United States v. Hamilton
| Decision Date | 08 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-CR-0083-M |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RUEL M. HAMILTON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is the Motion for Acquittal or New Trial Under Rules 29 and 33 (ECF No. 375), filed by Defendant Ruel M Hamilton. For the reasons explained below, the Motion is DENIED.
On June 29, 2021, a jury convicted Defendant Ruel M. Hamilton of Counts One, Two, and Three of the Superseding Indictment. ECF No. 339. Count One charged Hamilton with conspiracy to commit bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Counts Two and Three charged Hamilton with bribery concerning a local government receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). At trial, after the government rested, Hamilton moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the Court took under advisement. Following trial, prior to the jury's verdict, Hamilton moved for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, which the Court denied. Hamilton now moves for judgment of acquittal and, in the alternative, a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.
Rule 29 requires the Court to grant a judgment of acquittal despite a guilty verdict where there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. Evidence to support a conviction is sufficient if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2014). A court must give great deference to the jury's verdict, reviewing evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict, accepting all credibility choices and reasonable inferences made by the jury.” United States v. Moparty, 11 F.4th 280, 296 (5th Cir. 2021). The Court does not determine whether the verdict was correct, but rather, “whether the jury's decision was rational.” United States v. Martinez, 921 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 2019). A verdict based on “mere suspicion, speculation, or conjecture, or on an overly attenuated piling of inference on inference” is not rational. United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1521 (5th Cir. 1996).
Rule 33 provides that the Court may vacate judgment and grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Generally, the Court “should not grant a motion for new trial unless there would be a miscarriage of justice or the weight of evidence preponderates against the verdict.” United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 466 (5th Cir. 2004).
Hamilton moves for judgment of acquittal on all counts, arguing that the jurisdictional elements of § 666(b) were not met; the substantive elements of the charged offenses were not established at trial; and the jury was invited to convict Hamilton based on activities protected by the First Amendment. In the alternative, Hamilton moves for a new trial on evidentiary grounds and errors relating to the jury instructions.
Title 18, United States Code, Section 666(a)(2), makes it a crime for anyone who “corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5, 000 or more.” Section 666(b) requires that the organization, government, or agency in question “receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10, 000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.”
The parties entered into the following stipulation prior to trial, which was admitted into evidence as Government's Exhibit 220:
The parties hereby stipulate and agree that the City of Dallas is a local government within the State of Texas, which in each of the one-year fiscal periods from October 1, 2013 to September 31, 2014, from October 1, 2014 to September 31, 2015, and from October 1, 2017 to September 31, 2018, received in excess of $10, 000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance or other form of Federal assistance.
Because the stipulation only provides that the City of Dallas received “in excess of $10, 000, ” as opposed to “benefits in excess of $10, 000, ” Hamilton argues that the stipulation does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of § 666, because no other evidence was admitted showing it was met. Hamilton further argues that the government did not identify a specific federal program, mandating acquittal of the § 666 charges. Hamilton relies primarily on United States v. Bravo-Fernandez, 913 F.3d 244 (1st Cir. 2019), a First Circuit case which rejected the contention that a stipulation that a local government received over $10, 000 in “federal funds” satisfied the jurisdictional element of § 666.
As an initial matter, the Court finds Hamilton's argument here somewhat disingenuous given that, prior to trial, Hamilton volunteered “to save time . . . [by] stipulat[ing] on some or all of the 666 jurisdiction issues, ” yet now raises the absence of the word “benefits” in the stipulation despite having removed that language himself-without indicating that he did so- from the government's proposal that otherwise directly tracked the statutory language.[1] See Resp. (ECF No. 379) at Exs. A-D.
Regardless, the Court finds that the parties' stipulation satisfies the requirements of § 666(b). Although § 666(c) excludes certain items from being considered under the statute- namely, salary, wages, fees, or other compensation or expenses-the statute does not otherwise define “benefits, ” Federal program, ” or “Federal assistance.” See generally § 666. However, citing the legislative history of § 666, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that “the term ‘Federal program involving a grant, a contract, a subsidy, a loan, a guarantee, insurance, or another form of Federal assistance' should be construed broadly.” United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (citing S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 370 (1984)); see also Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 678 (2000) ( ).
To that end, in similar cases, the Fifth Circuit has found the “benefits in excess of $10, 000 under a Federal program” requirement can be satisfied with testimony about assistance funding received from the federal government. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 727 F.3d 329, 336-37 (5th Cir. 2013). For example, in Marmolejo, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Second Circuit in United States v. Rooney, 986 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993), had “equated ‘benefit' with ‘Federal assistance, '” and accordingly, grants and contracts received by Hidalgo County “[l]ikewise” constituted “Federal assistance” or a “Federal program” under § 666(b). 89 F.3d at 1190-91. Here, where the stipulation expressly provides that the City of Dallas “received in excess of $10, 000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance or other form of Federal assistance” for the relevant years, the Court finds the jurisdictional element met.
Hamilton points to the Supreme Court's opinion in Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000), to argue that simply because the federal government is the source of the funding does not necessarily mean federal assistance constitutes “benefits” for purposes of § 666. Mot. at 16-17 (quoting Fischer, 529 U.S. at 681). Fischer addressed whether a municipal agency that operated hospitals received “benefits” within the meaning of § 666(b) if the source of the funds was a federal program, like Medicare. 529 U.S. at 670-71. However, Fischer concerned the question of whether payments to Medicare providers, as opposed to directly to patients, to reimburse them for the costs of services rendered pursuant to a market transaction fell under § 666(b). In contrast, the stipulation here provides that the funding in question is received directly by the City of Dallas, as opposed to an ancillary provider who provides services to the City. Moreover, the stipulation provides at least the same amount of specificity regarding the relevant federal assistance as the testimony in Brown, which the Fifth Circuit post-Fischer found to be sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction under § 666(b). See 727 F.3d at 336-37 ().
In addition, the stipulation here was accompanied by evidence including the testimony of City of Dallas Housing Department employee Bernadette Mitchell, confirming that the City of Dallas received funding in the form of grants from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development approximating $30 million per year. Trial Tr. Vol. 2-B, at 93 (June 16, 2021). Ms. Mitchell testified that $3 million in these federal funding...
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