United States v. Hall

• Decision Date: 21 November 1890
• Citation: 44 F. 864
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. HALL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

44 F. 864

UNITED STATES v. HALL.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Western Division.

November 21, 1890

Syllabus by the Court

Where a subpoena duces tecum has been issued to a witness, requiring him to produce a deed therein described, and he answers orally under oath before the court that he had no such deed and never had it, and it further appears that the deed he was required to produce was alleged to have been furnished him by the prisoner, if, on the trial of a traverse to the answer made by the respondent to the subpoena duces tecum, the prisoner testified that he had furnished or delivered the respondent no such deed, his testimony would be in a matter material to the issue so formed, and, if he testified falsely, not believing his testimony to be true, he would be guilty of perjury.

Before the jury are authorized to convict the defendant on a charge of perjury, they must be satisfied from the testimony of one witness, with corroborating circumstances, or from the testimony of more than one witness, that the prisoner swore and testified falsely, not believing his testimony to be true.

The evidence must be something more than sufficient to counterbalance the oath of the prisoner and the legal presumption of his innocence. The oath of the accusing witness, therefore, will not avail to convict, unless it be strongly corroborated by other independent circumstances; but the jury will be justified in convicting upon the testimony of a single credible witness so corroborated.

In a case of perjury, every material allegation in the indictment may be shown by a single witness except the allegation that the evidence of the prisoner in question was false, and that he did not believe it to be true. The deed in question being a forgery, it is material to show, as a circumstance of corroboration of the testimony of the accusing witness, that it was in the handwriting of the prisoner, that the latter was extensively engaged in forging, and causing to be forged deeds to lands in that portion of the state.

The question whether a witness is impeached or not is for the jury to answer, and, though he swore differently on a former trial, if this was done under duress of bodily harm, it may not affect his testimony.

Where the law obliges a party to call a witness, the party calling him is not precluded from proving the truthfulness of any particular fact by any other competent testimony in direct contradiction to what such witness may have testified, and this is not only where it appears that the witness was intentionally mistaken, but even where the evidence may collaterally have the effect of showing that he was generally unworthy of belief.

Power of judges in the federal courts to sum up the evidence discussed, but declared merely advisory, and not intended to fetter the exercise of the independent judgment of the jury. It is the right and duty of the court to aid the jury 'to recall the testimony to their recollection by collating its details, by suggesting grounds of preference where there is contradiction, by directing their attention to the most important facts, by eliminating true points of inquiry, by resolving the evidence, however complicated, into its simplest elements, and by showing the bearing of its several parts, and their combined effect, stripped of every consideration which might otherwise mislead or confuse them. How this duty shall be performed depends in every case upon the discretion of the judge. There is none more important rests upon those who preside at jury trials. Constituted as juries are, it is frequently impossible for them to discharge their functions wisely and well without this aid. In such cases chance, mistake, or caprice may determine the result. ' Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 439.

Duty of the jury to discard improper and misleading appeals, adverted to.

John L Hardeman, Special Asst. U.S. Atty.

Bacon &amp Rutherford and Dessau & Bartlett, for defendant.

SPEER J., (charging jury.)

The laws of the United States provide that every person who having been sworn conformably to law that he will testify truly, does, willfully, and contrary to such oath, state any material matter which he does not believe to be true, he shall be held guilty of perjury, and, on conviction, shall be punished therefor. The prisoner, Luther A. Hall, has been indicted for an alleged violation of this law. To that indictment he has pleaded not guilty, and thus the charge preferred by the grand jury, with his plea thereon, presents for your determination, under the rules of law, the issue now on trial. The crime of perjury is a crime against public justice. It is a fundamental principle in all judicial investigations-- that is, in all trials before the courts-- that in the ascertainment of the truth of the matter in controversy society must rely upon the respect and obligation which the solemn oath, administered in accordance with law, will have in the mind and conscience of the witness. This crime was not originally punishable by the courts of law. It was deemed in the ages past a sin, rather than a crime, and its punishment was supposed to reside with the offended Deity, who had been solemnly invoked, and the solemn invocation to whom had been disregarded. But for several centuries past the crime has been triable and punishable in the courts, and the statute which the prisoner at the bar is charged to have violated was enacted immediately after the organization of our government, to-wit, in the year 1790. I am sure that all the occurrences of this lengthy trial have given to you, if you did not possess it in its outset, an adequate impression of the importance and gravity of the accusation, as well to the prisoner as to the community. It was well said to the Athenians, by the orator Lycurgus that no country can subsist a twelve-month where an oath is not thought binding, for the want of it must necessarily dissolve society. I allude to the gravity of the offense with which the prisoner stands charged, not to justify or arouse any undue anxiety or excitement in your minds, but to make you, if I can, thoroughly appreciate the magnitude of the issue on trial as it may affect the prisoner, and society as well. While I invoke your anxious and impartial attention to the entire case as it has been and will be submitted, I caution you against confusing the question of guilt or innocence with the magnitude of the charge, or its consequences to any, or to all. You will be careful, gentlemen, to observe the several elements necessary to constitute the crime of perjury. First, the oath must have been taken before a tribunal competent to administer the same, and in a case in which the law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered. The oath must be that the person taking it will testify truly. Having been so sworn, the person testifying must willfully, and contrary to his oath, state or testify to a material matter which he does not believe to be true. By the language 'material matter' is meant evidence or testimony material to the issue then on trial. In such case, a person so lawfully sworn, who willfully, and contrary to his oath, states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury. Now, let us first inquire whether, in the case before the court, the government has shown to the jury that the prisoner, Luther A. Hall, has been placed, by his conduct, in the attitude, in which we may rightfully inquire whether his testimony, about which the trial is had, was false, and not believed by him to be true. It is charged in the indictment that he was sworn as a witness on the trial of the traverse to an answer made by one Judge Goodwin to a subpoena duces tecum; that the trial was had upon the hearing of a rule brought by Norman W. Dodge against Luther A. Hall for an alleged violation and contempt of a decree of the circuit court of the United States for this district. It is further charged in the indictment that the oath was taken before the judge of this court, who was then presiding in said circuit court. Now, gentlemen, I charge you, as a matter of law, that the circuit court of the United States for this district and circuit is a tribunal competent to administer an oath; that the judge of this court has lawful power and authority to preside in the said circuit court of the United States, and had such authority at the time referred to in the bill of indictment, and on the trial of the proceeding therein described, between Norman W. Dodge and Luther A. Hall. I charge you further that, in hearing the answer of a witness to a subpoena duces tecum, and on the trial of a traverse to such answer, there is before the court a case, in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered. I charge you further that, if you believe from the evidence that the prisoner, at the time and on the issue described in the indictment, was sworn in the usual manner, the method of administering the oath is a sufficient compliance with the law. I charge you further, if you find from the evidence that a subpoena duces tecum was issued to one Judge Goodwin, requiring him to produce a deed therein described before the court, on a day certain, and he answered that he had no such deed, and it further appears from the evidence that the deed he was required to produce was alleged to have been furnished him by the prisoner; and if it further appears that on the trial of the traverse to the said answer, that the party taking out the subpoena insisted, by evidence and otherwise, that the deed sought to be produced was furnished Goodwin by the prisoner, if then the prisoner testified that he had furnished or delivered Goodwin no such deed, his testimony on the occasion...