United States v. Hall

• Decision Date: 30 August 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:17cr110/MCR
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOHN WILLIAM HALL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOHN WILLIAM HALL.

Case No. 3:17cr110/MCR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

August 30, 2018

ORDER

Defendant John William Hall pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1). Hall's Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") applies the enhanced mandatory minimum sentence provided in § 2252A(b)(1), based on Hall's two prior convictions in the state of Florida—one for lewd or lascivious conduct, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(6) (2002), and one for lewd or lascivious exhibition, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 800.04(7) (2002).¹ Hall objects. For the following reasons, Hall's objection is overruled.²

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A. Validity of Hall's Prior Convictions

As a threshold matter, Hall argues that his two prior Florida convictions cannot be used to enhance his sentence because the convictions are "presumptively void and unconstitutional." See ECF No. 39 at 7. This is incorrect. With the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding has no right to collaterally attack the validity of previous state convictions that are used for sentencing enhancement purposes. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994); United States v. Phillips, 120 F.3d 227, 231 (11th Cir. 1997). In this case, Hall does not claim that his Florida convictions were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. Indeed, the judgment and sentence recommendation for these convictions reflect that Hall was represented by counsel during the state court proceedings. See ECF No. 39-2. Therefore, Hall may not collaterally attack the validity of his Florida convictions in this federal sentencing proceeding.

B. Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1)

Section 2252A(b)(1) generally establishes a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for receipt of child pornography under § 2252A(a)(2). However, the statute mandates an enhanced minimum sentence of 15 years where the defendant has a prior conviction "under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." See 18 U.S.C.

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2252A(b)(1). In this case, Hall argues that his prior convictions under Fla. Stat. §§ 800.04(6) and (7) (2002) cannot qualify as 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) predicates because they do not "relate to" the generic federal offenses of aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward. More specifically, Hall claims that the Florida statutes under which he was convicted do not fall within the scope of § 2252A(b)(1) because those statutes criminalize a broader swath of conduct—namely, "strictly verbal conduct" and "acts done solely in the presence of an undercover officer posing as a child," respectively—than the relevant generic offenses. See ECF No. 39 at 6-8. Hall's arguments are squarely foreclosed by Eleventh Circuit precedent.

To determine whether a prior conviction triggers the § 2252A(b)(1) enhancement, sentencing courts generally employ a categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definition of the offense, without inquiring into the defendant's specific conduct in committing it. See United States v. Johnson, 681 F. App'x 735, 738 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2253 (2016)). Under this approach, courts must presume that the defendant's conviction "rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized" by the statute and determine whether, in all instances, those acts "relat[e] to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." See id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91 (2013)). In the § 2252A(b)(1) context,

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the term "sexual abuse" means "misuse or maltreatment for the purpose of libidinal gratification," and "abusive sexual conduct" means "behaving in a way that harms a minor for the purpose of one's libidinal gratification." See id. at 740. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that the term "relating to" must be interpreted broadly in the context of child exploitation offenses, as "§ 2252A does not simply mandate a sentencing enhancement for individuals convicted of state offenses equivalent to sexual abuse," but rather, "for any state offense that stands in some relation, bears upon, or is associated with that generic offense." United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012).

At the time of Hall's conviction in 2002, the "least of the acts criminalized" by Florida's lewd and lascivious conduct statute, Fla. Stat. § 800.04(6), was soliciting a minor to commit a lewd or lascivious act.³ As Hall correctly observes, this statute could be violated through "verbal conduct which is unaccompanied by other physical action" on the part of the defendant. See Morris v. State, 789 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (affirming a conviction for knowingly committing a lewd or lascivious act in the presence of a minor based on the defendant "telling a child that he desired to...