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 1962(d), (Count One); Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846, 841(b)(1)(A), (Count Eleven); and Using and Carrying a Firearm During and In Relation to Crime of Violence, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1)(A)(I) (Count Twelve). (Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 13).)
Before the current indictment was returned, Halgat had faced charges in two prior indictments. First, in United States v. Halgat, et al., 2:13-cr-00239-JAD-PAL, Halgat was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, from February 22, 2013 to March 2, 2013, and use and carrying a firearm in furtherance of that crime. These allegations are the same allegations contained in counts eleven and twelve of the current indictment. See Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 13).
Second, in United States v. Halgat, et al., 2:13-cr-00241-APG-VCF, Halgat was charged with four instances of distribution of cocaine on September 19, 2012, and October 11, 12, 26, 2012, as well as conspiracy to commit those offenses. These allegations are included in the list of overt acts in support of Count One, the RICO violation, of the current indictment. Id. at 28-29 (Overt Acts 59, 60, 62, 64, 65).
In both previous cases, Halgat moved to dismiss on precisely the same bases as the current motion, that is, outrageous government conduct. The assigned district judges jointly conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing to address the motion, and independently issued rulings which denied the motions. (See Order (ECF No. 290) in 2:13-cr-00239-JAD-PAL, attached as Ex. 1; Order (ECF No. 179) in 2:13-cr-00241-APG-VCF, attached as Ex. 2.) While Halgat was awaiting trial, both previous cases were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice by the government after the current indictment was returned.
Halgat now moves to dismiss the allegations against him based upon outrageous government conduct and pursuant to the court's supervisory powers. In furtherance of judicial economy, he incorporates "all docket entries" from the previous cases, as well as the arguments he made in those cases. He provides no new facts or arguments, but he updates some legal citations in previous motions.
The government responds that Halgat fails to provide points and authorities in support of his motion to dismiss the current RICO allegations, the doctrine of issue preclusion bars his motion, and the facts fail to meet the required standard to demonstrate outrageous government conduct.
Halgat replies that he is simply advancing the same arguments as outlined in Judge Ferenbach's report and recommendation for dismissal in case number 2:13-cr-00241-APG-VCF, that he provided ample points and authorities addressing the dismissal of the overt acts contained in Count One, and to the extent the court seeks additional authority, he cites cases standing for the proposition that two or more acts are required to show a pattern of racketeering.
Count One charges Halgat with Conspiracy to Participate in a Racketeering Enterprise, which contains 103 overt acts. The previous two indictments that were dismissed did not contain a racketeering allegation. Although he mentions a few cases regarding racketeering, Halgat provides no legal analysis supporting dismissal of Count One even if the overt acts with which he is accused were dismissed. Failure to provide points and authorities constitutes consent to denial of a motion. See LCR 47-3. Accordingly, the court will recommend denial of the motion as to Count One.
Although he incorporates all docket entries from the previous cases, Halgat does not mention in his motion that the district judges assigned to the previous cases had jointly conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing and issued decisions denying the motion to dismiss for outrageous government conduct that is now before the court. The government argues that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars Halgat's request to dismiss Counts Eleven and Twelve, noting that the motion contains no new analysis or arguments demonstrating why Judges Dorsey's and Gordon's findings should be overturned. Halgat replies that decisions of district judges are not binding on other district courts.
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, "means that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352, 356 (2016) (quotation omitted). Issue preclusion applies to criminal prosecutions and civil proceedings. Id.; United States v. Bhatia, 545 F.3d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 2008). "Dismissal without prejudice is generally not considered an adjudication on the merits of a controversy, and therefore, is not entitled to issue preclusive effect." 8 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 132.03[2][l][i] (3rd ed. 2011); In re Duncan, 713 F.2d 538, 544 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
Here, the government dismissed without prejudice the previous two cases against Halgat because it had indicted Halgat in the present case. The issues that were litigated in those cases regarding outrageous government conduct that Halgat seeks to revive in this case did not play a role in ultimate dismissal without prejudice of the cases. Nor were Judge Gordon and Judge Dorsey's orders final, appealable judgments. See Bhatia, 545 F.3d at 759 (); cf. Duncan, 713 F.2d at 542 (). Thus, the lack of a final judgment in the previous two cases that depended on Judge Gordon and Judge Dorsey's orders regarding outrageous government conduct forecloses the application of the issue preclusion doctrine.
Practically speaking, while it bears a new case number and was assigned to new judges, this case is in many respects a continuation of the previous two cases that were dismissed without prejudice. This case involves the same parties. The charges from the indictment in Judge Dorsey's case are the same charges in Counts Eleven and Twelve in this case. Some allegations from Judge Gordon's case are re-alleged as overt acts in support of Count One in this case. Halgat has incorporated by reference the motion, arguments, and exhibits from the previous cases into the present case, and he provides no new facts or arguments. As such, he asks for the same relief based on motions that were decided and denied by both Judge Gordon and Judge Dorsey. Their orders were comprehensive and explained in detail the decision to deny the motions to dismiss, based on the law and the evidence received during a three-day evidentiary hearing in which Halgat had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues contained in the motions. Judge Dorsey and Judge Gordon's orders leave no doubt as to the intention of the court. Thus, it appears Judge Dorsey and Gordon's orders arguably could be regarded under the preclusive doctrine of law of the case.
"Under the law of the case doctrine, a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case." United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). Id. Law of the case is a prudential doctrine recognizing the general practice of refusing to reopen matters that have been decided. Id.; Mayweathers v. Terhune, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2001); see, e.g., Loera v. U.S., 714 F.3d 1025, 1028-31 (7th Cir. 2013) ().
While courts do not lightly ignore rulings made after opportunity for a full and fair hearing in a later stage of the same proceeding, because the law of the case doctrine is outside the parties' arguments and this case is a resumption of the previous cases, rather than the identical case, the court will not apply the doctrine. Regardless, because Halgat moves to incorporate all docket entries and the arguments he raised in the previous cases, the court finds itself in the...
To continue reading
Request your trial